Gouvernance | Page 42

Alors que le colloque du SASE va bientôt avoir lieu à Berkeley aux Etats-Unis, je reviens aujourd’hui sur ce que j’avais présenté au colloque qui s’était tenu en 2014 à Chicago : “Enterprise” and Lawyer’s view: By by Irresponsibility and Welcome in a New Area ».

Accédez au diaporama : PPT SASE 2014 version anglaise

Voici le résumé de cette intervention :

As institutions corporations and enterprises are the basis of capitalism and the subject of great interest for legal studies. Beyond regulation, the inherent nature of corporations raises sensitive legal questions, indeed, since its first appearance in the 18^th century. Inspired by economic and financial sciences, legal theories incorporate corporations to contracts (referred to as “aggregate theory”), a private government (referred to as “artificial theory”) and an autonomous entity (“entity theory” or “doctrine de l’entreprise” in Continental Europe). It is indeed argued that incorporating corporations to a simple nexus of contracts has been the subject of great attention since the 1970s, provided that none of the above theories have definitely won unanimity in law, as seen by a comparative reading of the Canadian, American and European jurisprudence. Corporate governance rules clearly demonstrate such incorporation. In its essence, however, the contractual analysis regards the corporation as a means to serving private interests whereby the liability schemes are limited to protecting the supplier of capital. The contractual analysis’s vision is indeed restricted, and it summarizes its goals, to the sought-after maximization of the corporation’s shareholders value. At the heart of the corporation’s issues lies the financial aspect. Within this framework, non-financial concerns appear far away and are dealt with as simple externality that poses management problems. Nonetheless, the corporation’s activities are bearing an economic power that is today seen as ever increasingly significant and its financial and non-financial consequences should be the basis of further thinking. Yet, Canadian law has engaged into this pathway. On the one hand, Canadian corporate law has experienced a profound re-assessment through the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Peoples (2004) and BCE (2008). Far from being a strict contractual reading of the corporation, these decisions have shed light on the importance of different paradigms such as corporate social responsibility and the stakeholders’ theory. Indeed, new incorporated corporate concepts have reshaped the way the corporation is perceived and its relationship with the environment. On the other hand, Canadian competition law attempts at integrating social concerns into its political sphere. In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada has allowed the commencement of proceedings by indirect purchasers by way of a class action (see cases of Pros-sys, Sun-Rype and Infineon). Case law contemplates limiting the negative impact of anti-competition practices implemented by multinational corporations. The objective is to reinstate an economic balance as between corporations and its clients. The consumer is indeed called upon to play a protective role in the market in addition to the Canadian Competition authority’s competence. As affirmed by the Canadian Competition Tribunal in the decision of Visa/Master Card certain competition disputes between merchants are of common interest. Thus, the public should be made aware of the difficulties met by the businesses in the market. In light of the recent Canadian case law standpoint, it most certainly raises questions about the role that competition policies play within the corporation’s economic activities framework. This paper suggests showing the current legal positions of Canadian corporations and its competition law framework, in addition to putting them into perspective with  their US and European counterparts. In addition to demonstrating their convergence in favor of a more social concern, we stand for the proposition that corporations, as has been defined by the jurist, does not only form a contract. Indeed, it is an institution that carries responsibilities as against its own environment.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le message est clair pour Robert Dutton : « Québec doit protéger ses sièges sociaux » (Journal de Montréal, 20 juin 2016). Pendant son intervention, Robert Dutton a précisé qu’un fonds ad hoc devrait être créée et avoir des objectifs de rendement à remplir. L’homme d’affaires pense aussi que le gouvernement pourrait voter des lois pour protéger les sièges sociaux, par exemple, en accordant plus de droits de vote aux actionnaires de longue date qu’aux spéculateurs ou en octroyant des pouvoirs aux conseils d’administration, qui reçoivent des offres d’achat hostiles.

Robert Dutton réclame la création d’un fonds d’intervention pour protéger les entreprises québé-coises de prises de contrôle étrangères. Selon l’ancien président et chef de la direction de RONA, il ne revient pas à la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec d’assumer un tel mandat.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

« The American corporation has been transformed by globalization and new technology. But equally powerful is the belief on Wall Street and in boardrooms that the sole responsibility of a corporation is to maximize profits for its shareholders ». Ce résumé du rapport de Marketplace « The price of profits » illustre parfaitement les 5 beaux chapitres (pas trop longs et accessibles à tout public) qu’il nous est donné de lire. Revoilà la primauté de la valeur actionnariale sur le devant de la scène pour être critiquée…

Listen to business news on cable TV, and you’ll hear bankers, fund managers and CEOs talk about a corporation’s legal responsibility to “maximize shareholder value.” The idea that the product of a corporation is profits is gospel. It’s taught in business school. But it’s not true.

(…) If jobs were the first target, how to spend a company’s profits was next. A corporation can invest in itself and grow or — what? Giant investment funds pressed for higher returns — higher share prices. An increasingly favorite strategy was to spend profits buying back the company’s own shares. It was financial engineering: fewer shares, higher share price.

The former corporate raider Carl Icahn, for example, started buying shares of Apple in 2013, and eventually owned more than 50 million, nearly 1 percent. He pressured Apple to buy back shares — and Apple is spending more than $100 billion doing so.

Icahn sold his shares this spring. Economist William Lazonick, the author of a shareholder-value analysis, “Profits Without Prosperity,” noted that Icahn was a share-renter, not a shareholder. He never invested a dollar in Apple itself.

Icahn said his investment in Apple shares netted him $2 billion. Apple? Its shares are below what the company paid for them. So far, Apple is a loser.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le 20 juin 2016, l’AMF a officiellement lancé son programme de dénonciation. Contrairement à l’Ontario, l’AMF misera sur une approche axée uniquement sur la confidentialité, la prévention des représailles et l’anonymat pour les dénonciateurs d’infractions aux lois qu’elle administre. L’AMF persiste et dit non au système de récompenses. Selon elle, rien n’établit avec certitude que l’incitatif financier génère plus de dénonciations de qualité et que l’aspect véritablement clé de tout programme de dénonciation est la protection offerte aux dénonciateurs.

Sur le site de l’AMF, il peut être lu :

Dès la réception des dénonciations, les dénonciateurs soutenus par le programme bénéficient notamment du privilège de l’informateur. À cet égard, les enquêteurs, formés spécifiquement pour répondre aux enjeux auxquels les dénonciateurs font face, déploient tous les efforts requis pour préserver la confidentialité des informations et des documents transmis ainsi que l’identité des dénonciateurs.

Le programme de dénonciation de l’Autorité prévoit aussi des protections anti-représailles. Par exemple, une immunité protège les dénonciateurs contre d’éventuelles poursuites au civil découlant de leur dénonciation. Pour renforcer l’efficacité du programme, l’Autorité entend travailler conjointement avec le gouvernement du Québec en vue de proposer des mesures anti-représailles additionnelles dans la législation relative au secteur financier.

Comme elle l’a annoncé en février dernier, l’Autorité n’offrira pas de récompense aux dénonciateurs. Après avoir analysé divers programmes de dénonciation mis en place ailleurs dans le monde, dont au Royaume-Uni et en Australie, elle a conclu qu’il ne peut être établi avec certitude que l’incitatif financier génère plus de dénonciations de qualité et que l’aspect véritablement clé de tout programme de dénonciation est la protection offerte aux dénonciateurs.

Pour une mise en contexte, cette nouvelle du cabinet Osler est intéressante : « Dénonciation : l’AMF dit non aux récompenses ».

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

En voilà une question allez-vous me répondre et pourtant… Un récent article du Harvard Business Review de Suntae Kim, Matthew Karlesky, Christopher Myers et Todd Schifeling intitulé « Why Companies Are Becoming B Corporations » aborde la question de face.

2 raisons essentielles sont identifiées :

1. First, as large established firms have ramped up their corporate social responsibility efforts, small businesses that have long been committed to social and environmental causes want to prove that they are more genuine, authentic advocates of stakeholder benefits.
2.  The qualitative evidence, gathered from firms’ B corporation application materials, revealed that certifying firms believed “the major crises of our time are a result of the way we conduct business,” and they became a B Corporation to “join the movement of creating a new economy with a new set of rules” and “redefine the way people perceive success in the business world.”

So why do certain firms (and not others) choose to identify as B Corporations? Individual leaders are partly why some organizations broaden their purpose beyond maximizing shareholder value. We might look to Sir Richard Branson, who in 2013 co-launched the “B Team,” publicly decrying corporations’ sole focus on short-term profits and calling for a reprioritization of people- and planet-focused performance. We might also consider leaders of firms like Ben & Jerry’s or Patagonia (both B Corporations) that have prioritized societal and environmental agendas.

Clearly, such leaders can be important catalysts of social change. However, the explosive growth of B Corporations seems also to be driven by broader trends and changes in the corporate landscape that cannot be explained by individuals’ actions alone.

Two of us (Suntae Kim and Todd Schifeling) conducted research to build a more robust understanding of the rise of B corporations. By qualitatively examining the internal motives of firms in the process of becoming a B corporation, and quantitatively testing key factors in these firms’ external industry environment – including the shareholder- and stakeholder-focused behaviors of their corporate competitors – we found that there are at least two major underlying reasons why firms choose to seek B Corporation certification.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le message a le mérite d’être clair ! Le blog of Manifest, the proxy voting agency se montre pour le moins critique (!) d’une réforme américaine qui vient d’être proposé et qui vise notamment à mettre en place un encadrement des agences de conseil en vote : « Global investors condemn US attempt to undermine their voting decisions »

The US House of Representatives’ Finance Services Committee last week passed a series of  Bills which seek to repeal large chunks of the Dodd-Frank Act which was passed in response to the 2008 financial crash.

The bills would amend the mandate on public companies to provide shareholders with a vote on executive compensation to occur only when the company has made a material change to the executive compensation; repeal the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) authority to issue rules on proxy access and repeal the mandate that publicly-traded companies disclose the ratio of median versus chief executive officer pay.

Part of the package of legislative proposals is the Corporate Governance Reform & Transparency Act of 2016 would, if passed by Congress and signed by President Obama, require mandatory SEC registration for proxy advisory firms such as Manifest wishing to operate in the US.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, je signale cette excellente capsule-vidéo de mon collègue Bruno Dondero (Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne). Celle-ci porte sur la responsabilité sociale des entreprises et constitue une belle synthèse de la notion.

• Voir la capsule-vidéo : « La RSE »

Cette vidéo fait partie du dispositif pédagogique du MOOC Sorbonne Droit des entreprises, qui a connu sa première session entre mai et juin 2014 sur la plate-forme France Université Numérique (FUN).
Ces vidéos peuvent être utilisées, ensemble ou de manière séparée, pour servir de support ou de complément à un cours de droit des affaires, de niveau universitaire (Licence, Master) ou autre.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian