Rémunération des dirigeants : l’IRRCi sans concession !

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, le rapport suivant touchant la rrémunération des dirigeants américians méritent d’être lu avec attention : « The Alignment Gap Between Creating Value, Performance Measurement, and Long-Term Incentive Design » (décembre 2014). Ce rapport a été réalisé par Organizational Capital Partners et commandé par l’Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute. Sans faux semblant ce rapport démontre le fossé entre rémunération, retour pour l’actionnaire et performance économique de l’entreprise. « These findings indicate there is a critical need for a fundamental re-examination of measurement and executive compensation so as to incent sustained corporate economic performance. » « This means reducing the overwhelming dependence of large U.S. companies on total shareholder return (TSR) as a dominant performance and incentive compensation metric. TSR is not a direct measure of operating performance. It is a post hoc measure of alignment with short-term stock market price movements. Top management has limited decision authority over too much of what drives TSR, which can be as varied as Federal Reserve policy, the flow of funds into the stock market and specific industry dynamics as varied as commodity prices or changes in regulation. Disrupting the status quo of performance measurement won’t be easy, but the analysis reveals that too many companies are off course«  peut-il être lu dans la nouvelle entourant la publication de ce rapport (ici).

For the vast majority of S&P 1500 companies, there is a major disconnect between corporate operating performance, shareholder value and incentive plans for executives. New research details how an over-reliance on traditional short-term accounting metrics and total shareholder return obscures a line of sight to the underlying drivers of economic performance. As a result, economic performance explains only 12% of variance in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Ce contenu a été mis à jour le 4 juillet 2015 à 8 h 09 min.