Le 29 mars 2022, le projet de loi C-264 Loi modifiant la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité et la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (régimes de pension et régimes d’assurance collective) a été déposé à la Chambre des communes par la députée Marilène Gill. Ce projet s’attaque de nouveau à la question de la protection des participants à un régime de retraite.
Rappelons une chose : en l’état actuel, aucune de ces deux lois n’accorde de statut prioritaire aux « paiements spéciaux » requis pour maintenir un régime de retraite en bonne situation financière ou pour honorer les promesses du régime déficitaire en cas de terminaison.
Espérons que ce projet de loi aura plus de succès que les projets C-384 et C-372 déposés en 2017, C-405 et S-253 déposés en 2018 ou encore plus récemment, C-253 déposé en 2020. Pour le gouvernement fédéral et les citoyens canadiens, est-il tolérable que le Canada protège encore si peu les droits de ses retraités en contexte de faillite ou d’insolvabilité ?
L’Autorité européenne des marchés financiers (AEMF ou ESMA) viennent de publier un rapport soulignant la meilleure performance des fonds ESG.
Extrait
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the EU securities regulator, today publishes its fourth annual statistical report on the cost and performance of European Union (EU) retail investment products. A new finding this year is that UCITS with an environmental, social and governance (ESG) strategy (including equity, bond and mixed funds) outperformed their non-ESG peers, and were also overall cheaper.
Gross performance: Gross performance in 2020 was low or negative and highly volatile due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Investing long-term significantly reduces the risks related to sudden and large changes in the valuation of financial products;
Costs: Costs remained a critical component when evaluating the ultimate benefits of an investment, they reduced only marginally over time. Total costs were higher for retail investors than for institutional investors, on average. Costs for cross-border funds were higher than those for domestic funds;
ESG UCITS: ESG equity, bond and mixed funds were overall cheaper than non-ESG peers, while their performance reflected the strong performance of specific sectors since the COVID-19 crisis. Within the ESG fund category, impact funds performed better than other ESG strategies and funds with sustainable investment as objective performed better in net terms, after having included costs, than those promoting environmental or social characteristics despite slightly higher costs;
Structural market features: 15% of the managers of UCITS in our sample managed 90% of assets. Cross-border funds were, on average, larger than funds sold only in their home market and on average 60% of funds included in the sample were effectively sold cross-border. Heterogeneity across Member States persists;
Performance and costs by management type: Costs were significantly higher for active UCITS than for passive funds and ETFs. ETF UCITS performance was in line with that of other passive UCITS investing in similar assets;
Retail AIFs: In 2020, retail investors accounted for only 13% of the total Net Asset Value (NAV) in the EU AIF market. As for UCITS, the annualised monthly gross and net performance across the main retail AIFs fund types, significantly decreased compared with 2019. A full costs analysis could not be carried out due to the unavailability of data on cost composition; and
Structured Retail Products: Total costs were largely attributable to entry costs and varied substantially by country and by pay-off type, but they did not depend on issuance size or underlying type.
Je vous invite à regarder cette capsule-vidéo de Mme Charlotte Michon sur le devoir de vigilance. Elle revient sur le projet de directive sur le devoir de vigilance de la Commission européenne et le rapport de la mission d’information parlementaire d’évaluation de la loi française, tous deux publiés le 23 février 2022.
Droit & croissance propose une vidéo qui revient sur les critères ESG.
Résumé
Cette conférence, animée par Youcef Rahmani, Membre de Droit & Croissance et doctorant à l’Université d’Oxford, visait à étudier l’impact de la finance durable sur le système financier, et en particulier sur le prix des actifs.
Traditionnellement, le système financier cherche à faciliter la distribution efficiente de capitaux vers des projets créateurs de richesses. Or les coûts environnementaux et sociaux, qui sont des externalités de ce système, ne sont pas automatiquement incorporés dans les prix des actifs. La finance durable se positionne comme une solution « par le marché » cherchant à internaliser ces externalités. Les acteurs des marchés financiers mettent volontairement en place des procédés d’investissement incorporant des critères environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance (ESG). De fait, cette pratique tend à devenir une « norme » sur les marchés, qui encourage la distribution de capitaux vers des projets durables. Les projets exclus des critères ESG deviennent plus coûteux, et donc moins attractifs.
Mais l’adoption des critères ESG par le système financier est aussi remise en cause. D’un point de vue macro-économique d’abord, l’exercice de fortes pressions sur des secteurs qui ne sont traditionnellement pas en conformité avec les critères ESG (oil & gas, transports, agriculture, etc.) pour désinvestir de leurs activités représente une menace pour la stabilité du système financier, objectif auquel l’Union européenne accorde une grande importance. D’un point de vue micro-économique, ces pressions pourraient encourager le « greenwashing », le « regulatory arbitrage » et ainsi la formation de bulles spéculatives « vertes » destructrices de valeur, en contradiction avec l’objectif d’efficience des marchés.
Intéressant de signaler que si certains se posent la question, la réponse est toute trouvée. Le capital-investisseur s’intéresse-t-il aux critères ESG ? Oui pour Option droit des affaires : « Non-coté rime de plus en plus avec ESG » (Charles Ansabère, 5 janvier 2022).
Extrait
En France, les capital-investisseurs semblent passer à la vitesse supérieure en matière d’ESG (environnement, social, gouvernance). En toile de fond : la volonté d’accompagner leurs participations sur ces problématiques, de plus en plus identifiées comme créatrices de valeur. Mais encore faut-il en mesurer correctement les effets…
Au-delà des information contenues dans cet avis sur la prise en compte des critères ESG dans le domaine des fonds d’investissement, les ACVM fournissent de précieuses indications :
Pour donner suite aux constatations des examens de l’information continue axés sur les facteurs ESG, à ses observations sur les changements aux fonds existants en lien avec ces facteurs ainsi qu’aux recommandations de l’OICV, le personnel a décidé de fournir des indications sur l’application des obligations prévues par la réglementation en valeurs mobilières aux fonds d’investissement en ce qui a trait aux facteurs ESG, surtout aux fonds relatifs aux ESG, au regard des aspects suivants : i) les objectifs de placement et les noms des fonds; ii) les types de fonds; iii) l’information sur les stratégies de placement; iv) les politiques et procédures en matière de vote par procuration et d’engagement actionnarial; v) l’information sur les risques; vi) la convenance des placements; vii) l’information continue; viii) les communications publicitaires; ix) les changements aux fonds existants en lien avec les facteurs ESG; et x) la terminologie relative aux facteurs ESG.
Taking sustainability seriously: sustainable value creation within planetary boundaries
The question of how to secure the contribution of our businesses to the fundamental transformation to sustainability is not one that should be responded to in the ideological and emotional way as we have seen in some of the responses when the Sustainable Corporate Governance initiative was launched. Now that the Directive proposal is out, we encourage all who wish to participate in the discussion to lay aside any ideological ‘shareholder vs stakeholders’ viewpoints. That is not what is at stake. While the IPCC report on climate change of 2021 has been referred to as ‘code red for humanity’, planetary boundaries research shows that reality is even more grim – we have a whole set of code reds for humanity and they are increasing in number (as the latest planetary boundaries research shows), and the status for the European Union is not good. Working towards sustainability also entails questions of social justice – just as we cannot silo environmental issues into various categories to be dealt with separately, we cannot separate environmental and social issues. These are all interconnected elements. All of these issues must be dealt with simultaneously. The sustainability challenges of our time are complex and interconnected and attempting to silo sustainability work into dealing piecemeal with isolated elements will not work.
While there seems generally to be an increasing consensus among governments and businesses on the need to integrate sustainability into the governance of our globalized businesses, the attempts to do this so far seem to have been based on three principles: a) as few clear and enforceable rules as possible, b) support voluntary measures although they haven’t worked so far, and c) if we must regulate, be sure to leave company law out of the picture.
However, to get real about integrating sustainability, we need to go to company law, which is the regulatory infrastructure for decision-making in business. As all company law scholars who have analysed the sources know, company law gives a broad discretion to corporate boards and by extension senior management in their corporate governance. There is, in other words, space within the current company law and corporate governance systems to steer businesses in more sustainable directions. This has been used by some as an argument for the sanctity of company law – no need for change, move on, nothing to see here! The problem is that this discretionary space is taken up by the social norm of shareholder primacy. We therefore suggest, on the basis of over a decade of multijurisdictional comparative analyses of the drivers for and the barriers to sustainable business, that company law must take back that space and clarify why we have companies (corporate purpose) and give a principle-based instruction to boards on how to do their jobs in this era that is defined by the extreme unsustainabilities resulting from business as usual.
Sustainable value creation is already an emerging concept in corporate governance all over the world. What needs to be done is to position sustainable value creation within the ecological limits of our planet. We therefore propose both ‘sustainable value’ and ‘planetary boundaries’ as general clauses in company law, the content of which gradually can be firmed up as practice develops. This doesn’t mean we don’t think there should be any guidance in the law – quite the opposite, as we see the need to ensure that business does not take these two concepts and turn them into opportunities for greenwashing, bluewashing or ‘sustainability washing’. Integrating these concepts into the duties of the board is therefore also paramount, outlining this in a way that provides legal certainty.
Avoiding the shareholder vs stakeholder trap does not mean that we do not in our proposal encompass a wide variety of interests affected by the company’s business. However, while involving affected communities, trade unions, and civil society is crucial, a mere canvassing of ‘stakeholder interests’ and giving priority to the ones that make themselves heard the most is insufficient, misleading and potentially destructive for the overarching purpose of sustainable value creation. The backdrop must always be the interconnected complexities and the vulnerability of the often-unrepresented groups (whether invisible workers deep in the global value chains, Indigenous communities, or future generations), and the aim of a sustainable future within planetary boundaries.
Under pressure: the proposed Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive
The European Commission’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive proposal, presented on 23 February 2022, aims to put into place mandatory and harmonised sustainability due diligence rules in the European Economic Area, in recognition of the insufficiency of voluntary action by business and the regulatory chaos that business faces in its cross-border activities.
The proposed Directive is appropriately named ‘Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence’, resonating in title with the proposed Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive. It is positive that the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive proposal clarifies which environmental and human rights issues are intended to be included. However, a broader approach is needed, drawing on a research-based concept of sustainable value creation within planetary boundaries.
The proposal builds on a due diligence duty for the members of the board and the chief executive officer of the company. It reflects the international human rights and environmental international law obligations and concretises the steps of the due diligence process. There is, however, a danger of box ticking instead of principle-based evaluations of risks of unsustainability.
There are proposals for both public and private enforcement, including civil liability for the board members and the chief executive officer, which makes this proposal different from much of what we have otherwise seen in the corporate sustainability area. The scope of the proposal is however extremely narrow, excluding in its direct application all small and medium-sized enterprises, and covering only some 13,000 EU companies and some 4,000 third-country companies.
The proposal takes an important core company law step, which we have advocated in our work, namely to clarify that the duty of the board (strangely formulated as a duty, in Anglo-Saxon speak, for all ‘directors’) is to promote the interests of the company. Wisely, there is no attempt to harmonize this (and especially not by including some kind of stakeholder language), rather leaving the content of the interests of the company to the variety of company law regimes in Europe. What is missing, however, is further situating this duty within an overarching purpose of sustainable value creation within planetary boundaries, which would have given a clearer sustainability-oriented framing for the whole proposal.
The proposal does employ misleading stakeholder language in the consultation duties as part of due diligence, where it would have been better to specify that the consultation should take place with affected communities, groups and people.
The proposed Directive is clearly a product of the tension resulting from, on the one hand, the social norm of shareholder primacy and the drive to keep company law untouched by sustainability issues, and on the other hand, the willingness to make necessary changes to mitigate the extreme unsustainabilities of business as usual. We see this in the way core company law issues are relegated to the end of the proposal. It would have been much more logical to set out clearly in the beginning of the proposed Directive the core duties of the boards to ensure that sustainability due diligence is used as a key tool for integrating sustainability into the entire business of the company.
The Directive proposal needs to be strengthened on a number of points, and it is now to be discussed further by the European Parliament and the Council, before it can be adopted with possible revisions. We strongly recommend that subsequent work with the Directive proposal be based on a research-based concept of sustainability and take company law and corporate governance seriously, rather than allowing the misleading shareholder vs stakeholder dichotomy to set the parameters for continued siloing of core company law as the regulatory infrastructure for corporate decision-making.
