La crise de la COVID-19 met en relief l’importance de l’investissement responsable. Deux consultantes expertes dans le domaine invitent les comités de retraite à préparer les bonnes questions à poser à leurs gestionnaires de portefeuille.
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Intéressant article du Financial Times du 1er juillet 2020 qui revient sur le modèle allemand « German corporations — and regulation — are in the dock ».
Now the consensual German model of business has suffered multiple mechanical failures. Wirecard, the payments group that bolstered German tech credentials, has imploded in fraud. Bayer is taking up to $11bn in charges mostly triggered by a disastrous US takeover. Once-proud conglomerates Siemens and Thyssenkrupp are shrinking. Volkswagen’s service life shortens each time Tesla’s outlook improves.
(…) Germany, can we talk? “Sure. I’m driving but I’m German so that’s second nature,” jokes an economist via his hands-free, “I don’t think there is any common thread between Wirecard and these other examples.” According to him, the worst accidents occur when German business adopts US ways. Wirecard had a two-tier board structure, like most German businesses. But its supervisory board was seemingly full of corporate yespersons, not vigilant workers as governance rules dictate. And the group was led by a bossy entrepreneur. Kenneth Amaeshi, a professor of business at Edinburgh university, disagrees with such exceptionalism. He believes the Wirecard scandal puts German stakeholder capitalism “in the dock”. It points to a structural weakness of regulation, he says. He is right.
(…) Corporate governance must be overhauled this time.
Supervisory boards must shrink, meet more often and include more independent directors. Regulators must adopt the adversarial approach of US peers. Industrial giants should unbundle further to create a new tier of focused medium-sized businesses. Siemens’ 2018 flotation of Healthineers, a healthcare equipment unit, shows what can be done. Germany’s biggest challenge is spurring investment in disruptive technology. Business has depended on debt finance from risk-averse investors. But there is no lack of equity, as Guntram Wolff of Bruegel, a think-tank, points out. It features as retained corporate earnings rather than footloose investment capital. This is reflected in total equity of some €1.2tn on the balance sheets of Germany’s top 100 quoted companies, according to S&P Global data. Tax breaks are needed to chivvy more of this capital into start-ups and electric vehicle development. It would be a shame to waste two good crises — the meltdown of the German model plus coronavirus. Moreover, support is growing worldwide for stakeholder capitalism, in which social and environmental goals rank alongside profits. Germany just needs to reduce its emphasis on safe jobs for workers and well-networked managers. A little less consensus can make the German model roadworthy again.
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Dans le dossier Droit du travail et droit des sociétés : questions d’actualité réalisé sous la coordination scientifique de Jérôme Chacornac et Grégoire Duchange, je signale deux articles intéressants touchant les thématiques du blogue :
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Le journaliste Philippe Escande publie une tribune pertinente dans Le Monde : « Quand les dividendes de 2019 compromettent la survie des entreprises en 2020 » (7 juillet 2020). Une belle réflexion…
Selon une étude révélée par le Financial Times, peu suspect d’anticapitalisme primaire, les dividendes de 2019 pourraient compromettre la survie de bien des entreprises en 2020. 37 % des sociétés qui composent l’indice américain S&P 500 ont versé, en 2019, des dividendes (ou procédé à des rachats d’actions, ce qui est équivalent) pour un montant supérieur à l’ensemble de leurs bénéfices nets de l’année. C’est un peu moins en Europe, autour de 29 %.
Or, un tiers des entreprises a versé en 2019 plus que ce qu’elles ont gagné. Elles payent maintenant d’avoir cédé au court terme, note Philippe Escande, éditorialiste économique au « Monde ».
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Dans « Beware of the Panacea of Stakeholder-friendly Corporate Purposes », le professeur Marco Ventoruzzo propose une critique sévèrement de l’ouverture de la gouvernance d’entreprise aux parties prenantes (Oxford Business Law Blog, 13 avril 2020). À réfléchir…
In this short essay (…), I take issue with the relevance and effectiveness of ’corporate purpose’ as a form of private ordering (eg, as a bylaws provision), or in other sources of soft-law (self-regulation in corporate governance codes, declarations of business associations, etc). I challenge whether these are, in fact, effective tools to induce greater commitment toward stakeholders.
(…) My possible disagreement with Mayer and other similar approaches and initiatives—or, more precisely, with a possible reading of these approaches and initiatives—lays in the excessive trust and emphasis that has been reserved to formulas concerning the purpose of the corporation and their possible consequences. Mayer argues that the corporate contract should include a reference to stakeholders and general social interests beyond value for shareholders, suggesting that this simple trick would have a meaningful impact on business conduct.
(…) The reasons are obvious.
First, these formulas are so broad, vague and ephemeral that they cannot possibly represent a compass for corporate action; they cannot provide meaningful guidance for virtually any specific corporate decision that implies a (legitimate) tradeoff between the interests of different stakeholders. Also, as precedents show, these formulas can be used even less to invoke the violation of directors’ duties and their liability. This conclusion is inevitable because the very essence of the agency relationship, the crucial function of a director or executive, is exactly mediating and balancing the different and often conflicting interests that converge on the corporation in an uncertain and evolving scenario. The idea of constraining the necessary discretion of directors within the boundaries of a simple purpose declaration is no better than the idea of writing in the contract with a painter that her work must be a masterpiece. Such an attempted shortcut to real value is self-evidently flawed.
Second, multiplying the goals and interests that directors must or can pursue, if it can have any effect at all, by definition increases their flexibility and discretion and makes it easier to justify, ex ante and ex post, very different choices. Without being cynical, from this perspective it is not surprising that these formulas are often welcomed, if not sponsored, by business associations and interest groups linked to managers, executives and entrenched shareholders.
Third, self-regulation and private ordering are often a way to avoid or delay the adoption of more stringent statutory or regulatory provisions. The former might be more or less effective, but they might also create an illusion of responsibility. The risk of putting too much trust into the beneficial consequences of these formulas is a disregard for more biting mandatory provisions, which may be necessary to avoid externalities and other market failures.
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Bonjour à toutes et à tous, voici une intéressante tribune parue dans The Globe and Mail : « Why Canada should adopt pay ratio disclosures » (19 avril 2020).
In particular, securities regulators should make pay ratio disclosures mandatory to improve transparency of executive pay packages at public companies. Pay ratio disclosures reveal the difference in the total remuneration between a company’s top executives and its rank and file workers….
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Par la voix de Carter Dougherty, l’Americans for Financial Reform a adressé sa réponse à la SEC à propos de la divulgation obligatoire du risque COVID-19 : « SEC Should Mandate Disclosures on COVID-19 Risks and Responses » (1er juillet 2020).
The impact of the losses on shareholders will be significant. Investors, however, are being forced to rely on news reports to try to understand how the crisis is impacting companies in their portfolios and how those companies are responding. The SEC must act to require companies to provide consistent, reliable data to investors about the economic impact of the pandemic on their business, human capital management practices, and supply chain risks. These disclosures should include:
Prior to the onset of COVID-19, it was often argued that human rights, worker protection and supply chain matters were moral issues not relevant to a company’s financial performance. As millions of workers are laid off and supply chains unravel, the pandemic has proven that view wrong. Businesses that protect workers and consumers will be better positioned to continue operations and respond to consumer demand throughout the pandemic. The disclosures outlined above will provide investors with important information to help them understand how COVID-19 is impacting the companies they are invested in. In addition, by requiring these disclosures, the Commission has the opportunity to encourage companies to review their current practices and consider whether updates are necessary in light of recent events. The process of preparing these disclosures may help some public companies to recognize that their current practices are not sufficiently robust to protect their workers, consumers, supply chains and, as a result, their investors’ capital given the impact of the pandemic.
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