Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

La raison d’être en vedette

La Harvard Business Review propos un hors-série intitulé : « Le Must de la Raison d’être ».

« C’est parce qu’une entreprise est utile qu’elle est prospère, et non l’inverse. » Ce propos d’Antoine Frérot, le P-DG de Veolia, résume à lui seul toute l’ambition de la raison d’être, un concept qui prend de plus en plus d’ampleur au sein des entreprises. Car l’entreprise n’a pas pour finalité de permettre aux actionnaires de réaliser un maximum de profits. Elle doit avant tout contribuer au bien commun. Mais encore faut-il que les organisations trouvent le sens de leur raison d’être, autrement dit la raison d’être de leur raison d’être. Pour beaucoup d’entre elles, c’est encore un but à atteindre.

Table des matières

  1. Idées À Suivre
  2. Un Manifeste Pour L’économie À Impact Positif Net
  3. Pourquoi Sommes-Nous Ici ?
  4. Mettez La Raison D’être Au Coeur De Votre Stratégie
  5. Insuffler Une Raison D’être À L’entreprise
  6. Diriger À L’ère Des Parties Prenantes
  7. Les Clés D’une Gestion Hybride Réussie
  8. Créer De La Valeur Partagée
  9. La Mission Sociale Comme Avantage Concurrentiel
  10. De La Vocation À L’impact

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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Structures juridiques

Purpose et revitalisation du droit des sociétés

La professeure australienne Rosemary Teele Langford offre un bel article relayé par l’Oxford Business Law Blog : « Purpose-Based Governance and Revitalisation of Company Law to Facilitate Purpose-Based Companies » (18 septembre 2020).

Extrait :

The permissibility of corporations pursuing purposes other than profit has been the subject of debate for a number of years. This debate has intensified recently with proposals from bodies such as the British Academy and the Business Round Table (as discussed in previous OBLB posts) to allow or mandate the adoption of purposes by corporations. The challenges posed by COVID-19 have also focused attention on corporate purpose. In addition, there is increasing demand for appropriate vehicles for the conduct of social enterprises and other purpose-based ventures. At the same time, purpose is central to governance in the charitable sphere. In two recent articles I critically analyse the role of purpose in Australian company and charity law and demonstrate revitalisation of the law to facilitate adoption of, and governance centred on, purpose.

(…)

The second article, ‘Use of the Corporate Form for Public Benefit – Revitalisation of Australian Corporations Law’, provides extended detail on relevant aspects of the company law regime and focuses more closely on particular issues that arise in the facilitation of purpose-based companies. These include the application of directors’ duties in the context of such companies, with particular focus on the application of the duty to act in good faith in the interests of the company where companies have multiple purposes. This in turn has relevance for the drafting of appropriate constitutional provisions. Other issues arise in relation to standing and enforcement, departure from purposes and signalling. The focus of analysis is on the for-profit corporate form given that it is uncontroversial that other corporate forms (such as companies limited by guarantee) can be used for charitable and not-for-profit purposes. 

In this respect, experience from the UK and US can provide helpful insights in the revitalisation of Australian law. In particular, scholarly analysis of the issues arising from these overseas legislative regimes, and suggested solutions, are invaluable in determining the application of directors’ duties to purpose-based companies and in framing appropriate constitutional provisions. Although changes to the law are not necessary to enable companies to adopt purposes, these lessons from other jurisdictions that have legislated to allow for special-purpose companies are therefore instructive in revitalising Australian law. 

This analysis demonstrates that revitalisation of Australian law to allow purpose-based companies is feasible. In fact, it is opportune. This in turn allows company law to be attuned to practical and conceptual developments in the corporate sphere and more broadly. Such revitalisation does not require a fundamental shift, particularly given the malleability of directors’ duties. Indeed, given that the origins of the corporate form were connected with public ends, this evolution of the corporate form, and the attendant adaption of directors’ duties, are a natural adaptation rather than a radical reformulation. 

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actualités internationales Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

50 years later, Milton Friedman’s shareholder doctrine is dead

Belle tribune dans Fortune de MM. Colin Mayer, Leo Strine Jr et Jaap Winter au titre clair : « 50 years later, Milton Friedman’s shareholder doctrine is dead » (13 septembre 2020).

Extrait :

Fifty years ago, Milton Friedman in the New York Times magazine proclaimed that the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. Directors have the duty to do what is in the interests of their masters, the shareholders, to make as much profit as possible. Friedman was hostile to the New Deal and European models of social democracy and urged business to use its muscle to reduce the effectiveness of unions, blunt environmental and consumer protection measures, and defang antitrust law. He sought to reduce consideration of human concerns within the corporate boardroom and legal requirements on business to treat workers, consumers, and society fairly. 

Over the last 50 years, Friedman’s views became increasingly influential in the U.S. As a result, the power of the stock market and wealthy elites soared and consideration of the interests of workers, the environment, and consumers declined. Profound economic insecurity and inequality, a slow response to climate change, and undermined public institutions resulted. Using their wealth and power in the pursuit of profits, corporations led the way in loosening the external constraints that protected workers and other stakeholders against overreaching.

Under the dominant Friedman paradigm, corporations were constantly harried by all the mechanisms that shareholders had available—shareholder resolutions, takeovers, and hedge fund activism—to keep them narrowly focused on stockholder returns. And pushed by institutional investors, executive remuneration systems were increasingly focused on total stock returns. By making corporations the playthings of the stock market, it became steadily harder for corporations to operate in an enlightened way that reflected the real interests of their human investors in sustainable growth, fair treatment of workers, and protection of the environment.

Half a century later, it is clear that this narrow, stockholder-centered view of corporations has cost society severely. Well before the COVID-19 pandemic, the single-minded focus of business on profits was criticized for causing the degradation of nature and biodiversity, contributing to global warming, stagnating wages, and exacerbating economic inequality. The result is best exemplified by the drastic shift in gain sharing away from workers toward corporate elites, with stockholders and top management eating more of the economic pie.

Corporate America understood the threat that this way of thinking was having on the social compact and reacted through the 2019 corporate purpose statement of the Business Roundtable, emphasizing responsibility to stakeholders as well as shareholders. But the failure of many of the signatories to protect their stakeholders during the coronavirus pandemic has prompted cynicism about the original intentions of those signing the document, as well as their subsequent actions.

Stockholder advocates are right when then they claim that purpose statements on their own achieve little: Calling for corporate executives who answer to only one powerful constituency—stockholders in the form of highly assertive institutional investors—and have no legal duty to other stakeholders to run their corporations in a way that is fair to all stakeholders is not only ineffectual, it is naive and intellectually incoherent.

What is required is to match commitment to broader responsibility of corporations to society with a power structure that backs it up. That is what has been missing. Corporate law in the U.S. leaves it to directors and managers subject to potent stockholder power to give weight to other stakeholders. In principle, corporations can commit to purposes beyond profit and their stakeholders, but only if their powerful investors allow them to do so. Ultimately, because the law is permissive, it is in fact highly restrictive of corporations acting fairly for all their stakeholders because it hands authority to investors and financial markets for corporate control.

Absent any effective mechanism for encouraging adherence to the Roundtable statement, the system is stacked against those who attempt to do so. There is no requirement on corporations to look after their stakeholders and for the most part they do not, because if they did, they would incur the wrath of their shareholders. That was illustrated all too clearly by the immediate knee-jerk response of the Council of Institutional Investors to the Roundtable declaration last year, which expressed its disapproval by stating that the Roundtable had failed to recognize shareholders as owners as well as providers of capital, and that “accountability to everyone means accountability to no one.” 

If the Roundtable is serious about shifting from shareholder primacy to purposeful business, two things need to happen. One is that the promise of the New Deal needs to be renewed, and protections for workers, the environment, and consumers in the U.S. need to be brought closer to the standards set in places like Germany and Scandinavia. 

But to do that first thing, a second thing is necessary. Changes within company law itself must occur, so that corporations are better positioned to support the restoration of that framework and govern themselves internally in a manner that respects their workers and society. Changing the power structure within corporate law itself—to require companies to give fair consideration to stakeholders and temper their need to put profit above all other values—will also limit the ability and incentives for companies to weaken regulations that protect workers, consumers, and society more generally.

To make this change, corporate purpose has to be enshrined in the heart of corporate law as an expression of the broader responsibility of corporations to society and the duty of directors to ensure this. Laws already on the books of many states in the U.S. do exactly that by authorizing the public benefit corporation (PBC). A PBC has an obligation to state a public purpose beyond profit, to fulfill that purpose as part of the responsibilities of its directors, and to be accountable for so doing. This model is meaningfully distinct from the constituency statutes in some states that seek to strengthen stakeholder interests, but that stakeholder advocates condemn as ineffectual. PBCs have an affirmative duty to be good corporate citizens and to treat all stakeholders with respect. Such requirements are mandatory and meaningful, while constituency statutes are mushy.

The PBC model is growing in importance and is embraced by many younger entrepreneurs committed to the idea that making money in a way that is fair to everyone is the responsible path forward. But the model’s ultimate success depends on longstanding corporations moving to adopt it. 

Even in the wake of the Roundtable’s high-minded statement, that has not yet happened, and for good reason. Although corporations can opt in to become a PBC, there is no obligation on them to do so and they need the support of their shareholders. It is relatively easy for founder-owned companies or companies with a relatively low number of stockholders to adopt PBC forms if their owners are so inclined. It is much tougher to obtain the approval of a dispersed group of institutional investors who are accountable to an even more dispersed group of individual investors. There is a serious coordination problem of achieving reform in existing corporations.

That is why the law needs to change. Instead of being an opt-in alternative to shareholder primacy, the PBC should be the universal standard for societally important corporations, which should be defined as ones with over $1 billion of revenues, as suggested by Sen. Elizabeth Warren. In the U.S., this would be done most effectively by corporations becoming PBCs under state law. The magic of the U.S. system has rested in large part on cooperation between the federal government and states, which provides society with the best blend of national standards and nimble implementation. This approach would build on that.

Corporate shareholders and directors enjoy substantial advantages and protections through U.S. law that are not extended to those who run their own businesses. In return for offering these privileges, society can reasonably expect to benefit, not suffer, from what corporations do. Making responsibility in society a duty in corporate law will reestablish the legitimacy of incorporation.

There are three pillars to this. The first is that corporations must be responsible corporate citizens, treating their workers and other stakeholders fairly, and avoiding externalities, such as carbon emissions, that cause unreasonable or disproportionate harm to others. The second is that corporations should seek to make profit by benefiting others. The third is that they should be able to demonstrate that they fulfill both criteria by measuring and reporting their performances against them.

The PBC model embraces all three elements and puts legal, and thus market, force behind them. Corporate managers, like most of us, take obligatory duties seriously. If they don’t, the PBC model allows for courts to issue orders, such as injunctions, holding corporations to their stakeholder and societal obligations. In addition, the PBC model requires fairness to all stakeholders at all stages of a corporation’s life, even when it is sold. The PBC model shifts power to socially responsible investment and index funds that focus on the long term and cannot gain from unsustainable approaches to growth that harm society. 

Our proposal to amend corporate law to ensure responsible corporate citizenship will prompt a predictable outcry from vested interests and traditional academic quarters, claiming that it will be unworkable, devastating for entrepreneurship and innovation, undermine a capitalist system that has been an engine for growth and prosperity, and threaten jobs, pensions, and investment around the world. If putting the purpose of a business at the heart of corporate law does all of that, one might well wonder why we invented the corporation in the first place. 

Of course, it will do exactly the opposite. Putting purpose into law will simplify, not complicate, the running of businesses by aligning what the law wants them to do with the reason why they are created. It will be a source of entrepreneurship, innovation, and inspiration to find solutions to problems that individuals, societies, and the natural world face. It will make markets and the capitalist system function better by rewarding positive contributions to well-being and prosperity, not wealth transfers at the expense of others. It will create meaningful, fulfilling jobs, support employees in employment and retirement, and encourage investment in activities that generate wealth for all. 

We are calling for the universal adoption of the PBC for large corporations. We do so to save our capitalist system and corporations from the devastating consequences of their current approaches, and for the sake of our children, our societies, and the natural world. 

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actualités internationales devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance normes de droit Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

Sustainable Value Creation Within Planetary Boundaries—Reforming Corporate Purpose and Duties of the Corporate Board

Ma collègue Beate Sjåfjell nous gâte encore avec un très bel article (accessible en ligne !) : « Sustainable Value Creation Within Planetary Boundaries—Reforming Corporate Purpose and Duties of the Corporate Board » (Sustainibility, 2020, Vol. 12, Issue 15). Je vous conseille vivement la lecture de cet article…

Résumé :

Business, and the dominant legal form of business, that is, the corporation, must be involved in the transition to sustainability, if we are to succeed in securing a safe and just space for humanity. The corporate board has a crucial role in determining the strategy and the direction of the corporation. However, currently, the function of the corporate board is constrained through the social norm of shareholder primacy, reinforced through the intermediary structures of capital markets. This article argues that an EU law reform is key to integrating sustainability into mainstream corporate governance, into the corporate purpose and the core duties of the corporate board, to change corporations from within. While previous attempts at harmonizing core corporate law at the EU level have failed, there are now several drivers for reform that may facilitate a change, including the EU Commission’s increased emphasis on sustainability. Drawing on this momentum, this article presents a proposal to reform corporate purpose and duties of the board, based on the results of the EU-funded research project, Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART, 2016–2020).

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engagement et activisme actionnarial finance sociale et investissement responsable Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration Normes d'encadrement parties prenantes Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

COVID-19, purpose et critères ESG : une alliance nécessaire

Billet à découvrir sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance pour y lire cet article consacré à la sortie de crise sanitaire et aux apports de la raison d’être et des critères ESG : « ESG and Corporate Purpose in a Disrupted World » (Kristen Sullivan, Amy Silverstein et Leeann Galezio Arthur, 10 août 2020).

Extrait :

Corporate purpose and ESG as tools to reframe pandemic-related disruption

The links between ESG, company strategy, and risk have never been clearer than during the COVID-19 pandemic, when companies have had to quickly pivot and respond to critical risks that previously were not considered likely to occur. The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Survey 2020, published in January 2020, listed “infectious diseases” as number 10 in terms of potential economic impact, and did not make the top 10 list of risks considered to be “likely.” The impact of the pandemic was further magnified by the disruption it created for the operations of companies and their workforces, which were forced to rethink how and where they did business virtually overnight.

The radical recalibration of risk in the context of a global pandemic further highlights the interrelationships between long-term corporate strategy, the environment, and society. The unlikely scenario of a pandemic causing economic disruption of the magnitude seen today has caused many companies—including companies that have performed well in the pandemic—to reevaluate how they can maintain the long-term sustainability of the enterprise. While the nature and outcomes of that reevaluation will differ based on the unique set of circumstances facing each company, this likely means reframing the company’s role in society and the ways in which it addresses ESG-related challenges, including diversity and inclusion, employee safety, health and well-being, the existence of the physical workplace, supply chain disruptions, and more.

ESG factors are becoming a key determinant of financial strength. Recent research shows that the top 20 percent of ESG-ranked stocks outperformed the US market by over 5 percentage points during a recent period of volatility. Twenty-four out of 26 sustainable index funds outperformed comparable conventional index funds in Q1 2020. In addition, the MSCI ACWI ESG Leaders Index returned 5.24 percent, compared to 4.48 percent for the overall market, since it was established in September 2007 through February 2020. Notably, BlackRock, one of the world’s largest asset managers, recently analyzed the performance of 32 sustainable indices and compared that to their non-sustainable benchmarks as far back as 2015. According to BlackRock the findings indicated that “during market downturns in 2015–16 and 2018, sustainable indices tended to outperform their non-sustainable counterparts.” This trend may be further exacerbated by the effects of the pandemic and the social justice movement.

Financial resilience is certainly not the only benefit. Opportunities for brand differentiation, attraction and retention of top talent, greater innovation, operational efficiency, and an ability to attract capital and increase market valuation are abundant. Companies that have already built ESG strategies, measurements, and high-quality disclosures into their business models are likely to be well-positioned to capitalize on those opportunities and drive long-term value postcrisis.

As businesses begin to reopen and attempt to get back to some sense of normalcy, companies will need to rely on their employees, vendors, and customers to go beyond the respond phase and begin to recover and thrive. In a postpandemic world, this means seeking input from and continuing to build and retain the confidence and trust of those stakeholder groups. Business leaders are recognizing that ESG initiatives, particularly those that prioritize the health and safety of people, will be paramount to recovery.

What are investors and other stakeholders saying?

While current events have forced and will likely continue to force companies to make difficult decisions that may, in the short term, appear to be in conflict with corporate purpose, evidence suggests that as companies emerge from the crisis, they will refresh and recommit to corporate purpose, using it as a compass to focus ESG performance. Specific to the pandemic, the public may expect that companies will continue to play a greater role in helping not only employees, but the nation in general, through such activities as manufacturing personal protective equipment (PPE), equipment needed to treat COVID-19 patients, and retooling factories to produce ventilators, hand sanitizer, masks, and other items needed to address the pandemic. In some cases, decisions may be based upon or consistent with ESG priorities, such as decisions regarding employee health and well-being. From firms extending paid sick leave to all employees, including temporary workers, vendors, and contract workers, to reorienting relief funds to assist vulnerable populations, examples abound of companies demonstrating commitments to people and communities. As companies emerge from crisis mode, many are signaling that they will continue to keep these principles top of mind. This greater role is arguably becoming part of the “corporate social contract” that legitimizes and supports the existence and prosperity of corporations.

In the United States, much of the current focus on corporate purpose and ESG is likely to continue to be driven by investors rather than regulators or legislators in the near term. Thus, it’s important to consider investors’ views, which are still developing in the wake of COVID-19 and other developments.

Investors have indicated that they will assess a company’s response to the pandemic as a measure of stability, resilience ,and adaptability. Many have stated that employee health, well-being, and proactive human capital management are central to business continuity. Investor expectations remain high for companies to lead with purpose, particularly during times of severe economic disruption, and to continue to demonstrate progress against ESG goals.

State Street Global Advisors president and CEO Cyrus Taraporevala, in a March 2020 letter to board members, emphasized that companies should not sacrifice the long-term health and sustainability of the company when responding to the pandemic. According to Taraporevala, State Street continues “to believe that material ESG issues must be part of the bigger picture and clearly articulated as part of your company’s overall business strategy.” According to a recent BlackRock report, “companies with strong profiles on material sustainability issues have potential to outperform those with poor profiles. We believe companies managed with a focus on sustainability may be better positioned versus their less sustainable peers to weather adverse conditions while still benefiting from positive market environments.”

In addition to COVID-19, the recent social justice movement compels companies to think holistically about their purpose and role in society. Recent widespread protests of systemic, societal inequality leading to civil unrest and instability elevate the conversation on the “S” and “G” in ESG. Commitments to the health and well-being of employees, customers, communities, and other stakeholder groups will also require corporate leaders to address how the company articulates its purpose and ESG objectives through actions that proactively address racism and discrimination in the workplace and the communities where they operate. Companies are responding with, among other things, statements of support for diversity and inclusion efforts, reflective conversations with employees and customers, and monetary donations for diversity-focused initiatives. However, investors and others who are pledging to use their influence to hold companies accountable for meaningful progress on systemic inequality will likely look for data on hiring practices, pay equity, and diversity in executive management and on the board as metrics for further engagement on this issue.

What can boards do?

Deloitte US executive chair of the board, Janet Foutty, recently described the board as “the vehicle to hold an organization to its societal purpose.” Directors play a pivotal role in guiding

companies to balance short-term decisions with long-term strategy and thus must weigh the needs of all stakeholders while remaining cognizant of the risks associated with each decision. COVID-19 has underscored the role of ESG principles as central to business risk and strategy, as well as building credibility and trust with investors and the public at large. Boards can advise management on making clear, stakeholder-informed decisions that position the organization to emerge faster and stronger from a crisis.

It has been said before that those companies that do not control their own ESG strategies and narratives risk someone else controlling their ESG story. This is particularly true with regards to how an organization articulates its purpose and stays grounded in that purpose and ESG principles during a crisis. Transparent, high-quality ESG disclosure can be a tool to provide investors with information to efficiently allocate capital for long-term return. Boards have a role in the oversight of both the articulation of the company’s purpose and how those principles are integrated with strategy and risk.

As ESG moves to the top of the board agenda, it is important for boards to have the conversation on how they define the governance structure they will put in place to oversee ESG. Based on a recent review, completed by Deloitte’s Center for Board Effectiveness, of 310 company proxies in the S&P 500, filed from September 1, 2019, through May 6, 2020, 57 percent of the 310 companies noted that the nominating or governance committee has primary oversight responsibility, and only 9 percent noted the full board, with the remaining 34 percent spread across other committees. Regardless of the primary owner, the audit committee should be engaged with regard to any ESG disclosures, as well as prepared to oversee assurance associated with ESG metrics.

Conclusion

The board’s role necessitates oversight of corporate purpose and how corporate purpose is executed through ESG. Although companies will face tough decisions, proactive oversight of and transparency around ESG can help companies emerge from recent events with greater resilience and increased credibility. Those that have already embarked on this journey and stay the course will likely be those well-positioned to thrive in the future.

Questions for the board to consider asking:

How are the company’s corporate purpose and ESG objectives integrated with strategy and risk?

  1. Has management provided key information and assumptions about how ESG is addressed during the strategic planning process?
  2. How is the company communicating its purpose and ESG objectives to its stakeholders?
  3. What data does the company collect to assess the impact of ESG performance on economic performance, how does this data inform internal management decision- making, and how is the board made aware of and involved from a governance perspective?
  4. Does the company’s governance structure facilitate effective oversight of the company’s ESG matters?
  5. How is the company remaining true to its purpose and ESG, especially now given COVID-19 pandemic and social justice issues?
  6. What is the board’s diversity profile? Does the board incorporate diversity when searching for new candidates?
  7. Have the board and management discussed executive management succession and how the company can build a diverse pipeline of candidates?
  8. How will the company continue to refresh and recommit to its corporate purpose and ESG objectives as it emerges from the pandemic response and recovery and commit to accelerating diversity and inclusion efforts?
  9. How does the company align its performance incentives for executive leadership with attaining critical ESG goals and outcomes?

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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

On the Purpose and Objective of the Corporation

Nouvel article sur la raison d’être par Martin Lipton et al. : « On the Purpose and Objective of the Corporation » (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 5 août 2020).

Extrait :

Recent events—notably including the pandemic, its disparate impact on various segments of society, and the focus on inequality and injustice arising in the wake of the death of George Floyd—have accelerated the conversation on corporate purpose. The result has been substantial, salutary reflection about the role that corporations play in creating and distributing economic prosperity and the nexus between value and values.

For our part, we have supported stakeholder governance for over 40 years—first, to empower boards of directors to reject opportunistic takeover bids by corporate raiders, and later to combat short-termism and ensure that directors maintain the flexibility to invest for long-term growth and innovation. We continue to advise corporations and their boards that—consistent with Delaware law—they may exercise their business judgment to manage for the benefit of the corporation and all of its stakeholders over the long term.

In looking beyond the disruption caused by the pandemic, boards and corporate leaders have an opportunity to rebuild with the clarity and conviction that come from articulating a corporate purpose, anchored in a holistic understanding of the key drivers of their business, the ways in which those drivers shape and are shaped by values, and the interdependencies of multiple stakeholders that are essential to the long-term success of the business.

This opportunity leads us to reiterate and refine a simple formulation of corporate purpose and objective, as follows:

The purpose of a corporation is to conduct a lawful, ethical, profitable and sustainable business in order to ensure its success and grow its value over the long term. This requires consideration of all the stakeholders that are critical to its success (shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and communities), as determined by the corporation and its board of directors using their business judgment and with regular engagement with shareholders, who are essential partners in supporting the corporation’s pursuit of its purpose. Fulfilling purpose in such manner is fully consistent with the fiduciary duties of the board of directors and the stewardship obligations of shareholders.

This statement of corporate purpose is broad enough to apply to every business entity, but at the same time supplies clear guideposts for action and engagement. The basic objective of sustainable profitability recognizes that the purpose of for-profit corporations includes creation of value for investors. The requirement of lawful and ethical conduct ensures generally recognized standards of corporate social compliance. Going further, the broader mandate to take into account all corporate stakeholders, including communities, is not limited to local communities, but comprises society and the economy at large and directs boards to exercise their business judgment within the scope of this broader responsibility. The requirement of regular shareholder engagement acknowledges accountability to investors, but also the shared responsibility of shareholders for responsible long-term corporate stewardship.

Fulfilling this purpose will require different approaches for each corporation depending on its industry, history, regulatory environment, governance and other factors. We expect that board committees—focusing on stakeholders, ESG issues and the stewardship obligations of shareholders— will be useful or even necessary for some companies. But for all the differences among companies, there is an important unifying commonality: corporate action, taken against the backdrop of this formulation of corporate purpose, will be fully protected by the business judgment rule, so long as decisions are made by non-conflicted directors acting upon careful consideration and deliberation.

Executed in this way, stakeholder governance will be a better driver of long-term value creation and broad-based prosperity than the shareholder primacy model. Directors and managers have the responsibility of exercising their business judgment in acting for the corporate entity that they represent, balancing its rights and obligations and taking into account both risks and opportunities over the long term, in regular consultation with shareholders. Directors will not be forced to narrow their focus and act as if any one interest trumps all others, with potentially destructive consequences, but will instead have latitude to make decisions that reasonably balance the interests of all constituencies in a manner that will promote the sustainable, long-term business success of the corporation as a whole.

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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit normes de marché objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises

For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?

Encore un papier sur le fameux « purpose » du droit des sociétés par actions. C’est le professeur Edward Rock qui s’y attaque dans un article intitulé « For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over Corporate Purpose » (European Corporate Governance Institute – Law Working Paper No. 515/2020, 1er mai 2020).

Résumé :

A high profile public debate is taking place over one of the oldest questions in corporate law, namely, “For whom is the corporation managed?” In addition to legal academics and lawyers, high profile business leaders and business school professors have entered the fray and politicians have offered legislative “fixes” for the “problem of shareholder primacy.” In this article, I take this debate to be an interesting development in corporate governance and try to understand and explain what is going on. I argue that, analytically and conceptually, there are four separate questions being asked. First, what is the best theory of the legal form we call “the corporation”? Second, how should academic finance understand the properties of the legal form when building models or engaging in empirical research? Third, what are good management strategies for building valuable firms? And, finally, what are the social roles and obligations of large publicly traded firms? I argue that populist pressures that emerged from the financial crisis, combined with political dysfunction, have led to the confusion of these different questions, with regrettable results.

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