Nouvelles diverses | Page 16

Le 13 mars 2020, le professeur Claude Francoeur a publié une intéressante tribune dans le quotidien La presse + intitulé : « Place aux femmes et aux jeunes en gouvernance ! ». Malgré l’actualité de ce thème, le statut quo domine malheureusement dans les pratiques des entreprises canadiennes.

Résumé :

Les boys clubs – en particulier, ceux qui sont systématiquement entretenus dans les conseils d’administration (C.A.) de nos plus grandes entreprises – ont récemment fait l’objet de vives critiques. On leur demande de briser ces cercles fermés en faisant entre autres davantage place aux femmes. Malgré ces revendications, les C.A. des entreprises canadiennes demeurent très homogènes, la grande majorité des administrateurs étant encore et toujours des hommes !

À la prochaine…

Bel article proposé par la professeure Tsuk Mitchell, Dalia : « From Dodge to eBay: The Elusive Corporate Purpose » (Virginia Law & Business Review, 2019, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 155-211) ! Cet article revient sur la fameuse mission des entreprises en confrontant les visions économiques et socio-politiques qui expliquent une lecture différentes de son contenu.

Résumé :

This article examines the history of the law of corporate purpose. I argue that the seemingly conflicting visions of corporate social responsibility and shareholder wealth maximization, which characterize contemporary debates about the subject, are grounded in two different paradigms for corporate law — a socio-political paradigm and an economic-financial one. Advocates of the socio-political paradigm have historically focused on the power that corporations could exercise in society, while those embracing the economic-financial paradigm expressed concerns about the power that the control group could exercise over the corporation’s shareholders. Over the course of the twentieth century, scholars have debated the merits of each of these paradigms and the concerns associated with them, while judges drew upon the academic and, more importantly, the managerial sentiments and concerns of the era to attach a purpose to corporate law’s doctrine, that is, the ultra vires doctrine in the early twentieth century, the enabling business judgment rule by mid-century, and the laws applicable to evaluating managerial responses to hostile takeovers at the century’s end. Ultimately, the cases seemingly addressing corporate purpose did not endorse wealth maximization or social responsibility as objectives. Rather, they empowered corporate managers to set corporate goals without interference from shareholders or the courts.

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Les fonds d’investissement apportent-ils réellement leur soutien aux critères lorsqu’ils exercent leur vote ? Voilà une belle à laquelle un auteur apporte malheureusement une réponse négative : Caleb Griffin, Environmental & Social Voting at Index Funds (February 14, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=. On est donc encore loin des voeux affichés par les gros joueurs de l’industrie semble-t-il…

Résumé :

This Article demonstrates that, despite a considerable marketing focus on their E&S efforts, overall support for E&S proposals is low for the Big Three.

In the 2018-2019 proxy season, Vanguard’s largest funds supported 7.5% of unique shareholder E&S proposals, while State Street’s largest funds supported 22.7% of such proposals and BlackRock’s largest funds supported 7.1% of such proposals. Other funds support E&S proposals at far higher rates (e.g., Deutsche Bank at 77.9%) and far lower rates (e.g., Dimensional at 0%). Given that funds have a fiduciary duty to vote in the “best interests” of their investors, which fund got it right? The surprising answer is that no one knows—not even the funds themselves. Only by blind luck could these funds, who seek no input from their investors and make no serious attempts to discern investor preferences, be accurately reflecting investors’ interests with their voting behaviors. What are the odds that all, or even the majority, of Vanguard’s investors would benefit from just 7.5% of shareholder E&S proposals while State Street’s shareholders would benefit from 22.7% and Deutsche’s shareholders would benefit from 77.9%? What is the likelihood that BlackRock’s SRI investors would be satisfied with support for 27.7% of E&S proposals while Vanguard’s SRI investors were satisfied with support for 2.2% of such proposals? Is it probable that Guggenheim’s investors are well-served by 77.9% of SRI activities while Dimensional’s investors were well-served by exactly 0% of them?

Ultimately, this Article concludes that it is a convenient myth that index fund stewardship teams are even marginally constrained by the “best interests” standard when voting on E&S proposals, and likely other proposals as well. The truth is that these index funds, possessing the power to decide the fate of most E&S proposals, can do as they wish with that power. The status quo urgently needs change to ensure that index funds are truly acting in investors’ best interests. This Article proposes that such constraint should come in the form of greater input from index fund investors.

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Beau papier proposé par les professeurs Macey et Strine Jr intitulé « Citizens United As Bad Corporate Law » (16 août 2018, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 18-28; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 598). Cet article vient discuter utilement de qu.est une société par actions et ses caractéristiques fondamentales.

Résumé

In this Article we show that Citizens United v. FEC, arguably the most important First Amendment case of the new millennium, is predicated on a fundamental misconception about the nature of the corporation. Specifically, Citizens United v. FEC, which prohibited the government from restricting independent expenditures for corporate communications, and held that corporations enjoy the same free speech rights to engage in political spending as human citizens, is grounded on the erroneous theory that corporations are “associations of citizens” rather than what they actually are: independent legal entities distinct from those who own their stock. Our contribution to the literature on Citizens United is that the case is as much a case about corporate law, as it is about the First Amendment. The major disagreement among the justices in Citizens United is about the applicability of settled First Amendment protections to a particular juridical entity, the corporation. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority opines that Congress may not take into account the distinctions between corporations and human beings in regulating political speech, and that corporations must be permitted the same freedom to speak as human beings. In dissent, Justice Stevens fails directly to challenge Justice Kennedy’s existential conception of the corporation notwithstanding the fact that that it constitutes the core of the majority opinion. This Article fills that void. We reject the Citizens United majority’s conception of the corporation as an “associations of citizens” and reaffirm its status as an artificial, metaphysical, and legal construct that exists separate and apart from its investors. The Citizens United view of the corporation as an association of individuals is inconsistent with the established conception of the corporation as a juridical entity with limited liability.

This conception confuses the corporation with the general partnership form of business organization. In fact, the entire point of the incorporation process is to permit the creation of a legal entity that is not an association of individuals, but rather a discrete legal entity whose rights and obligations are distinct from those of it its creators, investors, managers, and other constituents. We base our argument that corporations are separate and distinct legal entities and that they are not “associations of citizens” as Citizens United asserts on three facts about the corporate form:

(1) the treatment of corporations as separate legal entities is what distinguishes corporations from general partnerships and sole proprietorships and what justifies the legal notion of “limited liability” and other central characteristics of the corporate form, such as the ability to contract and to sue and be sued;

(2) corporations do not have owners, they have investors who have contract-based, financial interests in the firms and limited management rights; and

(3) corporations are not fiction, but fact only because the law makes them real and distinct entities with a legal identity.

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