Normes d’encadrement

Bel article de M. Barker sur LinkedIn intitulé : « The irrelevance of agency theory during the Covid-19 crisis » (5 avril 2020). Il est effectivement temps de revoir le modèle de l’agence et sa place comme paradigme central de toute réflexion sur la gouvernance d’entreprise : d’autres modèles existent, il est bon de le rappeler !

Extrait :

The implicit mistrust between principals and agents must be replaced by a pooling of resources and know-how, and a more cooperative attitude to other stakeholders such as employees and society as a whole.

Corporate governance scholars have developed a range of alternative theoretical paradigms through which to embody this more team-based approach, including stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory. These frameworks seem to offer a more relevant perspective on what we should demand from corporate governance during the crisis.

A first is that non-executive directors should see themselves as sharing more of a common agenda with management. They must be prepared to work side by side with them in order to overcome the profound challenges being faced by most organisations at the current time.

Second, investors will have to exhibit greater trust in boards and management. Once they are satisfied that the right leadership is in place, they need to let them get on with it.

Third, it becomes more important than ever for boards to understand and incorporate into decision-making the different perspectives of groups whose motivation and participation is critical to the survival of the organisation. These will include middle managers, employees, customers, suppliers and the wider community.

Finally, we should not view existing shareholder rights as sacrosanct during the crisis. Shareholder rights are not the same thing as human rights, which should never be seen as negotiable. Rather, they are pragmatic arrangements that have been established in order to underpin the prosperity of the economy as a whole.

À la prochaine…

En réalité, cette success story exceptionnelle cache d’énormes difficultés pour l’Etat actionnaire. Le bilan chiffré des dix dernières années est éloquent. Au 22 février, le portefeuille de l’Etat (14 participations cotées dont ADP, EDF, PSA, Renault, etc.) était valorisé à 57,8 milliards d’euros, son plus bas niveau historique. Il valait 148,5 milliards d’euros fin 2008 !

Série de déboires pour l’Etat actionnaire

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Très beau papier dans The Economist intitulé « The Dark Art ». Cet article revient sur la puissance des grandes entreprises qui leur permet de développer des stratégies favorisant leurs seuls intérêts au détriment de celui des États et des consommateurs (évasion fiscale, lobbying…)

Companies are by nature competitive. That is mostly to be welcomed, but sometimes their competitive instincts play out in less welcome ways as they engage in some of the darker arts of management. The two most obvious ones are to pay as little tax as is legally possible, and to lobby governments and a variety of other bodies to gain an advantage over rivals. To a greater or lesser extent all companies do this. The big difference is that the superstar companies, being good at everything they do, are also much better than the rest at practising these dark arts and taking them mainstream

Les moyens des grandes entreprises les conduisent à être bonnes dans beaucoup de domaines dont celui de jouer avec les règles juridiques ou de les orienter :

This raises three worries. The first is that they will keep getting better at them, applying the same creative excellence to rule-bending as they do to running their business in general. Second, superstars might use the combination of these and other skills to build up impregnable advantages, giving them growing monopoly power. Third, as their businesses become more mature, they may come to rely increasingly on those dark arts.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, le Parlement devrait adopter d’ici à la fin du mois d’octobre la loi Sapin 2 qui impose notamment un vote contraignant des actionnaires des sociétés cotées en AG concernant la rémunération des dirigeants. Une démarche à risques estime Fabrice Rémon, Fondateur de Gouvernance en Actions.

Accéder ici à capsule-vidéo

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Ivan Tchotourian

Alors que Theresa May a fait part de son intérêt d’importer en Grande-Bretagne le système allemand, MM. Horst Eidenmüller,  Mathias Habersack, Caspar Behme et Lars Klöhn  reviennent sur la pertinence de cette proposition en jetant un regard prudent (de chercheurs !) sur ce système : « Corporate Co-Determination German-Style as a Model for the UK? » (18 juillet 2016).

On 13 July 2016, Theresa May took up office as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Only shortly before, she had made headlines when she proposed to adopt European-style worker representation on the boards of leading companies.

Corporate co-determination hence seems to gain a certain degree of popularity with the British government – which is highly astonishing, considering that it was the UK which most fiercely fought against co-determination on a European level. It was mainly the diverging views of the UK and Germany on co-determination which have thwarted projects like the Draft Fifth Company Law Directive or the establishment of a European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea, SPE). It is downright ironic that while the UK now shows an interest in co-determination, the concept is being questioned in Germany after decades of lying dormant. The reason for the new German discussion of co-determination are doubts regarding the compatibility of its specific form of co-determination with higher-ranking Union law. This post provides a brief overview of the most recent developments in German co-determination law that were the focus of a joint Oxford/Munich conference at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) in Munich in March 2016.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le blog de l’Université d’Oxford publie un très récent billet analysant sur le dilemme et la position délicate dans laquelle peut être placé l’État actionnaire : « Exercise of Shareholder Control Over a State Owned Enterprise – Comments on Comissão de Valores Mobiliários’s decision in the Eletrobras case » (par le professeur Mario Engler Pinto Junior).

The Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), the Brazilian equivalent of the SEC, has recently imposed sanctions on the Federal Government for actions taken as the controlling shareholder of the public company Eletrobras. More precisely, the sanctions were imposed on the Federal Government for voting in a general meeting to grant approval of an Elecrobras significant transaction. CVM considered that the Federal Government had a conflict of interest and should have abstained from voting in a shareholders’ meeting called to approve the renewal of the concession contract held by Eletrobras and its subsidiaries for electrical power generation.

 In Brazil, the Federal Government is also the public authority responsible for regulating the electrical sector. According to CVM, the renewal of the concession contract for electrical power generation was a related party transaction that could bring indirect economic benefits to the Federal Government.

My paper criticizes CVM’s approach, arguing that the contract renewal was a legitimate public policy decision in the context of the electrical sector as a whole.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian