Responsabilité sociale des entreprises | Page 58

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, j’ai eu le plaisir d’être interviewé par l’animateur de RDI Économie (M. Gérald Fillion) pour parler avec lui de la responsabilité sociale de la fonderie Horne.

Vous pouvez consulter mon analyse dans la partie Opinions et commentaires du site et au lien suivant : Gérald Fillion, « Arsenic dans l’air: la Fonderie Horne continuera de dépasser les normes provinciales » (RDI Radio Canada, 14 mai 2019).

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Le 7 mars 2019, ecoDa a pris position sur le devoir de loyauté des administrateurs : « ecoDa’s position paper on Directors Duties »

Extrait :

ecoDa supports the fundamental concept of Corporate purpose. However the European Commission should propose policy principles and refrains from trying to standardize directors’ duties among Member States and sectors. ecoDa believes that soft law through Corporate Governance codes is more suitable to adapt to an evolving context.

Acknowledging that shareholders define the company’s purpose does not mean neither that the interests of other stakeholders should not be taken into account by the directors when fulfilling their duties towards the company. On the contrary, there is no doubt that boards are taking such interests into account to an extent deemed consistent with the company’s purpose. Basically, there is a sound business case for more social and environmental involvement. Understanding consumers’ expectations and employees’ aspiration is becoming a prerequisite to become more innovative, to attract the right talents and to ensure sustainability in the long run. It is obvious that companies cannot be run in a sustainable manner if boards ignore the context in which they operate.

Therefore, the European Commission should refrain from trying to harmonize the fundamental concept of corporate interest and directors’ duties due to the very important legal differences across Europe and the different contexts across sectors. No law should hold directors accountable to several “principals”, arguably with often mutually contradictory interests. The board can solely be accountable to the company for the discharge of its duty to promote the purpose of the company. If the criteria for liability are not clearly defined, the boards will be liable to nobody for nothing or to everybody for anything. “Being liable to everybody means being liable to nobody”. Legal certainty is the basis of a competitive economic environment.

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Dans un article du Financial Post de janvier 2019, Terence Corcoran revient sur les thèses de Milton Friedman pour les appuyer au travers d’arguments intéressants. Je vous invite à lire son analyse dans l’article suivant : « Milton Friedman is right, profit is a company’s only purpose » (Financial Post, 19 janvier 2019)

Petit extrait :

There is nothing in the redefine-capitalism movement that was not identified almost 50 years ago by Friedman as a danger to markets and economic freedom. The concepts and principles reviewed in his 1970 essay, ignored by Mayer and all the reformers, are as relevant today as they were then.

Generally, Friedman would have no problem with corporations that engage in virtue signalling. For example, Gillette’s “toxic masculinity” ad is an obvious attempt to sell products by piggybacking on a controversial social issue. Gillette is acting out of self-interest.

Friedman declined to denounce such corporate attempts to “generate goodwill” and draw attention to their products, although he warned that the strategic pursuit of social approval and conflict amounted to “hypocritical window-dressing.”

It is utterly false to portray corporations as manufacturers of profits at the expense of society. Today’s corporations, from Microsoft Corp. to GM to Amazon.com Inc., survive by producing goods and services that feed, clothe, transport, entertain and otherwise provide benefits to billions of people.

The corporate adoption of social purposes would take focus away from these core business purposes. Worse, expanding the number of corporate purposes places an undesirable undemocratic framework on corporate executives. As Friedman saw it in 1970, giving social and political responsibilities to business leaders installs unelected corporate managers in positions of unelected power

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Bonjour à toutes et à tous, TVA nouvelles a relayé il y a peu un article du Journal de Montréal de Philippe Orfali sur les primes juteuses pour «fidéliser» les fondateurs et la haute direction des sociétés québécoises cotées en bourse. Les sociétés continuent d’offrir à leurs dirigeants de généreuses primes visant à les « fidéliser » ou à les retenir, et ce, même s’il s’agit d’entreprises auxquelles ils sont très attachés, en raison de liens familiaux.

Or, comme le souligne le porte-parole du MÉDAC (Willie Gagnon) «On comprend que lorsque vient le temps d’attirer de nouveaux membres de la direction, il faille offrir des incitatifs. Mais quand on vient de la famille qui contrôle, on a déjà un intérêt à long terme dans la société par la participation massive au capital et au contrôle de l’entreprise».

«Il n’y a pas lieu d’avoir d’incitatif à long terme versé! L’incitatif ici, c’est le contrôle et la performance de la société», ajoute-t-il.

La notion de rémunération concurrentielle ne devrait pas s’appliquer quand on détient des centaines de millions ou des milliards dans cette même entreprise, selon lui.

À réfléchir !

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