Normes d’encadrement | Page 6

En cette période estivale, suivre l’actualité est toujours intéressant. Ma lecture d’un article ce matin « Renewed Interest in IPOs of Public Benefit Corporations » (de Cydney Posner) m’apprenait que l’État américain du Delaware est en train de débattre d’une réforme législative en matière d’entreprise à mission !

Pour accéder à cette réforme : ici

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These and other similar risks are some of the reasons that, in adopting laws authorizing PBCs, the Delaware legislature made it particularly difficult to convert a traditional corporation to a PBC. For example, currently, the approval of 2/3 of the outstanding stock is required for a traditional corporation to amend its certificate of incorporation to become a PBC or to merge with another entity if the effect of the merger is to convert the shares into shares of a PBC. (Note that, originally, the vote required for conversion was 90%, which made it well nigh impossible for a traditional public company to convert to a PBC.) Appraisal rights are available to stockholders that did not vote in favor of the conversion or merger. And the same vote is required for conversion from a PBC form of entity into a traditional corporation.

The legislation that was just passed by the House in Delaware would, if ultimately signed into law, eliminate the 2/3 voting requirements, making it easier to convert a traditional corporation to a PBC or a PBC to a traditional corporation. Only the standard stockholder vote provisions would be applicable—generally a vote of a majority of the outstanding shares (or any greater or other vote required under the company’s certificate of incorporation) would be required. The amendments would also eliminate the special appraisal rights provisions, with the result that appraisal rights would not be available for conversions resulting from amendments to the certificate, but standard appraisal rights (§262) would be available in the context of mergers.

In addition, as noted above, the current PBC statute mandates that the board of directors manage the business and affairs of the PBC by balancing “the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.” The statute provides that, with respect to a decision implicating the “balance requirement,” directors of PBCs will be deemed to satisfy their fiduciary duties to stockholders and the corporation if their decision “is both informed and disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.” A PBC is also permitted to include in its certificate, for purposes of its director exculpatory provisions under §102(b)(7) and its indemnification provisions under §145, that any disinterested failure to satisfy the mandate will not be considered to “constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.”

The new legislation would also amp up the protections for directors of a PBC. The amendments would clarify that a director would not be considered “interested” in connection with a balancing decision solely because of the director’s interest in stock of the corporation, except to the extent that the same ownership would create a conflict of interest if the corporation were not a PBC. The amendments would also provide that, in the absence of a conflict, no failure to satisfy the balancing requirement would, for purposes of §102(b)(7) or §145, be considered “an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty, unless the certificate of incorporation so provides.” That is, the certificate would no longer need to expressly provide for the protection for it to apply. In addition, the amendments would provide that, to bring any lawsuit to enforce the PBC balancing requirement, the plaintiffs must own at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, for PBCs listed on a national securities exchange, shares with a market value of at least $2 million, if lower.

À la prochaine…

Selon un article de Les Échos.fr (« L’Allemagne s’attaque à l’éthique de ses entreprises à l’étranger », 15 juillet 2020), Berlin prépare pour la rentrée un projet de loi sur le respect des normes environnementales et sociales sur la chaîne d’approvisionnement des entreprises allemandes.

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C’est un jeans bleu produit au Bangladesh, taille haute, banal, mais « il coûte 7 euros aux distributeurs allemands avec toutes les certifications nécessaires sur le respect des droits de l’homme par le producteur. Sans ces normes, il arrive sur le marché allemand à 5 euros : la différence est de 2 euros ». Un pantalon ou des sachets de thé à la main, le ministre allemand du Développement, Gerd Müller, s’est voulu très pédagogue en présentant mardi, à Berlin, les résultats d’une enquête sur le respect des normes sociales et environnementales internationales par les entreprises allemandes.

20 % des entreprises respectent les normes

Selon cette enquête, 98 multinationales allemandes, sur les 455 ayant répondu, respectent leurs engagements, et « c’est déjà une surprise », fait valoir Gerd Müller. « Clairement, l’Allemagne ne peut continuer à traiter la question du respect des normes sociales sur une base volontaire », en conclut Hubertus Heil, le ministre du Travail allemand.

Un cadre général devrait être présenté en août et un projet de loi sur les chaînes d’approvisionnement sera mis sur la table à la rentrée parlementaire, a-t-il annoncé. Son ambition : assurer une gestion des risques « proportionnée et raisonnable » par les entreprises et mettre en place des sanctions avec des amendes ou l’exclusion de marchés publiques à la clef. La loi anticiperait des initiatives européennes annoncées par Bruxelles pour 2021.

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Minerva Analytics apporte une belle mise à jour à la problématique de la diversité en m’apprenant que la Grèce vient de renforcer son dispositif juridique en matière de féminisation : « Greek companies will soon be mandated to meet a 25% female quota on their boards following a landmark decision for gender diversity ».

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The quota requirement has been included as an amendment to the bill transposing the EU Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II) into Greek law, and is the result of a consultation led by a group of academics specialising in corporate governance.

(…)

Overall, the directive is designed to encourage companies away from short-termism, focusing on areas such as director remuneration. However, the Greek amendment marks the first time it has been used to tackle the EU’s poor record on gender diversity at a board level.

According to the European Commission’s 2019 report on equality between men and women, since 2015, progress on corporate gender inclusivity has stalled. As of October 2018, the proportion of women on the boards of the EU’s biggest companies was only 26.7%.

Within this, France was the only EU member state with at least 40% female representation at board-level, while women account for less than a third of board-level positions in Italy, Sweden, Finland and Germany.

According to the same data, women made up less than 10% of board members in Greece.

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David Larcker, Bradford Lynch, Brian Tayan et Daniel Taylor publient un texte qui revient sur la transparence des ghrandes entreprises américaines en matière de COVID-19 « The Spread of Covid-19 Disclosure » (29 juin 2020). Un document plein de statistiques et de tendances sur la transparence… vraiment intéressant sachant que l’enjeu de la question n’est pas à négliger.

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The COVID-19 pandemic presents an interesting scenario whereby an unexpected shock to the economic system led to a rapid deterioration in the economic landscape, causing sharp changes in performance relative to expectations just a few months prior. For most companies, the pandemic has been detrimental. For a few, it brought unexpected demand. In many cases, supply chains have been strained, causing ripple effects that extend well beyond any one company.

How do companies respond to such a situation? What choices do they make, and how much transparency do they offer? How does disclosure vary in a setting where the potential impact is so widely uncertain? The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique setting to examine disclosure choices in a situation of extreme uncertainty that extends across all companies in the public market. This devastating outlier event provides a rare glimpse into disclosure behavior by managers and boards.

Why This Matters

1. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to examine disclosure practices of companies relative to peers in real time about a somewhat unprecedented shock that impacted practically every publicly listed company in the U.S. We see that decisions varied considerably about whether to make disclosure and, if so, what and how much to say about the pandemic’s impact on operations, finances, and future. What motivates some companies to be forthcoming about what they are experiencing, while others remain silent? Does this reflect different degrees of certitude about how the virus would impact their businesses, or differences in managements’ perception of their “obligations” to be transparent with the public? What does this say about a company’s view of its relation and duty to shareholders?
2. In one example, we saw a consumer beverage company make zero references to COVID-19 in its SEC filings and website, despite the virus plausibly having at least some impact on its business. In another example, we saw a company claim no material changes to its previously reported risk factors when managers almost certainly had relevant information about the virus and the likely impact on sales and operations. What discussion among the senior managers, board members, external auditor, and general counsel leads to a decision to make no disclosures? What should shareholders glean from this decision, particularly in light of peer disclosure?
3. The COVID-19 pandemic represents a so-called “black swan” event that inflicted severe and unexpected damage to wide swaths of the economy. What strategic insights will companies learn from this event? Can boards use these insights to prepare for other possible outlier events, such as climate events, terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and other emergencies? Should these insights be disclosed to shareholders?

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Intéressant article du Financial Times du 1er juillet 2020 qui revient sur le modèle allemand « German corporations — and regulation — are in the dock ».

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Now the consensual German model of business has suffered multiple mechanical failures. Wirecard, the payments group that bolstered German tech credentials, has imploded in fraud. Bayer is taking up to $11bn in charges mostly triggered by a disastrous US takeover. Once-proud conglomerates Siemens and Thyssenkrupp are shrinking. Volkswagen’s service life shortens each time Tesla’s outlook improves.

(…) Germany, can we talk? “Sure. I’m driving but I’m German so that’s second nature,” jokes an economist via his hands-free, “I don’t think there is any common thread between Wirecard and these other examples.” According to him, the worst accidents occur when German business adopts US ways. Wirecard had a two-tier board structure, like most German businesses. But its supervisory board was seemingly full of corporate yespersons, not vigilant workers as governance rules dictate. And the group was led by a bossy entrepreneur. Kenneth Amaeshi, a professor of business at Edinburgh university, disagrees with such exceptionalism. He believes the Wirecard scandal puts German stakeholder capitalism “in the dock”. It points to a structural weakness of regulation, he says. He is right.

(…) Corporate governance must be overhauled this time.

Supervisory boards must shrink, meet more often and include more independent directors. Regulators must adopt the adversarial approach of US peers. Industrial giants should unbundle further to create a new tier of focused medium-sized businesses. Siemens’ 2018 flotation of Healthineers, a healthcare equipment unit, shows what can be done. Germany’s biggest challenge is spurring investment in disruptive technology. Business has depended on debt finance from risk-averse investors. But there is no lack of equity, as Guntram Wolff of Bruegel, a think-tank, points out. It features as retained corporate earnings rather than footloose investment capital. This is reflected in total equity of some €1.2tn on the balance sheets of Germany’s top 100 quoted companies, according to S&P Global data. Tax breaks are needed to chivvy more of this capital into start-ups and electric vehicle development. It would be a shame to waste two good crises — the meltdown of the German model plus coronavirus. Moreover, support is growing worldwide for stakeholder capitalism, in which social and environmental goals rank alongside profits. Germany just needs to reduce its emphasis on safe jobs for workers and well-networked managers. A little less consensus can make the German model roadworthy again.

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Dans le dossier Droit du travail et droit des sociétés : questions d’actualité réalisé sous la coordination scientifique de Jérôme Chacornac et Grégoire Duchange, je signale deux articles intéressants touchant les thématiques du blogue :

• L’obligation de prendre en considération les enjeux sociaux : quel impact pour les salariés d’une société ? Par Matthieu Buchberger
• Les administrateurs représentant les salariés : un renforcement de principe mais des difficultés pratiques ignorées… Par Valentino Armillei

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