Normes d’encadrement

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, voici une belle information pour celles et ceux intéressés par les problématiques de gouvernance et de droit des marchés. La province de l’Ontario a mis en place un groupe de travail pour envisager des réformes à l’encadrement réglementaire. 70 propositions ont été faites et la consultation sur celles-ci est ouverte jusqu’en septembre 2020 : « Capital Markets Modernisation Taskforce ».

Voici un résumé des principales pistes explorées… vraiment intéressant !

Extrait :

The CMMT was formed in February 2020 and reports directly to the Minister of Finance. It was tasked to develop “bold, innovative recommendations” to improve how capital markets function in Canada. 

Twelve of the drafted proposals specifically target shareholder voting and company transparency, with the taskforce identifying an “imbalance” among Canada’s proxy and shareholder voting systems. Several stakeholders raised concerns to the CMMT about the influence of proxy advisors, errors in their reports and potential conflicts of interests where voting recommendations and consulting services were provided to the same businesses.  

To remedy this, the CMMT proposes establishing a new regulatory framework that would provide companies with the right to ‘rebut’ reports from proxy advisors. In addition, the taskforce also hopes to restrict conflicts of interest by limiting the services proxy advisors can offer. 

Several of the other proposals are aimed at reforming and improving the proxy plumbing. For instance, currently in Canada, the majority of shareholder votes are cast via proxies using either the company’s or dissident’s proxy ballot. Unfortunately, this means such proxy cards can look different and often confuse investors. 

Therefore, the CMMT proposes the use of universal proxy ballots to improve standardisation and mandate voting disclosure for each side when a dispute arises.  

At the same time, the taskforce has also proposed introducing rules to prevent over-voting and the requirement for companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to have an annual shareholder votes on executive compensation. In further efforts to improve corporate governance standards, the taskforce proposes further legislative guidance be made around the role of independent directors in a bid to avoid conflicts of interest from arising, arguing that current laws do not fully address the role such directors play. 

Elsewhere, the taskforce wants to reduce the ownership threshold for early warning reporting disclosure in Canadian companies from 10% to 5%. This would bring Canada in line with other major markets, with the CMMT also acknowledging that a shareholder can currently requisition a meeting with a holding of as little as 5%.  

In a bid to improve transparency, the CMMT is also proposing the adoption of quarterly filing requirements for institutional investors of Canadian companies and – in a very encouraging step – the introduction of enhanced disclosure of material ESG information. 

With stronger ESG reporting, Canada would be following in the footsteps of other jurisdictions and create a level playing field for its companies. In particular the taskforce identified the metrics used by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) as potential solutions.  

Other CMMT’s recommendations include giving regulators new and enhanced powers when dealing with listed entities. For instance, the taskforce has proposed empowering the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) to issue no-action letters. This already happens in the US where a company can seek a no-action letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission when it has the basis to exclude a particular shareholder proposal. 

The CMMT has also proposed the introduction of broader remedies for the OSC when dealing with mergers and acquisitions. The taskforce proposes granting the OSC similar powers to those recently granted to the British Columbia Securities Commission, which can now rescind a transaction, require a person to dispose of securities in connection with a deal or even prohibit them from exercising voting rights.

À la prochaine…

Par l’intermédiaire de Julien Robitaille-Rodrigue, le cabinet Stikeman Elliott revient sur les programmes de dénonciation québécois et ontarien avec une question simple : « Les récompenses financières favorisent-elles la dénonciation? Le Québec et l’Ontario : deux approches à l’essai »  (7 novembre 2017).

Extrait

The Answer: Too Early To Tell

Despite this potential similarity and the satisfactory quantitative results produced by both models, the relative success of each program remains hard to determine at this relatively early point.

To date, it appears that the lack of financial awards has not negatively affected the AMF whistleblower program. Beyond the total number of received reports however, it is possible that financial incentives have a qualitative impact on whistleblower disclosures. Only when we have data on the quality of the received tips and the likelihood of these tips to result in actual proceedings, will we be able to accurately appreciate the value of each model.

In any event, the AMF program’s early success will certainly comfort the Alberta Securities Commission, who announced earlier this year that it was exploring the creation of a whistleblower program but ruled out offering financial incentives to whistleblowers, that it made the right decision.

À toutes fins utiles, je vous rappelle que j’avais publié un billet de blogue sur Contact au sujet du programme de dénonciation mis en place au Québec : « Dénonciation: nouvel outil éthique des entreprises » (13 octobre 2016).

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

La province de l’Ontario est en train de travailler sur une réforme de son droit des sociétés comme en témoigne ce document « Business Law Advisory Council Fall 2016 Report » déposé au début du mois de mars.

The Ministry of Government and Consumer Services sought public feedback on the draft report of the Business Law Advisory Council (BLAC) to the Minister of Government and Consumer Services on priorities and recommendations for reform of Ontario’s corporate and commercial legislation from November 16 to December 12, 2016.

Following the Council’s consideration of the consultation feedback, the Council has now finalized the report. Attached is the final report submitted by BLAC to the Minister on February 3, 2017.

This report suggests recommendations to amend the following acts:
• the Business Corporations Act
• the Personal Property Security Act
• the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000 (and the General Regulation under the Act)

It also now includes the following three issues for future consideration:
• board diversity
• majority voting
• benefit corporations

Extrait sur le vote majoritaire :

Under the OBCA (and most other Canadian corporate statutes), shareholders do not have the right to vote against a candidate for election to the board of directors. Majority voting is a work around that requires a public company to give shareholders the ability to vote for or withhold their votes (the only options under the OBCA) from individual directors and to have the numbers voted for and withheld made public. In its current form in Canada, directors who did not receive a majority of votes cast in favour of their election must tender their resignations to the board. It is then for the board to determine whether or not it is in the best interests of the corporation for the board to accept the resignation of any director.

Majority voting in various forms has been adopted by Canadian public companies since 2006. In 2014 the Toronto Stock Exchange made majority voting mandatory for its listed issuers.

There are many who do not believe that the TSX requirement is enough. Among other things, it leaves with the board of directors the authority to decide whether a director who has not received a majority of votes in favour of his or her election should remain on the board. Moreover, the TSX provisions do not apply to public companies that are listed on the TSX Venture Exchange. In September 2016, the federal government introduced proposed amendments to the CBCA which would result in director candidates who have not received a majority of votes cast in favour of their election not being elected (subject to certain exceptions).

Majority voting is an important priority for the Council. We are reviewing the approach in the proposed amendments to the CBCA and whether improvements could be made to this approach in developing proposals for the OBCA.

Extrait sur les Benefit Corporations :

3. Benefit Corporations

Benefit corporations are for profit corporations that have a broad purpose to create value for all stakeholders. The directors and officers of these entities are required to consider the impact of their decisions on shareholders, but also on employees, society and on the environment. In the U.S. 30 states (as well as the District of Columbia) have adopted legislation that provides for the creation of benefit corporations. Legislation providing for benefit corporations exists or is under discussion in other jurisdictions around the world as well.

Benefit corporations are different from social enterprise legislation currently in force in British Columbia and Nova Scotia. The legislation in those provinces provide for forms of « hybrid corporations » which are similar in form to not-for-profit corporations, but which also have a limited ability to engage in business activities (and are subject to a number of restrictions not imposed on for-profit organizations). The Ontario government has also explored the introduction of legislation to facilitate hybrid corporations as part of its social enterprise strategy.

The Council has received input on the value of and demand for benefit corporation legislation in Ontario and will consider this issue further.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Pour appuyer la finance sociale, le Canada a proposé par le passé de mobiliser les actifs des caisses de retraite. Dans cette optique, le rapport de 2010 du Groupe de travail sur la finance sociale a encouragé les gouvernements fédéraux et provinciaux du Canada à exiger des caisses de retraite qu’elles divulguent leurs pratiques d’investissement responsable. Le 27 novembre 2014, le gouvernement de l’Ontario a déposé le Règlement de l’Ontario 235/14 (règlement modificatif) pris en vertu de la Loi sur les régimes de retraite de l’Ontario. Au travers ce règlement (ici), le Parlement ontarien a décidé de rendre obligatoire à compter du 1^er janvier 2016 la divulgation de la prise en compte des questions environnementales, sociales et de gouvernance dans l’énoncé des politiques et procédures de placement des plans de retraite agréés. Le texte est rédigé comme suit : « A statement that the administrator of the pension plan must establish a statement of investment policies and procedures for the plan that contains, (i) the investment policies and procedures in respect of the plan’s portfolio of investments and loans, and (ii) information about whether environmental, social and governance factors are incorporated into the plan’s investment policies and procedures and, if so, how those factors are incorporated ».

Depuis mars 2016, les administrateurs des régimes de retraite déposent donc un énoncé des politiques et procédures de placement auprès du surintendant des services financiers contenant des renseignements précisant si des facteurs environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance sont intégrés dans l’énoncé des politiques et des procédures de placement du régime et, dans l’affirmative, comment ils le sont. Pour les relevés annuels remis aux participants actifs, le règlement modifié exige que tous les relevés annuels fournis depuis le 1^erjuillet 2016 contiennent des renseignements sur l’énoncé des politiques et procédures de placement du régime, y compris des renseignements précisant si des facteurs environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance sont intégrés dans l’énoncé des politiques et des procédures de placement du régime et, dans l’affirmative, comment ils le sont.

Dans un article de Benefits Canada intitulé « Pension plans still grappling with ESG definition despite new rules », le constat de la pratique observée se montre critique :

Even with new rules implemented in Ontario this year, the issue of environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors remains a tricky question for Canada’s pension plans as they face a lack of perfect clarity around the definition of what they entail.

That was definitely the experience of RBC’s defined contribution pension team as it tried to wrap its head around Ontario’s new ESG requirement. Under new rules implemented this year, Ontario’s pension plan administrators need to mention in their statement of investment policies and procedures whether they’ve incorporated ESG factors into the investment process and, if so, how and if not, why not.

Even though these are “seemingly easy questions,” they really aren’t, said Angela Lin-Reeve, portfolio manager, pension investments, at RBC, during Benefits Canada’s 2016 Benefits and Pension Summit in Toronto on March 31. “We had to get educated because this wasn’t an angle we were used to in evaluating investments,” she said, adding that the small size of her team — just two full-time employees — made things even more difficult.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian