Gouvernance | Page 32

Le groupe européen d’experts en droit des sociétés vient de faire une proposition pour un droit des groupes : « A proposal for reforming group law in the European Union – Comparative observations on the way forward, October 2016 ».

The legal regime applicable to groups of companies in the European Union has been discussed for many years. National legislations have been adopted in a certain number of member states, and new initiatives are being considered by the European Commission and in academic writing. The central issues in groups of companies is the relationship between the controlling shareholder, often the parent company and the subsidiaries, and the potential for abuse to the detriment of the latter’s minority shareholders and creditors. Several answers have been formulated, going from a duty of the parent to indemnify the subsidiary for the charges imposed by the parent, to the acceptance of these charges provided they result in some benefit to the subsidiary and provided they do not endanger the subsidiary’s solvency. In a third approach, these issues may be solved by other common company law, e.g.  on the basis of the unfair prejudice provisions.  With respect to shareholder and creditor protection, a comparative analysis concludes that there is no need for additional regulatory safeguards. The present approaches indicate that group relations are often characterised by conflicts of interest. Therefore, it is proposed to develop a standard for dealing with these, especially under the form of Related Party Transactions.   The specific conditions for dealing with intragroup related party transactions are submitted for further discussion.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Bel article publié au Financial Times du 21 octobre 2016 : « Want to change banking culture? Back whistleblowers ». Après le scandale Wells Fargo, le journaliste revient sur la réforme de la culture bancaire dans laquelle les programmes de dénonciation ont toute leur place à condition que les dénonciateurs soient protégés.

Morceaux choisis :

Bill Dudley asked a couple of good questions this week, addressing a conference on reforming bank culture at the New York Federal Reserve.

“When people speak up to point out potential conduct issues, how are they treated?” said the Fed president, who spent about 20 years at Goldman Sachs before joining the reserve bank. “Are they held up as examples to emulate, or are they discouraged or even penalised?”

(…) There is a lot that needs to change, says Michael Winston. He is one of four former senior executives who have formed a group called Bank Whistleblowers United, pursuing a mission, they say, of restoring accountability to Wall Street.

(…) “If we want people to come forward, like in the Wells Fargo situation, we need to respect them, not punish them,” he says. “I know a lot of whistleblowers; nobody sees any protection. None.”

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Ivan Tchotourian

Intéressant ce que relaie le Time. Il y a un des candidats à l’élection présidentielle américaine a invoqué le devoir fiduciaire pour justifier les politiques d’évitement fiscales qu’il a mises en œuvre pendant de nombreuses années : « Donald Trump’s ‘Fiduciary Duty’ Excuse on Taxes Is Just Plain Wrong ». Qu’en penser ? Pour la journaliste Rana Foroohar, la réponse est claire : « The Donald and his surrogates say he has a legal responsibility to minimize tax payments for his shareholders. It’s not a good excuse ».

It’s hard to know what to say to the New York Times’ revelation that Donald Trump lost so much money running various casino and hotel businesses into the ground in the mid-1990s ($916 million to be exact) that he could have avoided paying taxes for a full 18 years as a result (which may account for why he hasn’t voluntarily released his returns—they would make him look like a failure).

But predictably, Trump did have a response – fiduciary duty made me do it. So, how does the excuse stack up? Does Donald Trump, or any taxpayer, have a “fiduciary duty,” or legal responsibility, to maximize his income or minimize his payments on his personal taxes? In a word, no. “His argument is legal nonsense,” says Cornell University corporate and business law professor Lynn Stout,

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Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, ce matin, je vous propose de retourner sur l’intéressant sujet des agences de conseil en vote (proxy advisors) au travers ce billet du Harvard Law School Forum : « The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design » (par Nadya Malenko et Yao Shen).

À quelle conclusion arrivent ces auteurs ?

Overall, our article suggests that at least based on the sample of 2010-2011 say-on-pay votes, the influence of ISS does not seem overstated. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the role and economic impact of proxy advisory firms.

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Ivan Tchotourian

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Ivan Tchotourian

Intéressant éclairage apporté par Paula Loop sur LinkedIn à propos de la notion d’engagement qui est devenu une notion incontournable de droit de la gouvernance d’entreprise : « Shareholder engagement: What does success look like? ».

Petit extrait :

Shareholder engagement is a hot topic these days and one that is frequently debated in the C-suite and boardroom. Traditionally, executives put a lot of emphasis on the role of Investor Relations in the engagement process, only rolling up their sleeves and getting involved if there was an issue or an event that called for additional effort.

Calls for more frequent director communication

But now we’re hearing investors say that they would like to hear from key executives—and even directors—on a more regular basis. Depending on the facts and circumstances, investors might like to hear from the company annually, or in some cases, more often. For some executives and directors, this is a new paradigm

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Ivan Tchotourian