Normes d’encadrement | Page 19

Voici un article qui intéressera celles et ceux qui suivent l’actualité entourant les Public Benefit Corporation : « Delaware Public Benefit Corporations—Recent Developments » (Michael R. Littenberg, Emily J. Oldshue, and Brittany N. Pifer, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 31 août 2020).

Extrait :

The 2020 Amendments

Delaware has amended the PBC statute twice since inception to address concerns that limited its utility.

Most recently, in July, Delaware amended the PBC statute to, among other things, (1) reduce the stockholder approval threshold necessary for becoming a PBC, and for exiting the PBC regime; (2) eliminate statutory appraisal rights in connection with the conversion of a conventional corporation to a PBC; and (3) strengthen the protections for directors. Each of these amendments is discussed in more detail below.

Voting Thresholds for Opting In and Opting Out Lowered. Section 363(a) of the DGCL originally provided that an existing conventional corporation could not become a PBC without the approval of 90% of the outstanding stock on the amendment of its certificate of incorporation or the merger or consolidation with or into a PBC. Conversely, under Section 363(c), a PBC had to satisfy the 90% voting threshold to become a conventional corporation. In 2015, this threshold was amended down to a two-thirds majority. The 2020 PBC amendments eliminated Section 363(a) and (c). The result is that the voting thresholds for conversions, mergers and consolidations involving PBCs are now governed by Sections 242(b) and 251 of the DGCL, which provide for majority voting unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise.

Elimination of Statutory Appraisal Rights in Connection with PBC Conversions. Section 363(b) of the DGCL previously provided appraisal rights for stockholders of a conventional corporation that amended its certificate of incorporation to become a PBC or engaged in a merger or consolidation that resulted in the surviving corporation being a PBC, to the extent the stockholder did not vote for the amendment, merger or consolidation. In 2015, this section of the DGCL was amended to add a “market out” exception, which provided that appraisal rights generally would not be available to holders of shares listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more than 2,000 holders. The market out exception of course did not apply in the private company context.

The 2020 PBC amendments eliminated Section 363(b). As a result, there no longer is a specific statutory appraisal right if a conventional corporation converts to a PBC. Appraisal rights in connection with PBC mergers and consolidations are now governed by Section 262 of the DGCL, which addresses appraisal rights in connection with mergers and consolidations more generally.

Director Protections Strengthened. As discussed above, under Section 365(a) of the DGCL, directors of a PBC must balance the pecuniary interest of stockholders, the interests of other stakeholders and the specific public benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation. Section 365(c) has been amended to clarify that a director’s ownership of stock or other interests in the PBC does not inherently create a conflict of interest, unless the ownership of the interests would create a conflict of interest in a conventional corporation.

In addition, the 2020 PBC amendments revised Section 365(c) to provide that any failure on a director’s part to satisfy Section 365(a)’s balancing requirement does not constitute an act or omission not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty for purposes of Section 102(b)(7) (exculpation of directors) or Section 145 (indemnification) of the DGCL, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. Previously, this was framed as an opt-in in Section 365(c), rather than as an opt-out.

Ability to Bring Derivative Suit Brought into Alignment with Conventional Corporations. Section 367 of the DGCL sets forth the ownership requirements for PBC stockholders to be able to bring a derivative suit to enforce the statutory requirement to balance the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the PBC’s conduct and the public benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation. The 2020 PBC amendments provide that a derivative action to enforce the balancing requirement can only be brought by one or more plaintiffs owning individually or collectively (1) at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or (2) in the case of a corporation listed on a national securities exchange, the lesser of 2% of the corporation’s shares and shares with a value of at least $2,000,000.

The amendments to Section 367 align the thresholds for PBC derivative actions with those applicable to conventional corporations.

À la prochaine…

Sur l’Oxford Business Law Blog, le professeur Luca Enriques publie une synthèse bien intéressante à celles et ceux qui cherchent à faire le point sur les conséquences de la COVID-19 sur le droit des sociétés par actions : « GCGC/ECGI Global Webinar Series – Extreme times, Extreme Measures: Pandemic-Resistant Corporate Law » (22 avril 2020).

Extrait :

These are exceptional times. Almost everywhere, policymakers are taking exceptional measures. Most of these measures are in the domains of public health, public finance and public law. Among the latter, of great relevance to corporate governance are the rules broadening governments’ powers to authorize large share block purchases (eg, in Germany and Italy). Even stronger proposals are being aired, and in some cases already adopted, in the direction of injecting public funds into companies in exchange for equity (Germany), if not of nationalising businesses altogether (France).

But some incursions into private law have also been made. This is especially true with regard to insolvency (or bankruptcy) law, as documented by Aurelio Gurrea Martinez. Some of the bankruptcy law-related measures intervene to change rules that ordinarily apply in the vicinity of insolvency and are therefore at the boundary between insolvency and corporate law. For instance, a number of countries are discussing whether to review directors’ duties in the proximity of insolvency (eg, the UK and New Zealand: see Licht) or have already done so (eg, Australia, Spain and Germany). 

Similarly, some of the jurisdictions still providing for the ‘recapitalize or liquidate’ rule (which requires directors to promote a recapitalization of the company, convert it into an unlimited liability partnership or liquidate it, if net assets fall below a given threshold), such as Spain, Italy and Ecuador, have chosen to suspend its application during the crisis. Finally, in Italy rules on the subordination of shareholders loans have also been suspended.

This post asks the question of whether company law rules not specifically dealing with companies in the twilight zone should also be tweaked to face the emergency. One obvious focus are rules dealing with how general meetings must be held (see eg the UK and Italy). Such rules may be at odds with social distancing provisions wherever they don’t allow for virtual meetings or forms of collective representation of the shareholders. But one can think more broadly about how corporate law should be amended in order to avoid economic rather than viral contagion and keep companies afloat in these exceptional times. Below are some general considerations to guide policymakers’ choices in this area, followed by examples of temporary corporate law interventions for the emergency. This post concludes with some thoughts about how to prepare for a similar emergency in the future.

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Ma collègue Beate Sjåfjell nous gâte encore avec un très bel article (accessible en ligne !) : « Sustainable Value Creation Within Planetary Boundaries—Reforming Corporate Purpose and Duties of the Corporate Board » (Sustainibility, 2020, Vol. 12, Issue 15). Je vous conseille vivement la lecture de cet article…

Résumé :

Business, and the dominant legal form of business, that is, the corporation, must be involved in the transition to sustainability, if we are to succeed in securing a safe and just space for humanity. The corporate board has a crucial role in determining the strategy and the direction of the corporation. However, currently, the function of the corporate board is constrained through the social norm of shareholder primacy, reinforced through the intermediary structures of capital markets. This article argues that an EU law reform is key to integrating sustainability into mainstream corporate governance, into the corporate purpose and the core duties of the corporate board, to change corporations from within. While previous attempts at harmonizing core corporate law at the EU level have failed, there are now several drivers for reform that may facilitate a change, including the EU Commission’s increased emphasis on sustainability. Drawing on this momentum, this article presents a proposal to reform corporate purpose and duties of the board, based on the results of the EU-funded research project, Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART, 2016–2020).

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Billet à découvrir sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance pour y lire cet article consacré à la sortie de crise sanitaire et aux apports de la raison d’être et des critères ESG : « ESG and Corporate Purpose in a Disrupted World » (Kristen Sullivan, Amy Silverstein et Leeann Galezio Arthur, 10 août 2020).

Extrait :

Corporate purpose and ESG as tools to reframe pandemic-related disruption

The links between ESG, company strategy, and risk have never been clearer than during the COVID-19 pandemic, when companies have had to quickly pivot and respond to critical risks that previously were not considered likely to occur. The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Survey 2020, published in January 2020, listed “infectious diseases” as number 10 in terms of potential economic impact, and did not make the top 10 list of risks considered to be “likely.” The impact of the pandemic was further magnified by the disruption it created for the operations of companies and their workforces, which were forced to rethink how and where they did business virtually overnight.

The radical recalibration of risk in the context of a global pandemic further highlights the interrelationships between long-term corporate strategy, the environment, and society. The unlikely scenario of a pandemic causing economic disruption of the magnitude seen today has caused many companies—including companies that have performed well in the pandemic—to reevaluate how they can maintain the long-term sustainability of the enterprise. While the nature and outcomes of that reevaluation will differ based on the unique set of circumstances facing each company, this likely means reframing the company’s role in society and the ways in which it addresses ESG-related challenges, including diversity and inclusion, employee safety, health and well-being, the existence of the physical workplace, supply chain disruptions, and more.

ESG factors are becoming a key determinant of financial strength. Recent research shows that the top 20 percent of ESG-ranked stocks outperformed the US market by over 5 percentage points during a recent period of volatility. Twenty-four out of 26 sustainable index funds outperformed comparable conventional index funds in Q1 2020. In addition, the MSCI ACWI ESG Leaders Index returned 5.24 percent, compared to 4.48 percent for the overall market, since it was established in September 2007 through February 2020. Notably, BlackRock, one of the world’s largest asset managers, recently analyzed the performance of 32 sustainable indices and compared that to their non-sustainable benchmarks as far back as 2015. According to BlackRock the findings indicated that “during market downturns in 2015–16 and 2018, sustainable indices tended to outperform their non-sustainable counterparts.” This trend may be further exacerbated by the effects of the pandemic and the social justice movement.

Financial resilience is certainly not the only benefit. Opportunities for brand differentiation, attraction and retention of top talent, greater innovation, operational efficiency, and an ability to attract capital and increase market valuation are abundant. Companies that have already built ESG strategies, measurements, and high-quality disclosures into their business models are likely to be well-positioned to capitalize on those opportunities and drive long-term value postcrisis.

As businesses begin to reopen and attempt to get back to some sense of normalcy, companies will need to rely on their employees, vendors, and customers to go beyond the respond phase and begin to recover and thrive. In a postpandemic world, this means seeking input from and continuing to build and retain the confidence and trust of those stakeholder groups. Business leaders are recognizing that ESG initiatives, particularly those that prioritize the health and safety of people, will be paramount to recovery.

What are investors and other stakeholders saying?

While current events have forced and will likely continue to force companies to make difficult decisions that may, in the short term, appear to be in conflict with corporate purpose, evidence suggests that as companies emerge from the crisis, they will refresh and recommit to corporate purpose, using it as a compass to focus ESG performance. Specific to the pandemic, the public may expect that companies will continue to play a greater role in helping not only employees, but the nation in general, through such activities as manufacturing personal protective equipment (PPE), equipment needed to treat COVID-19 patients, and retooling factories to produce ventilators, hand sanitizer, masks, and other items needed to address the pandemic. In some cases, decisions may be based upon or consistent with ESG priorities, such as decisions regarding employee health and well-being. From firms extending paid sick leave to all employees, including temporary workers, vendors, and contract workers, to reorienting relief funds to assist vulnerable populations, examples abound of companies demonstrating commitments to people and communities. As companies emerge from crisis mode, many are signaling that they will continue to keep these principles top of mind. This greater role is arguably becoming part of the “corporate social contract” that legitimizes and supports the existence and prosperity of corporations.

In the United States, much of the current focus on corporate purpose and ESG is likely to continue to be driven by investors rather than regulators or legislators in the near term. Thus, it’s important to consider investors’ views, which are still developing in the wake of COVID-19 and other developments.

Investors have indicated that they will assess a company’s response to the pandemic as a measure of stability, resilience ,and adaptability. Many have stated that employee health, well-being, and proactive human capital management are central to business continuity. Investor expectations remain high for companies to lead with purpose, particularly during times of severe economic disruption, and to continue to demonstrate progress against ESG goals.

State Street Global Advisors president and CEO Cyrus Taraporevala, in a March 2020 letter to board members, emphasized that companies should not sacrifice the long-term health and sustainability of the company when responding to the pandemic. According to Taraporevala, State Street continues “to believe that material ESG issues must be part of the bigger picture and clearly articulated as part of your company’s overall business strategy.” According to a recent BlackRock report, “companies with strong profiles on material sustainability issues have potential to outperform those with poor profiles. We believe companies managed with a focus on sustainability may be better positioned versus their less sustainable peers to weather adverse conditions while still benefiting from positive market environments.”

In addition to COVID-19, the recent social justice movement compels companies to think holistically about their purpose and role in society. Recent widespread protests of systemic, societal inequality leading to civil unrest and instability elevate the conversation on the “S” and “G” in ESG. Commitments to the health and well-being of employees, customers, communities, and other stakeholder groups will also require corporate leaders to address how the company articulates its purpose and ESG objectives through actions that proactively address racism and discrimination in the workplace and the communities where they operate. Companies are responding with, among other things, statements of support for diversity and inclusion efforts, reflective conversations with employees and customers, and monetary donations for diversity-focused initiatives. However, investors and others who are pledging to use their influence to hold companies accountable for meaningful progress on systemic inequality will likely look for data on hiring practices, pay equity, and diversity in executive management and on the board as metrics for further engagement on this issue.

What can boards do?

Deloitte US executive chair of the board, Janet Foutty, recently described the board as “the vehicle to hold an organization to its societal purpose.” Directors play a pivotal role in guiding

companies to balance short-term decisions with long-term strategy and thus must weigh the needs of all stakeholders while remaining cognizant of the risks associated with each decision. COVID-19 has underscored the role of ESG principles as central to business risk and strategy, as well as building credibility and trust with investors and the public at large. Boards can advise management on making clear, stakeholder-informed decisions that position the organization to emerge faster and stronger from a crisis.

It has been said before that those companies that do not control their own ESG strategies and narratives risk someone else controlling their ESG story. This is particularly true with regards to how an organization articulates its purpose and stays grounded in that purpose and ESG principles during a crisis. Transparent, high-quality ESG disclosure can be a tool to provide investors with information to efficiently allocate capital for long-term return. Boards have a role in the oversight of both the articulation of the company’s purpose and how those principles are integrated with strategy and risk.

As ESG moves to the top of the board agenda, it is important for boards to have the conversation on how they define the governance structure they will put in place to oversee ESG. Based on a recent review, completed by Deloitte’s Center for Board Effectiveness, of 310 company proxies in the S&P 500, filed from September 1, 2019, through May 6, 2020, 57 percent of the 310 companies noted that the nominating or governance committee has primary oversight responsibility, and only 9 percent noted the full board, with the remaining 34 percent spread across other committees. Regardless of the primary owner, the audit committee should be engaged with regard to any ESG disclosures, as well as prepared to oversee assurance associated with ESG metrics.

Conclusion

The board’s role necessitates oversight of corporate purpose and how corporate purpose is executed through ESG. Although companies will face tough decisions, proactive oversight of and transparency around ESG can help companies emerge from recent events with greater resilience and increased credibility. Those that have already embarked on this journey and stay the course will likely be those well-positioned to thrive in the future.

Questions for the board to consider asking:

How are the company’s corporate purpose and ESG objectives integrated with strategy and risk?

1. Has management provided key information and assumptions about how ESG is addressed during the strategic planning process?
2. How is the company communicating its purpose and ESG objectives to its stakeholders?
3. What data does the company collect to assess the impact of ESG performance on economic performance, how does this data inform internal management decision- making, and how is the board made aware of and involved from a governance perspective?
4. Does the company’s governance structure facilitate effective oversight of the company’s ESG matters?
5. How is the company remaining true to its purpose and ESG, especially now given COVID-19 pandemic and social justice issues?
6. What is the board’s diversity profile? Does the board incorporate diversity when searching for new candidates?
7. Have the board and management discussed executive management succession and how the company can build a diverse pipeline of candidates?
8. How will the company continue to refresh and recommit to its corporate purpose and ESG objectives as it emerges from the pandemic response and recovery and commit to accelerating diversity and inclusion efforts?
9. How does the company align its performance incentives for executive leadership with attaining critical ESG goals and outcomes?

À la prochaine…

Me Errol Cohen publie un intéressant article dans Les Échos.fr sur l’entreprise à mission : « La société à mission : un fonctionnement spécifique, Fiscalité et droit des entreprises » (13 août 2020).

Extrait :

La société à mission : un fonctionnement spécifique, Fiscalité et droit des entreprises

Le statut de société à mission s’appuie sur les travaux académiques relatifs à la société à objet social étendu. Mais il les adapte aux nouvelles dispositions relatives à la « raison d’être » . Ce dernier étage de la fusée regroupe essentiellement les principes suivants : une définition de la mission, étendant l’objet social, marquant l’engagement de l’entreprise et assurant l’opposabilité de la mission ; une mission qui intègre des objectifs d’ordre social et environnemental, propres à l’entreprise, et non réductibles au profit ; une mission qui constitue un outil d’ancrage de l’entreprise dans son environnement, ses écosystèmes et plus largement dans le cours de l’histoire, et qui vient donc donner un déploiement plus approfondi et plus opérationnel à la « raison d’être » ; un principe de contrôle interne de cet engagement par un comité de mission dont la composition reflète les différentes parties inscrites dans la mission, et notamment un salarié. Les parties prenantes de l’entreprise (sans que cette liste soit exhaustive, clients, fournisseurs, salariés, famille de ceux-ci, le territoire où ils se trouvent, etc.) ne sont pas explicitement mentionnées dans le texte de la « société à mission » mais elles sont clairement évoquées dans les débats parlementaires.

La notion de mission englobe aussi indirectement les principes suivants : la prise en compte du temps long, de l’innovation et de la recherche ; le développement pérenne, comme fondement de l’entreprise et de son engagement collectif ; la restauration de la liberté d’arbitrage du dirigeant et des instances de direction ; l’arbitrage éclairé dans le cadre de la mission.

La raison d’être, tout comme la mission, se distingue de la vocation habituelle de la société ou d’une activité qui se justifierait avant tout par son but lucratif. Elles doivent marquer des « avancées » et des engagements par rapport à l’objet social habituel, et donc impliquer des engagements nouveaux et des transformations à venir promises à certaines parties. Raison d’être et mission sont clairement des vecteurs de mouvement et de progrès collectif. Certes, des particularismes dans l’activité ou dans le déploiement d’une société peuvent rendre plus aisé le passage en société à mission, mais ils ne peuvent pour autant lui servir de substitut.

Indépendance du dirigeant face aux actionnaires

L’établissement d’une mission invite les dirigeants, dans leurs relations avec les actionnaires et les parties prenantes, à une prise de conscience plus large de leur action, des énergies à libérer et des partenaires à prendre en compte. La mission sera une vigoureuse incitation à projeter les valeurs sociales, environnementales et d’innovation dans un monde plus responsable et riche de sens. Ce plaidoyer peut paraître « idéaliste », mais il ne l’est en rien.

Il est facile de constater que les entreprises sont devenues des acteurs fondamentaux de nos sociétés, tant par la croissance économique et sociale qu’elles peuvent amener que par les impacts négatifs (pollutions, inégalités…) qu’elles peuvent induire.

Rappelons que ce qui s’est révélé être un parti pris idéaliste, c’était l’idée que les entreprises par la seule prise en compte de leur « intérêt bien compris » adopteraient spontanément des démarches engagées en faveur d’une responsabilité sociale et environnementale accrue. Or – et c’est là que se cachait l’idéalisme – c’était supposer que les dirigeants ont toujours les moyens de résister face aux exigences et aux pressions en termes de valeur actionnariale ; la recherche a bien montré que cette résistance, si elle existe, ne dure pas longtemps. Car l’univers des actionnaires est lui-même un univers en mouvement rapide.

Et si certains actionnaires peuvent être attentifs à l’intérêt à long terme de l’entreprise, encore faut-il que cette stratégie ne joue pas trop sur le cours des actions, car une baisse attirerait immédiatement des fonds activistes avides d’opérations aux effets rapides et qui rapportent gros. Paradoxalement, dans un monde dominé par la valeur actionnariale et les codes de gouvernance standards, un comportement vertueux vulnérabilise l’entreprise et peut la soumettre à des risques difficilement soutenables. Ce qui revient simplement à dire que l’idéalisme réside surtout dans l’idée que les dirigeants peuvent installer un comportement responsable envers et contre tous les mécanismes juridiques et normatifs actuels.

La société à mission permet de sortir du paradoxe de la vertu contre-productive et vulnérabilisante. Elle offre un schéma de gouvernance alternatif et cohérent qui soutient le dirigeant en réorganisant ses relations avec les actionnaires et les parties prenantes.L’auteur

À la prochaine…

Nouvel article sur la raison d’être par Martin Lipton et al. : « On the Purpose and Objective of the Corporation » (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 5 août 2020).

Extrait :

Recent events—notably including the pandemic, its disparate impact on various segments of society, and the focus on inequality and injustice arising in the wake of the death of George Floyd—have accelerated the conversation on corporate purpose. The result has been substantial, salutary reflection about the role that corporations play in creating and distributing economic prosperity and the nexus between value and values.

For our part, we have supported stakeholder governance for over 40 years—first, to empower boards of directors to reject opportunistic takeover bids by corporate raiders, and later to combat short-termism and ensure that directors maintain the flexibility to invest for long-term growth and innovation. We continue to advise corporations and their boards that—consistent with Delaware law—they may exercise their business judgment to manage for the benefit of the corporation and all of its stakeholders over the long term.

In looking beyond the disruption caused by the pandemic, boards and corporate leaders have an opportunity to rebuild with the clarity and conviction that come from articulating a corporate purpose, anchored in a holistic understanding of the key drivers of their business, the ways in which those drivers shape and are shaped by values, and the interdependencies of multiple stakeholders that are essential to the long-term success of the business.

This opportunity leads us to reiterate and refine a simple formulation of corporate purpose and objective, as follows:

The purpose of a corporation is to conduct a lawful, ethical, profitable and sustainable business in order to ensure its success and grow its value over the long term. This requires consideration of all the stakeholders that are critical to its success (shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and communities), as determined by the corporation and its board of directors using their business judgment and with regular engagement with shareholders, who are essential partners in supporting the corporation’s pursuit of its purpose. Fulfilling purpose in such manner is fully consistent with the fiduciary duties of the board of directors and the stewardship obligations of shareholders.

This statement of corporate purpose is broad enough to apply to every business entity, but at the same time supplies clear guideposts for action and engagement. The basic objective of sustainable profitability recognizes that the purpose of for-profit corporations includes creation of value for investors. The requirement of lawful and ethical conduct ensures generally recognized standards of corporate social compliance. Going further, the broader mandate to take into account all corporate stakeholders, including communities, is not limited to local communities, but comprises society and the economy at large and directs boards to exercise their business judgment within the scope of this broader responsibility. The requirement of regular shareholder engagement acknowledges accountability to investors, but also the shared responsibility of shareholders for responsible long-term corporate stewardship.

Fulfilling this purpose will require different approaches for each corporation depending on its industry, history, regulatory environment, governance and other factors. We expect that board committees—focusing on stakeholders, ESG issues and the stewardship obligations of shareholders— will be useful or even necessary for some companies. But for all the differences among companies, there is an important unifying commonality: corporate action, taken against the backdrop of this formulation of corporate purpose, will be fully protected by the business judgment rule, so long as decisions are made by non-conflicted directors acting upon careful consideration and deliberation.

Executed in this way, stakeholder governance will be a better driver of long-term value creation and broad-based prosperity than the shareholder primacy model. Directors and managers have the responsibility of exercising their business judgment in acting for the corporate entity that they represent, balancing its rights and obligations and taking into account both risks and opportunities over the long term, in regular consultation with shareholders. Directors will not be forced to narrow their focus and act as if any one interest trumps all others, with potentially destructive consequences, but will instead have latitude to make decisions that reasonably balance the interests of all constituencies in a manner that will promote the sustainable, long-term business success of the corporation as a whole.

À la prochaine…