Gouvernance | Page 107

Dans « Why Enron Remains Relevant » (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 2 décembre 2016), Michael W. Peregrine aborde les leçons de l’affaire Enron, 15 ans après. Un bel article !

The fifteenth anniversary of the Enron bankruptcy (December 2, 2001) provides an excellent opportunity for the general counsel to review with a new generation of corporate officers and directors the problematic board conduct that proved to have seismic and lasting implications for corporate governance. The self-identified failures of Enron director oversight not only led to what was at the time the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, but also served as a leading prompt for the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the corporate responsibility movement that followed. For those reasons, the Enron bankruptcy remains one of the most consequential governance developments in corporate history.

Enron evolved from a natural gas company to what was by 2001 a highly diversified energy trading enterprise that pursued various forms of particularly complex transactions. Among these were the soon-to-be notorious related party transactions in which Enron financial management executives held lucrative economic interests. (These were the so-called “Star Wars” joint ventures, with names such as “Jedi”, “Raptor” and “Chewco”). Not only was Enron’s management team experienced, both its board and its audit committee were composed of individuals with broad and diverse business, accounting and regulatory backgrounds.

In the late 1990s the company experienced rapid growth, such that by March 2001 its stock was trading at 55 times earnings. However, that rapid growth attracted substantial scrutiny, including reports in the financial press that seriously questioned whether such high value could be sustained. These reports focused in part on the complexity and opaqueness of the company’s financial statements, that made it difficult to accurately track its source of income.

By mid-summer 2001 its share price began to drop; CEO Jeff Skilling unexpectedly resigned in August; the now-famous Sherron Watkins whistleblower letter was sent (anonymously) to Board Chair Ken Lay on August 15. On October 16, the company announced its intention to restate its financial statements from 1997 to 2007. On October 21 the SEC announced that it had commenced an investigation of the related party transactions. Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow was fired on October 25 after disclosing to the board that he had earned $30 million from those transactions. On October 29, Enron’s credit rating was lowered. A possible purchaser of Enron terminated negotiations on November 28, and the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on December 2.

The rest became history: the collapse of the company; the individual criminal prosecutions and convictions; the obstruction of justice verdict against company and, for Arthur Andersen (subsequently but belatedly overturned); the loss of scores of jobs and the collateral damage to the city of Houston; Mr. Lay’s sudden death; and, ultimately the 2002 enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, which was intended to prevent future accounting, financial and governance failings as had occurred in Enron and other similar corporate scandals. But a 2016 Enron board briefing would be much more than a financial history lesson. For the continuing relevance of Enron is at least two-fold

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Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, ça y est la France l’a fait : elle a adopté le devoir de vigilance pour les grandes entreprises. Le 30 novembre dernier, l’Assemblée nationale a finalement adopté, en dernière lecture cette nouvelle obligation. Si la nouvelle est à saluer, le texte se révèle éloigné des ambitions affichées au départ. Ce commentaire publié dans Les Échos.fr « L’Assemblée nationale adopte une vision répressive de la loi sur le devoir de vigilance des multinationales » revient sur un certain nombre de critiques :

Et encore :

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Ivan Tchotourian

Le 10 octobre, The National Law Review a publié un article intéressant revenant sur la situation britannique et les réformes à venir en gouvernance d’entreprise : « UK Corporate Governance: Change Has Got to Come! ».

A number of themes trailed in UK’s Theresa May’s first speech after securing the Conservative nomination, were repeated at last week’s Conservative Party conference in Birmingham. The new Government reiterated its intention to occupy the centre ground of British politics and the delivery of this political objective will undoubtedly have implications for corporate Britain – in the words of the Prime Minister “ a change has got to come.”

At the moment we are short on detail, but the Government has promised to publish plans later this year to have consumers and workers represented on company boards of directors. Speech soundbites also focussed on executive pay, the taxation of international business and the payment of excessive dividends, together with a more general promise to protect and enhance workers’ rights.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Quel bel article d’Alana Semuels dans The Atlantic (ici) ! Cette étude revient sur la politique des fonds de couverture (hedge funds) et l’implication de leur activisme sur les politiques et les stratégies mises en place par les entreprises américaines.

Extrait :

DuPont is one of dozens of American companies that have abandoned a long-term approach to doing business after being the target of so-called activist investors. These investors buy up shares of a company and attempt to maximize the returns to their shares, usually by replacing members of the board of directors with hand-picked candidates who will push the company to cut costs. Activity by such investors has skyrocketed of late. In a 20-month stretch in 2005 and 2006, there were only 52 activist campaigns, according to John C. Coffee, a professor at Columbia University Law School. Between 2010 and early 2014, by contrast, there were 1,115 activist campaigns. “Hedge-fund activism has recently spiked, almost hyperbolically,” Coffee writes in a 2016 paper, “The Wolf at The Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance.”

These campaigns are damaging to the long-term outlook of individual companies like DuPont and also to America’s economy more generally. They often result in big cuts to research and development, substantial reductions in the workforce, and a focus on outcomes—in particular short-term profit—that hurt a company’s ability to survive in the long-term. The threat of activism affects companies across the economy: Even public companies not targeted by activists often change their behavior and cut costs to avoid becoming a target. This may be one of the reasons why America is slipping in funding research and development projects when compared with other countries.

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Ivan Tchotourian

C’est sous le titre d’« actionnaire propriétaire » que Gérard Bérubé publie une intéressante tribune dans Le Devoir de ce matin. Si cet article revient sur les propos tenus lors d’une conférence (et notamment de l’importance de reconnaître la place des actionnaires propriétaires, je ne peux que douter de cette assimilation faite entre les actionnaires et les propriétaires (entendons-nous, je me place sur le terrain juridique). Répétons-le : l’actionnaire n’est pas le propriétaire de l’entreprise, entreprise qui n’appartient à personne !

L’étiquette d’actionnaire touriste a été popularisée par Yvan Allaire, président exécutif du conseil d’administration de l’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP). Gaétan Morin a plutôt évoqué lundi la notion d’actionnaire propriétaire. Mais tous deux font l’éloge d’un certain « capitalisme de propriétaires » et dénoncent la dictature de marchés obnubilés par les rendements de court terme ou imposant leur diktat de l’immédiat.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Un article du Timely Disclosure de Me Lindzon Russell aborde la situation des entreprises canadiennes face à l’activismes des investisseurs : « Canadian Issuers Continue To Have Success Against Activist Investors ». Résultat : elles résistent bien !

As noted in the Globe and Mail’s recent article, “In Canada’s boardrooms, activist investors are striking out” (subscription to the Globe and Mail required), Canadian listed public companies have continued to have success against activist investors. In fact, since January 1, 2015, Canadian listed issuers have a perfect record against “professional” activists in formal proxy contests, having won all six such contests to make changes to the board which were initiated by hedge funds or institutional investors. This success may be driven, at least in part, by issuers’ increased emphasis on advance preparation, including shareholder engagement. If issuers are more attuned to the views of their shareholders, it stands to reason that they will be in a better position to assess the likelihood of successfully defending against an activist in a formal proxy contest and pre-emptively settle those situations that they do not believe they can win. This explanation, while compelling, may be incomplete. With that in mind, I offer the following five observations based on a review of the public record of unsuccessful contests recently initiated by “professional” activists.

Je vous laisse découvrir les 5 observations de l’auteur…

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Ivan Tchotourian