The Law and Practice of Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis of China and the U.S.

Une belle comparaison entre les droits étatsuniens et chinois à propos des droits d’inspection des actionnaires dans : R. Huang et R. Thomas, « The Law and Practice of Shareholder Inspection Rights: A Comparative Analysis of China and the U.S. », European Corporate Governance Institute – Law Working Paper No. 499/2020.

Extrait :

Shareholder inspection rights allow a shareholder to access relevant documents and records of their company, so as to address the problem of information asymmetry inherent in the corporate form, and facilitate monitoring of the operation of the company and, if necessary, the bringing of further action for remedies.

In the United States (U.S.), all states have now codified shareholder inspection rights, albeit with some significant differences amongst them. Drawing upon overseas experiences such as the U.S. law, China has introduced the regime of shareholder inspection rights, but with some important adaptions made to its local environment. By providing access to relevant information, inspection rights have the potential to serve as an effective mechanism to deal with different types of agency problems in the company: not only the manager–shareholder conflict that is the most serious agency problem in the U.S., but also the conflict between majority and minority shareholders which mainly plagues the corporate governance system in China.

However, due to institutional differences, variations may exist between the two jurisdictions as to how inspection rights are structured and enforced. In our recent article, we thus compare shareholder inspection rights in China and the U.S. (that is mostly represented by Delaware, the preeminent corporate law jurisdiction in the U.S.), both in terms of the law on the books and the law in practice.

(…) Overall, we find that shareholder inspection rights play an important role in both the Chinese and US legal systems. While Chinese corporate governance and American corporate governance face different sets of agency cost problems, improved shareholder monitoring creates important benefits in both of them. There exist, however, some important differences in the structure and enforcement of the inspection rights regime between the two jurisdictions, which can be largely explained by reference to their different contexts of political economy.

À la prochaine…

Ce contenu a été mis à jour le 11 juin 2020 à 15 h 31 min.

Commentaires

Laisser un commentaire