Publications

Le 31 janvier 2017, le Investor Stewardship Group (réunissant plus de 16 investisseur), a publié un premier projet de code de gouvernance d’entreprise et de code de gérance des investisseurs. Concernant le Stewardship Code, les principes sont les suivants :

Principle A: Institutional investors are accountable to those whose money they invest.

Principle B: Institutional investors should demonstrate how they evaluate corporate governance factors with respect to the companies in which they invest.

Principle C: Institutional investors should disclose, in general terms, how they manage potential conflicts of interest that may arise in their proxy voting and engagement activities.

Principle D: Institutional investors are responsible for proxy voting decisions and should monitor the relevant activities and policies of third parties that advise them on those decisions.

Principle E: Institutional investors should address and attempt to resolve differences with companies in a constructive and pragmatic manner.

Principle F: Institutional investors should work together, where appropriate, to encourage the adoption and implementation of the Corporate Governance andStewardship principles.

Pour accéder à ces principes : cliquez ici.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Mon collègue Jacques Grisé publie sur son blog un billet très intéressant tiré du Harvard Law School Forum (Corporate Governance by the Numbers de Ann Yerger, EY Center for Board Matters) : « La gouvernance en chiffre ».

Ce billet présente les principales données sur la gouvernance des sociétés américaines en les présentant sous forme chiffrée. L’auteur a compilé les données de plus de 3 000 sociétés publiques aux États-Unis, en les présentant selon les 5 indices les plus importants : S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, S&P SmallCap 600, S&P 1500 et Russell 3000.

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Ivan Tchotourian

L’“Associated Press/Equilar S&P 500 CEO Pay Study 2016” vient d’être publié. Since 2011, Equilar has worked together with the Associated Press on various executive compensation studies. This latest version of an ongoing annual study identifies total compensation for 341 CEOs who served in that role at an S&P 500 company for at least two years as of fiscal year-end.

Voici les éléments essentiels :

• Median total compensation* for S&P 500 CEOs in this year’s study totaled $10.8 million. For those executives, the median pay increase was 4.5% from the year prior.
• Of the 341 executives in the study, just 17 were female. However, those female executives earned a median $18.0 million, compared to $10.5 million at the median for the 324 male executives.
• Healthcare companies in the S&P 500 saw the highest pay packages at the median, reaching $14.5 million. Utilities CEOs earned a median $9.3 million, the lowest of the industry sectors in the study.
• CEOs based in New Jersey earned more at the median—$20.7 million—than executives in any other state. New York had the second-highest median CEO pay at $14.5 million. While the number of S&P 500 CEOs varies widely, New Jersey also boasted the sixth-highest number of S&P 500 executives with 14, trailing New York (39), California (36), Texas (36), Illinois (22) and Massachusetts (17).

Vous trouverez une synthèse publiée au Chicago Tribune sous le titre “CEO pay climbs again, even as their stock prices don’t”.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, 6 agences fédérales américaines (dont la SEC) ont publié pour commentaire (jusqu’au 22 juillet 2016) leur proposition de mise en place de l’article 956 du Dodd-Frank Act visant à interdire les rémunérations incitatives qui encourageraient une prise de risque inconsidéré des institutions financières. Ce document est intitulé : « Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements ».

The OCC, Board, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA, and SEC (the Agencies) are seeking comment on a joint proposed rule (the proposed rule) to revise the proposed rule the Agencies published in the Federal Register on April 14, 2011, and to implement section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Section 956 generally requires that the Agencies jointly issue regulations or guidelines: (1) prohibiting incentive-based payment arrangements that the Agencies determine encourage inappropriate risks by certain financial institutions by providing excessive compensation or that could lead to material financial loss; and (2) requiring those financial institutions to disclose information concerning incentive-based compensation arrangements to the appropriate Federal regulator.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Rapport sur la gouvernance des sociétés fermées par le NACD (pour une synthèse, cliquez ici) !

The National Association of Corporate Directors recently released its 2015-2016 NACD Private Company Governance Survey. In an article in the March 2016 edition of “Private Company Director” – a monthly publication sponsored by NACD – senior research analyst, Ted Sikora, highlighted a few of the results. Some of the more interesting take-aways were those that distinguished family owned business from other privately held companies. For example:

• Approximately three-quarters of all family owned business lack any kind of formal CEO/leadership succession plan. At the same time, respondents to the survey from family owned businesses identified leadership and management training as some of the most important and time consuming parts of their job (more so than other privately held companies). This interesting juxtaposition might arise from the fact that many family owned businesses (although certainly not all) already have a presumptive leadership heir. As such, there does not appear to be any need for a formal process for identifying a new CEO. Because the next generation of leadership is frequently already with the business, however, there is a constant reminder of the training they need
• Barely half of family owned businesses have any kind of board evaluation mechanism. Again, it is not difficult to imagine the relationship dynamics in a family business that would lead to this result. If everyone on the board of directors is in the family, a formal review process would seem particularly awkward.
• A majority of family owned businesses have no limitations or restrictions on time spent in management or on the board. Many privately held companies will have term limits, age limits and other restrictions, but these appear notably less used in family owned businesses.
• Respondents from family owned businesses strongly identified the need for outside, industry expertise on their boards. Yet family owned businesses are the most likely to have boards lacking in outsiders, industry experts and others identified as adding value.
• Consistent with nearly every other survey in this area, family owned businesses demonstrated a longer vision and a greater priority of long-term planning, as compared with their non-family owned counterparts.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian