The company’s actions under Arts 6-8 are subject to supervision by authorities (to be established in each Member State, not a Union level), which are to have a wide range of enforcement powers, including the imposition of financial penalties linked to turnover. In addition, those harmed by adverse impacts are to be given a right to sue companies in the courts of the Member States (for damages among other remedies), though it is unclear from Art 22 how far the Member State needs to modify its domestic liability system when transposing that Article.
One way to think about what the above might mean for companies is to ‘stress test’ the provisions in the context of the most distressing, widespread and difficult-to-fix human rights cases which recent litigation around the world has revealed. These are cases where the host state of a multinational’s operations is complicit in the abuses.
In my view, litigation and straight-down-the-line supervisory action are unlikely to bring about a satisfactory forward-looking resolution to these deep-seated problems. If exit is to be a true last resort for companies covered by the proposal, what is needed is an inducement for companies to exercise voice rather than exit. And that voice is likely to have to be, not that of the company alone, but part of a cooperation among the company, the host state, local communities and overseas development agencies. A company playing its part in the cooperation should be granted protection against both litigation and supervisory action. Look as hard as one likes, however, no such safe harbour provisions are to be found in the Commission’s proposal. In fact, Art 18(4) specifically rules out protection against supervisory sanctions and private litigation when the company engages in remedial action after being found in breach. In short, the proposal is a standard, backward-looking set of provisions for imposing liability on companies, not a blue-print for cooperative efforts to end abuses in the future. In the most difficult cases where it is most desirable to alter behaviour, exit is what the Commission’s proposal is likely to induce, with uncertain or no benefits for the victims of the abuses.
Le budget fédéral 2022 vient d’être publié. Deux propositions méritent d’être signalées tant elles touchent directement les problématiques abordés dans le blogue (pour en savoir plus : ici) :
Divulgations sur le climat pour les institutions sous réglementation fédérale
Le gouvernement fédéral s’est engagé à se tourner vers la divulgation obligatoire des risques financiers relatifs aux changements climatiques pour un large spectre de l’économie canadienne selon le cadre international du Groupe de travail sur l’information financière relative aux changements climatiques (GIFCC).
Le Bureau du surintendant des institutions financières (BSIF) consultera les institutions financières sous réglementation fédérale sur les lignes directrices en matière de divulgations sur le climat en 2022, et exigera que les institutions financières publient des divulgations sur le climat, conformément au cadre du GIFCC, au moyen d’une approche progressive à compter de 2024.
Le BSIF s’attendra également à ce que les institutions financières recueillent et évaluent des renseignements sur les risques relatifs aux changements climatiques et les émissions auprès de leurs clients.
Comme les banques et les assureurs sous réglementation fédérale jouent un rôle de premier plan dans le façonnement de l’économie canadienne, les directives du BSIF auront une incidence importante sur la façon dont les entreprises canadiennes gèrent les risques et les expositions liés aux changements climatiques et en font rapport.
Séparément, le gouvernement ira de l’avant avec les exigences de divulgation des considérations environnementales, sociales et de gouvernance (ESG), y compris les risques relatifs aux changements climatiques, pour les régimes de pension sous réglementation fédérale.
Appuyer le bureau de Montréal du Conseil des normes internationales d’information sur la durabilité
Le gouvernement fédéral a accueilli le choix de la International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), qui a sélectionné Montréal pour héberger l’un des deux bureaux centraux du nouveau Conseil des normes internationales d’information sur la durabilité (ISSB). L’ISSB élaborera des normes de durabilité mondiales pour accroître la qualité et la comparabilité des rapports d’entreprise internationaux sur les facteurs environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance (ESG). Le gouvernement s’est engagé à appuyer le démarrage du bureau de Montréal et à positionner le Canada comme un chef de file de la production de rapports sur la durabilité.
Le budget de 2022 propose de fournir 8 millions de dollars sur trois ans, à compter de 2022-2023, à Développement économique Canada pour les régions du Québec en vue d’appuyer le démarrage du bureau de Montréal de l’ISSB. Cet investissement s’ajoute à l’important financement de l’industrie et du secteur public partout au Canada qui a aidé à amener l’ISSB au Canada.
Le 29 mars 2022, le projet de loi C-264 Loi modifiant la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité et la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (régimes de pension et régimes d’assurance collective) a été déposé à la Chambre des communes par la députée Marilène Gill. Ce projet s’attaque de nouveau à la question de la protection des participants à un régime de retraite.
Rappelons une chose : en l’état actuel, aucune de ces deux lois n’accorde de statut prioritaire aux « paiements spéciaux » requis pour maintenir un régime de retraite en bonne situation financière ou pour honorer les promesses du régime déficitaire en cas de terminaison.
Espérons que ce projet de loi aura plus de succès que les projets C-384 et C-372 déposés en 2017, C-405 et S-253 déposés en 2018 ou encore plus récemment, C-253 déposé en 2020. Pour le gouvernement fédéral et les citoyens canadiens, est-il tolérable que le Canada protège encore si peu les droits de ses retraités en contexte de faillite ou d’insolvabilité ?
Je vous invite à regarder cette capsule-vidéo de Mme Charlotte Michon sur le devoir de vigilance. Elle revient sur le projet de directive sur le devoir de vigilance de la Commission européenne et le rapport de la mission d’information parlementaire d’évaluation de la loi française, tous deux publiés le 23 février 2022.
Droit & croissance propose une vidéo qui revient sur les critères ESG.
Résumé
Cette conférence, animée par Youcef Rahmani, Membre de Droit & Croissance et doctorant à l’Université d’Oxford, visait à étudier l’impact de la finance durable sur le système financier, et en particulier sur le prix des actifs.
Traditionnellement, le système financier cherche à faciliter la distribution efficiente de capitaux vers des projets créateurs de richesses. Or les coûts environnementaux et sociaux, qui sont des externalités de ce système, ne sont pas automatiquement incorporés dans les prix des actifs. La finance durable se positionne comme une solution « par le marché » cherchant à internaliser ces externalités. Les acteurs des marchés financiers mettent volontairement en place des procédés d’investissement incorporant des critères environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance (ESG). De fait, cette pratique tend à devenir une « norme » sur les marchés, qui encourage la distribution de capitaux vers des projets durables. Les projets exclus des critères ESG deviennent plus coûteux, et donc moins attractifs.
Mais l’adoption des critères ESG par le système financier est aussi remise en cause. D’un point de vue macro-économique d’abord, l’exercice de fortes pressions sur des secteurs qui ne sont traditionnellement pas en conformité avec les critères ESG (oil & gas, transports, agriculture, etc.) pour désinvestir de leurs activités représente une menace pour la stabilité du système financier, objectif auquel l’Union européenne accorde une grande importance. D’un point de vue micro-économique, ces pressions pourraient encourager le « greenwashing », le « regulatory arbitrage » et ainsi la formation de bulles spéculatives « vertes » destructrices de valeur, en contradiction avec l’objectif d’efficience des marchés.
Au-delà des information contenues dans cet avis sur la prise en compte des critères ESG dans le domaine des fonds d’investissement, les ACVM fournissent de précieuses indications :
Pour donner suite aux constatations des examens de l’information continue axés sur les facteurs ESG, à ses observations sur les changements aux fonds existants en lien avec ces facteurs ainsi qu’aux recommandations de l’OICV, le personnel a décidé de fournir des indications sur l’application des obligations prévues par la réglementation en valeurs mobilières aux fonds d’investissement en ce qui a trait aux facteurs ESG, surtout aux fonds relatifs aux ESG, au regard des aspects suivants : i) les objectifs de placement et les noms des fonds; ii) les types de fonds; iii) l’information sur les stratégies de placement; iv) les politiques et procédures en matière de vote par procuration et d’engagement actionnarial; v) l’information sur les risques; vi) la convenance des placements; vii) l’information continue; viii) les communications publicitaires; ix) les changements aux fonds existants en lien avec les facteurs ESG; et x) la terminologie relative aux facteurs ESG.
Taking sustainability seriously: sustainable value creation within planetary boundaries
The question of how to secure the contribution of our businesses to the fundamental transformation to sustainability is not one that should be responded to in the ideological and emotional way as we have seen in some of the responses when the Sustainable Corporate Governance initiative was launched. Now that the Directive proposal is out, we encourage all who wish to participate in the discussion to lay aside any ideological ‘shareholder vs stakeholders’ viewpoints. That is not what is at stake. While the IPCC report on climate change of 2021 has been referred to as ‘code red for humanity’, planetary boundaries research shows that reality is even more grim – we have a whole set of code reds for humanity and they are increasing in number (as the latest planetary boundaries research shows), and the status for the European Union is not good. Working towards sustainability also entails questions of social justice – just as we cannot silo environmental issues into various categories to be dealt with separately, we cannot separate environmental and social issues. These are all interconnected elements. All of these issues must be dealt with simultaneously. The sustainability challenges of our time are complex and interconnected and attempting to silo sustainability work into dealing piecemeal with isolated elements will not work.
While there seems generally to be an increasing consensus among governments and businesses on the need to integrate sustainability into the governance of our globalized businesses, the attempts to do this so far seem to have been based on three principles: a) as few clear and enforceable rules as possible, b) support voluntary measures although they haven’t worked so far, and c) if we must regulate, be sure to leave company law out of the picture.
However, to get real about integrating sustainability, we need to go to company law, which is the regulatory infrastructure for decision-making in business. As all company law scholars who have analysed the sources know, company law gives a broad discretion to corporate boards and by extension senior management in their corporate governance. There is, in other words, space within the current company law and corporate governance systems to steer businesses in more sustainable directions. This has been used by some as an argument for the sanctity of company law – no need for change, move on, nothing to see here! The problem is that this discretionary space is taken up by the social norm of shareholder primacy. We therefore suggest, on the basis of over a decade of multijurisdictional comparative analyses of the drivers for and the barriers to sustainable business, that company law must take back that space and clarify why we have companies (corporate purpose) and give a principle-based instruction to boards on how to do their jobs in this era that is defined by the extreme unsustainabilities resulting from business as usual.
Sustainable value creation is already an emerging concept in corporate governance all over the world. What needs to be done is to position sustainable value creation within the ecological limits of our planet. We therefore propose both ‘sustainable value’ and ‘planetary boundaries’ as general clauses in company law, the content of which gradually can be firmed up as practice develops. This doesn’t mean we don’t think there should be any guidance in the law – quite the opposite, as we see the need to ensure that business does not take these two concepts and turn them into opportunities for greenwashing, bluewashing or ‘sustainability washing’. Integrating these concepts into the duties of the board is therefore also paramount, outlining this in a way that provides legal certainty.
Avoiding the shareholder vs stakeholder trap does not mean that we do not in our proposal encompass a wide variety of interests affected by the company’s business. However, while involving affected communities, trade unions, and civil society is crucial, a mere canvassing of ‘stakeholder interests’ and giving priority to the ones that make themselves heard the most is insufficient, misleading and potentially destructive for the overarching purpose of sustainable value creation. The backdrop must always be the interconnected complexities and the vulnerability of the often-unrepresented groups (whether invisible workers deep in the global value chains, Indigenous communities, or future generations), and the aim of a sustainable future within planetary boundaries.
Under pressure: the proposed Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive
The European Commission’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive proposal, presented on 23 February 2022, aims to put into place mandatory and harmonised sustainability due diligence rules in the European Economic Area, in recognition of the insufficiency of voluntary action by business and the regulatory chaos that business faces in its cross-border activities.
The proposed Directive is appropriately named ‘Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence’, resonating in title with the proposed Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive. It is positive that the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive proposal clarifies which environmental and human rights issues are intended to be included. However, a broader approach is needed, drawing on a research-based concept of sustainable value creation within planetary boundaries.
The proposal builds on a due diligence duty for the members of the board and the chief executive officer of the company. It reflects the international human rights and environmental international law obligations and concretises the steps of the due diligence process. There is, however, a danger of box ticking instead of principle-based evaluations of risks of unsustainability.
There are proposals for both public and private enforcement, including civil liability for the board members and the chief executive officer, which makes this proposal different from much of what we have otherwise seen in the corporate sustainability area. The scope of the proposal is however extremely narrow, excluding in its direct application all small and medium-sized enterprises, and covering only some 13,000 EU companies and some 4,000 third-country companies.
The proposal takes an important core company law step, which we have advocated in our work, namely to clarify that the duty of the board (strangely formulated as a duty, in Anglo-Saxon speak, for all ‘directors’) is to promote the interests of the company. Wisely, there is no attempt to harmonize this (and especially not by including some kind of stakeholder language), rather leaving the content of the interests of the company to the variety of company law regimes in Europe. What is missing, however, is further situating this duty within an overarching purpose of sustainable value creation within planetary boundaries, which would have given a clearer sustainability-oriented framing for the whole proposal.
The proposal does employ misleading stakeholder language in the consultation duties as part of due diligence, where it would have been better to specify that the consultation should take place with affected communities, groups and people.
The proposed Directive is clearly a product of the tension resulting from, on the one hand, the social norm of shareholder primacy and the drive to keep company law untouched by sustainability issues, and on the other hand, the willingness to make necessary changes to mitigate the extreme unsustainabilities of business as usual. We see this in the way core company law issues are relegated to the end of the proposal. It would have been much more logical to set out clearly in the beginning of the proposed Directive the core duties of the boards to ensure that sustainability due diligence is used as a key tool for integrating sustainability into the entire business of the company.
The Directive proposal needs to be strengthened on a number of points, and it is now to be discussed further by the European Parliament and the Council, before it can be adopted with possible revisions. We strongly recommend that subsequent work with the Directive proposal be based on a research-based concept of sustainability and take company law and corporate governance seriously, rather than allowing the misleading shareholder vs stakeholder dichotomy to set the parameters for continued siloing of core company law as the regulatory infrastructure for corporate decision-making.
