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Bel article publié au Financial Times du 21 octobre 2016 : « Want to change banking culture? Back whistleblowers ». Après le scandale Wells Fargo, le journaliste revient sur la réforme de la culture bancaire dans laquelle les programmes de dénonciation ont toute leur place à condition que les dénonciateurs soient protégés.

Morceaux choisis :

Bill Dudley asked a couple of good questions this week, addressing a conference on reforming bank culture at the New York Federal Reserve.

“When people speak up to point out potential conduct issues, how are they treated?” said the Fed president, who spent about 20 years at Goldman Sachs before joining the reserve bank. “Are they held up as examples to emulate, or are they discouraged or even penalised?”

(…) There is a lot that needs to change, says Michael Winston. He is one of four former senior executives who have formed a group called Bank Whistleblowers United, pursuing a mission, they say, of restoring accountability to Wall Street.

(…) “If we want people to come forward, like in the Wells Fargo situation, we need to respect them, not punish them,” he says. “I know a lot of whistleblowers; nobody sees any protection. None.”

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Intéressant ce que relaie le Time. Il y a un des candidats à l’élection présidentielle américaine a invoqué le devoir fiduciaire pour justifier les politiques d’évitement fiscales qu’il a mises en œuvre pendant de nombreuses années : « Donald Trump’s ‘Fiduciary Duty’ Excuse on Taxes Is Just Plain Wrong ». Qu’en penser ? Pour la journaliste Rana Foroohar, la réponse est claire : « The Donald and his surrogates say he has a legal responsibility to minimize tax payments for his shareholders. It’s not a good excuse ».

It’s hard to know what to say to the New York Times’ revelation that Donald Trump lost so much money running various casino and hotel businesses into the ground in the mid-1990s ($916 million to be exact) that he could have avoided paying taxes for a full 18 years as a result (which may account for why he hasn’t voluntarily released his returns—they would make him look like a failure).

But predictably, Trump did have a response – fiduciary duty made me do it. So, how does the excuse stack up? Does Donald Trump, or any taxpayer, have a “fiduciary duty,” or legal responsibility, to maximize his income or minimize his payments on his personal taxes? In a word, no. “His argument is legal nonsense,” says Cornell University corporate and business law professor Lynn Stout,

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, ce matin, je vous propose de retourner sur l’intéressant sujet des agences de conseil en vote (proxy advisors) au travers ce billet du Harvard Law School Forum : « The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design » (par Nadya Malenko et Yao Shen).

À quelle conclusion arrivent ces auteurs ?

Overall, our article suggests that at least based on the sample of 2010-2011 say-on-pay votes, the influence of ISS does not seem overstated. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the role and economic impact of proxy advisory firms.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

« Petit » billet proposé par Findley Davies revenant sur les sujets chauds en matière de rémunération des hauts dirigeants : « Hot Topics in Executive Compensation » (par Brad Smith).

Voici un extrait :

Areas of Interest :

a. Evergreen renewals of executive compensation agreements

b. Golden parachute excise tax gross ups

c. Guaranteed bonuses/equity grants

d. « Excessive » severance or perquisites

e. « Liberal » change of control definitions and/or payouts

f. Single trigger vesting of equity grants

g. Reconciliation of non-GAAP performance measures to GAAP

• Trends in executive compensation design

Observations :

a. Mandatory holding periods after vesting are growing in popularity for accounting purposes.

b. A portfolio approach (more than one vehicle) is becoming the norm for delivery of long term incentive compensation.

c. Total Shareholder Return is becoming a more popular performance metric.

d. Clawbacks are becoming more of a standard practice in executive compensation in light of upcoming Dodd-Frank regulations.

e. Use of stock options is becoming less common because of accounting issues and advisory firms’ stance that they are not pay for performance.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Spencer Stuart vient de publier son étude 2016 sur les CA : « 2016 Global Board of Directors Survey ». Qu’en retenir ?

• Political and Economic Landscape: Uncertainty dominates boardroom Outlook
• Political and Economic Landscape: Economy, regulations and cybersecurity top issues for directors
• Company Risks: Women directors report higher concerns about risk than male directors
• Strategy: Top challenges differ for public and private companies
• Boardroom Grades: Directors consider boards weaker in people-related processes
• Board Turnover: Directors—especially women—favor tools to trigger change
• Board Diversity: Greater independence doesn’t always drive greater diversity
• Boardroom Diversity: Quotas not supported overall
• Boardroom Diversity: Search firms have been successful in expanding the talent pool of qualified female directors

Le Harvard Law School Forum résume comme suit cette étude :

Corporate boards face no shortage of challenges—from economic uncertainty to strategic and competitive shifts to a dynamic set of risks. Investor attention to board performance and governance has also escalated, and many boards are holding themselves to higher standards. Directors want to ensure that their boards contribute at the highest level, incorporating diverse perspectives, aligning with shareholder interests and setting a positive tone at the top for the organization.

Yet our research has revealed a gap between best practice and reality, especially in areas such as board diversity, HR/talent management, CEO succession planning and director evaluations. But the study provides hope that boards will make progress, as directors support practices that can help promote change. Future research is needed to track progress on these fronts and to study the impact of measures such as quotas and diversity on board performance.

Amid the many challenges confronting corporations—and the growing expectations on corporate boards—directors must be thoughtful about defining the skill sets needed around the board table and diligent in recruiting the right directors, planning for CEO succession and evaluating their own performance. In this way, they will be best positioned to contribute at the high levels which they are demanding of themselves, and to which others are holding them accountable

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Intéressant éclairage apporté par Paula Loop sur LinkedIn à propos de la notion d’engagement qui est devenu une notion incontournable de droit de la gouvernance d’entreprise : « Shareholder engagement: What does success look like? ».

Petit extrait :

Shareholder engagement is a hot topic these days and one that is frequently debated in the C-suite and boardroom. Traditionally, executives put a lot of emphasis on the role of Investor Relations in the engagement process, only rolling up their sleeves and getting involved if there was an issue or an event that called for additional effort.

Calls for more frequent director communication

But now we’re hearing investors say that they would like to hear from key executives—and even directors—on a more regular basis. Depending on the facts and circumstances, investors might like to hear from the company annually, or in some cases, more often. For some executives and directors, this is a new paradigm

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian