Gouvernance | Page 33

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, je vous informe qu’Andrew Ceresney (directeur de la division Enforcement à la SEC) s’est exprimé lors de la Sixteenth Annual Taxpayers Against Fraud Conference à Washington le 14 septembre 2016 (« The SEC’s Whistleblower Program: The Successful Early Years »). À cette occasion, M. Ceresney est revenu sur la dénonciation, son histoire et son succès actuel… ainsi que l’influence qu’a exercé le programme de dénonciation américain pour le Canada (Ontario et Québec) et l’Australie.

Whistleblowers provide an invaluable public service, often at great personal and professional sacrifice and peril. I cannot overstate the appreciation we have for the willingness of whistleblowers to come forward with evidence of potential securities law violations. I often speak of the transformative impact that the program has had on the Agency, both in terms of the detection of illegal conduct and in moving our investigations forward quicker and through the use of fewer resources.

Dans son allocution, M. Ceserney fournit des chiffres :

1. The success of the program can be seen, in part, in the over $107 million we have paid to 33 whistleblowers for their valuable assistance, in cases with more than $500 million ordered in sanctions
2. Since the inception of the program, the Office has received more than 14,000 tips from whistleblowers in every state in the United States and from over 95 foreign countries. What’s more, tips from whistleblowers increased from 3,001 in fiscal year 2012 — the first full fiscal year that the Commission’s Whistleblower Office was in operation — to nearly 4,000 last year, an approximately 30% increase. And we are on target to exceed that level this year. During fiscal year 2015, the Office returned over 2,800 phone calls from members of the public. By the end of fiscal year 2015, the Commission and Claims Review Staff had issued Final Orders and Preliminary Determinations with respect to over 390 claims for whistleblower awards.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

En Grande-Bretagne, The Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS) Committee vient de lancer une consultation publique sur la gouvernance d’entreprise : « Corporate Governance inquiry launched ».

The Business, Innovation, and Skills (BIS) Committee has today launched an inquiry on corporate governance, focussing on executive pay, directors duties, and the composition of boardrooms, including worker representation and gender balance in executive positions.

Les questions abordées sont très intéressantes :

Directors Duties

• Is company law sufficiently clear on the roles of directors and non-executive directors, and are those duties the right ones? If not, how should it be amended?
• Is the duty to promote the long-term success of the company clear and enforceable?
• How are the interests of shareholders, current and former employees best balanced?
• How best should the decisions of Boards be scrutinised and open to challenge?
• Should there be greater alignment between the rules governing public and private companies? What would be the consequences of this?
• Should additional duties be placed on companies to promote greater transparency, e.g. around the roles of advisors. If so, what should be published and why? What would the impact of this be on business behaviour and costs to business?
• How effectively have the provisions of the 1992 Cadbury report been embedded? How best can shareholders have confidence that Executives are subject to independent challenge?
• Should Government regulate or rely on guidance and professional bodies to ensure that Directors fulfil their duties effectively?

Executive pay

• What factors have influenced the steep rise in executive pay over the past 30 years relative to salaries of more junior employees?
• How should executive pay take account of companies’ long-term performance?
• Should executive pay reflect the value added by executives to companies relative to more junior employees? If so, how?
• What evidence is there that executive pay is too high? How, if at all, should Government seek to influence or control executive pay?
• Do recent high-profile shareholder actions demonstrate that the current framework for controlling executive pay is bedding in effectively? Should shareholders have a greater role?

Composition of Boards

• What evidence is there that more diverse company boards perform better?
• How should greater diversity of board membership be achieved? What should diversity include, e.g. gender, ethnicity, age, sexuality, disability, experience, socio-economic background?
• Should there be worker representation on boards and/or remuneration committees? If so, what form should this take?
• What more should be done to increase the number of women in Executive positions on boards?

Attention : la réponse est à envoyer pour le 26 octobre 2016 !

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Dans Compliance Week, Paul Hodgson publie une tribune sous ce titre favorable à l’entrée des salariés dans les conseils d’administration (« I’m alright, Jack: worker representation on boards », 13 septembre 2016).

Probably the most European of new Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May’s fairly European corporate governance reform proposals is the proposal to have employee/worker representation on the board. It’s a concept unknown outside the European Union, and the United Kingdom is one of the few EU countries that has not yet introduced it.

But the idea was so far off anyone’s governance radar, except for the Trades Union Congress, that the proposal has taken almost everyone else by surprise, including companies, advisers, investors, and proxy advisers.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, l’organisation Eres mesure pour la 1e fois la performance des opérations d’actionnariat salarié dans le SBF120 depuis 2006 (ici). Dans la nouvelle édition de son étude, Eres analyse la performance sur 5 ans des opérations d’actionnariat salarié initiées entre 2006 et 2010 par les entreprises du SBF120.

Pour 100€ investis, entre 2006 et 2010, en titres de leur entreprise, les salariés du SBF120 ont réalisé un gain moyen entre 78% (décote et dividende compris, hors abondement) et 547% (avec un abondement de 300%).

Mais quelle est la fréquence de gain pour les salariés actionnaires ? L’étude de Eres répond à cette question et révèle que :

• Les salariés ayant souscrit à une opération d’actionnariat salarié (augmentation de capital réservée ou cession d’actions), réalisée par les entreprises du SBF120 entre 2006 et 2010, ont été gagnants dans 72% des cas avec le dividende et la décote (sans tenir compte de l’abondement) alors qu’un actionnaire normal aurait été gagnant dans 60% des cas seulement.
• Avec un taux d’abondement de 75%, les salariés auraient été gagnants dans 90% des cas au bout de 5 ans.
• Abondement et décote permettent de limiter sensiblement le risque pris par les salariés.
• Ces résultats sont conservateurs dans la mesure où ils partent du principe que le salarié cède ses actions au bout de 5 ans alors que rien ne l’y oblige.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le blog de l’Université d’Oxford relaie ce papier de Deborah A. DeMott : « Fiduciary Contours: Perspectives on Mutual Funds and Private Funds » du 22 août 2016. Excellente étude sur les devoirs fiduciaires des gestionnaires et la protection des investisseurs-consommateurs !

My paper,  written for a forthcoming book focused on research concerning mutual funds, examines the content, scope, and function of the fiduciary duties owed by investment managers, drawing in particular on contrasts between mutual (or public) funds and private funds (principally hedge funds and private equity funds). The paper surveys the relevant regulatory architectures as well as private-law duties of loyalty. The paper also develops more specific contrasts between mutual funds and private funds concerning principal transactions, fees, fund governance, and regulatory frameworks for internal compliance. The thesis of the paper is that in the mutual-fund context, the specifics of fiduciary duty reflect distinctive and hybrid qualities of this form of investment in securities, conventionally understood to involve an investment company that issues shares to public investors as well as a highly prescriptive regulatory structure, embodied in the United States in the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Investment Company Act, an exemplar of a ‘rules-based’ regulatory regime, addresses many potential breaches of fiduciary duties through prescription, for example, by prohibiting principal transactions, those between the fund itself and its manager or between the fund and the manager’s affiliates.

In contrast, fiduciary duties in the private-fund context exemplify a ‘principles-based’ regime, embodied in the not-so-prescriptive structure of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which applies to fund managers required to register with the SEC as investment advisers. In this less prescriptive realm, fiduciary duties are harder to assess, at least in part because many private-fund managers until recently operated behind a thick veil of opacity.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian