Gouvernance | Page 44

UCLA School of Law vient de publier un rapport d’une dizainede pages sur la gestion du capital humain et son intégration dans la gouvernance des entreprises : « Corporate Governance : The growing Importance of Human Capital Management » (avril 2020).

Extrait :

1. Over the last several years, investors and proxy advisory firms have increasingly focused their attention on environmental, sustainability and governance (ESG) and human capital management (HCM) issues. While there is no one definition of HCM, the term is widely used to cover a very broad range of workforce matters that are of concern to investors and the public as they focus on building long-term value and reducing business and reputational risks. These concerns have resulted in calls for enhanced company disclosures about their HCM practices and processes.

2. Under Delaware and federal law, directors have no duties that are specifically focused on HCM. However, under Delaware law and that of many other states, directors have duties of care, loyalty and oversight that can under certain circumstances apply to HCM matters and can result in director liability.

3. While federal securities laws and rules contain several corporate disclosure requirements that apply to employees and touch on HCM issues, current laws and rules are not as robust or focused as many investors would like and have proposed. In response to rulemaking and other investor requests, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed amendments to its disclosure rules that would expressly require companies to describe their human capital resources to the extent that they are material to an understanding of a company’s business as a whole.

4. Some public companies have already articulated board responsibilities for oversight of HCM matters; some have renamed and expanded the responsibilities of their compensation committees to reflect their expanded focus; and some have disclosed their HCM polices and efforts in their securities law filings and other publications.

5. Separate and apart from the legal requirements that apply to corporate board duties and corporate disclosure requirements, there are important business, governance and reputational reasons for boards and companies to care about and address HCM matters. 6. While there is no one-size-fits-all approach to board oversight of HCM matters, areas for possible board attention are (i) diversity and inclusion, (ii) employee satisfaction and engagement, (iii) succession and talent management, (iv) attrition and retention, and (v) ethics, workforce culture and risk.

À la prochaine…

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, je signale cette intéressante étude : Zetzsche, Dirk Andreas and Anker-Sørensen, Linn and Consiglio, Roberta and Yeboah-Smith, Miko, « The COVID-19-Crisis and Company Law – Towards Virtual Shareholder Meetings », 15 avril 2020, University of Luxembourg Faculty of Law, Economics & Finance, WPS 2020-007.

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Regulators and Parliaments around the world have responded to the COVID-19 epidemic by amending company law. This crisis legislation allows us to examine how, and to what effect, the corporate governance framework can be amended in times of crisis. In fact, almost all leading industrialized nations have already enacted crisis legislation in the field of company law. 

In our recent working paper, ‘The COVID-19-Crisis and Company Law – Towards Virtual Shareholder Meetings’,  we have sought to (1) document the respective crisis legislation; (2) assist countries looking for solutions to respond rapidly and efficiently to the crisis; (3) exchange experiences of crisis measures; and (4) spur academic discussion on the extent to which the crisis legislation can function as a blueprint for general corporate governance reform.

Countries considered in full or in part include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Readers are encouraged to highlight any inaccuracies in our presentation of the respective laws, and to bring further crisis-related legislation not considered in this working draft to the attention of the authors. Moreover, readers are invited to indicate where there is room for improvement therein, and/or to signal the need for policy reform.

Drawing on the analysis of these more than twenty countries, we note five fields in which legislators have been particularly active. First, the extension of filing periods for annual and quarterly reports to reflect the practical difficulties regarding the collection of numbers and the auditing of financial statements. Second, company law requires shareholders to take decisions in meetings—and these meetings were for the most part in-person gatherings. However, since the gathering of individuals in one location is now at odds with the measures being implemented to contain the virus, legislators have generally allowed for virtual-only meetings, online-only proxy voting and voting-by-mail, and granted relief to various formalities aimed at protecting shareholders (including fixed meeting and notice periods). Third, provisions requiring physical attendance of board members, including provisions on signing corporate documents, have been temporarily lifted for board matters. Fourth, parliaments have enacted changes to allow for more flexible and speedy capital measures, including the disbursement of dividends and the recapitalization of firms, having accepted that the crisis impairs a company’s equity. Fifth and finally, some countries have implemented temporary changes to insolvency law to delay companies’ petitioning for insolvency as a result of the liquidity shock prompted by the imposition of overnight lockdowns.

The legislation passed in response to the COVID-19 crisis provides for an interesting case study through which to examine what can be done to modernize the corporate governance framework with a view to furthering digitalization. Given the difficulties or indeed the impossibility of conducting in-person meetings currently, the overall trajectory of company law reforms has been to allow for digitalization of corporate governance, and ensuring the permissibility of virtual shareholder meetings (VSM), in particular. 

In this respect, it is safe to assume that the rules on VSM will have model character. While the details of the modus operandi of VSM will require careful adjustment, to ensure that shareholders will be afforded the same rights and opportunities to participate as they would at an in-person meeting (including Q&A), the experimental phase during the crisis will feed into the policy discussion, with some more successful and some less successful examples providing food for thought. Yet, it is safe to say that the COVID-19 pandemic has unveiled the need for virtual-only shareholder meetings, and that some types of VSM will stay for good long after the current crisis has subsided. 

À la prochaine…

Le cabinet McCarthy Tetrault propose une série intéressante sur Soptify concernant la COVID-19 : Le droit aux temps de la COVID-19. Je vous invite à parcourir l’épisode 11 intitulé : « Comment est-ce que la COVID-19 est une opportunité de revoir notre gouvernance d’entreprise? ».

Description de l’épisode :

Chrystelle Chevalier-Gagnon discute avec Emmanuelle Létourneau, de Létourneau gouvernance entreprenante, de la façon dont la crise actuelle peut être synonyme d’opportunité pour revoir la gouvernance de nos entreprises. *Cet épisode explore un sujet qui intéresse tout le monde, pas seulement les avocats, et bien qu’il puisse contenir des informations juridiques, il ne fournit pas de conseils juridiques.

À la prochaine…

Dans La presse, Stéphanie Grammond livre une belle réflexion dans sa chronique intitulée « Les retraités avant les actionnaires » (26 avril 2020). Très intéressant et qui rappelle le chapitre du livre que j’ai rédigé avec mon collègue Charles Tremblay-Potvin à paraître « Sears Canada : les retraités sacrifiés à l’aune de la primauté actionnariale ? » dans Droit des aînés (éditions Yvon Blais).

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À la mi-avril, Ottawa a annoncé un assouplissement temporaire pour donner du lest aux employeurs qui parrainent un régime de retraite à prestations déterminées. Or, ces mesures affaibliront la protection des rentes à un moment où les régimes traversent une tempête parfaite.

(…)

Vu à l’envers, il y a maintenant un « trou » de 11 % dans les caisses de retraite, un déficit qui doit être comblé par des cotisations spéciales des employeurs.

Mais comme les sociétés grattent les fonds de tiroir, Ottawa a décrété un moratoire sur ces cotisations pour 2020 et laisse entrevoir un allégement pour 2021 pour les entreprises de compétence fédérale (ex. : transports, banques, télécoms).

Au Québec, les sociétés ont déjà eu de l’oxygène ces dernières années. Leurs cotisations ne sont plus établies en fonction du ratio de solvabilité qui donne le portrait en cas de faillite. Elles le sont plutôt en fonction d’un ratio de « capitalisation améliorée » qui permet l’utilisation d’hypothèques plus accommodantes fondées sur la « continuité des affaires », un concept qui semble bien fragile en cette ère de pandémie.

(…)

Les gouvernements font le pari que ces assouplissements aideront les entreprises à survivre et à payer des rentes pleines et entières. Mais en cas de faillite, les retraités seront doublement perdants, car ils se retrouveront avec une rente amputée plus sévèrement.

D’où l’urgence de trouver des solutions pour mieux les protéger.

Malheureusement, il est trop tard pour lancer un fonds de garantie des prestations de retraite comme en Ontario. Quand un 18 roues est sur le point d’emboutir votre voiture, ce n’est plus le temps d’appeler l’assureur.

Par contre, on devrait changer les lois encadrant les faillites pour donner une « super-priorité » aux retraités. Actuellement, ils sont considérés comme des créanciers ordinaires, ce qui ne leur laisse que des miettes une fois que les autres se sont servis.

(…) Mais les entreprises qui ont un régime de retraite déficitaire ne devraient pas avoir le droit de racheter leurs actions, à plus forte raison si elles ont reçu l’aide du gouvernement. Pourquoi les cadeaux aux actionnaires passeraient-ils avant les promesses aux retraités ?

À la prochaine…

Dans FastCompany, le journaliste Christopher Zara publie un intéressant article reprenant une étude menée actuellement par The Conference Board sur la réduction des rémunérations : « Pandemic pay cuts: The growing list of companies reducing salaries during COVID-19 ». Le constat est éloquent pour l’application de la RSE et de la théorie des parties prenantes par les entreprises, je vous le laisse découvrir ci-dessous :

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More than 30 million Americans have filed for unemployment benefits since the economy first began to unravel due to the coronavirus pandemic. That figure may not count untold millions of freelancers or self-employed individuals who are also out of work, nor does it factor in countless people who simply couldn’t get through to their state labor department to file a claim. And of those who are still working, many are making considerably less money due to reduced hours.

And then there are the company-imposed pay cuts. Over the past few weeks, the Conference Board has been tracking pay reduction announcements for publicly traded companies, using SEC filings by firms listed in the Russell 3000 Index.

Some the findings may surprise you: For instance, the salary reductions are not just hitting top executives and their fat bonuses. At last count, 61% of the affected companies applied pay reductions to the base salaries of senior managers who make less than top-tier executives, the Conference Board says. It adds that 11% of all companies in the index announced base pay cuts between March 1 and April 24.

The good news is, the announcements peaked in early April and have declined a bit in recent weeks. The bad news? The group anticipates a “second wave” of salary reductions could emerge in the weeks ahead as the ripple effects of COVID-19 continue to wreak havoc on bottom lines.

The Conference Board posted the insights in a new report that also includes a wealth of data visualizations and the full list of companies. It says the list will be updated weekly as long as the crisis continues. The data is being compiled in collaboration with consulting firm Semler Brossy and Esgauge Analytics. It shows that the industries hardest hit by the coronavirus are what you would expect, including retail and hospitality.

À la prochaine…

Article sympathique à lire de Suren Gomtsian intitulé : « When Businesses Can Do Good: Lessons from the Coronavirus Crisis for Promoting Responsible Business Practices » (Oxford Business Law Blog).

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Universal threats can unite opposing camps in a common effort. The new coronavirus has hit almost every country and has created a shared understanding that every effort to contribute, however small it may be, is needed to overcome the crisis. Many businesses, typically criticised for giving priority to profits and to the interests of shareholders and managers, are part of the common response to the virus.

(…)

It is very unlikely that the virus has suddenly changed the corporate world. Clearly, the motivations of businesses for doing good may differ. While some have a genuine sense about their role in fighting the virus and helping those in need, many others view the crisis as a well-calculated opportunity to amend their battered reputations as partners and employers and gain advantage over competitors once the pandemic is over. But regardless of the motivations, the reaction of the corporate world to the pandemic offers three lessons for the promotion of responsible business practices in normal times.

First, in the absence of legislative action, change in corporate behaviour happens when there is broad consensus in society that collective action in response to a threat is an urgent priority. It is not poor ethics or morals that hold businesses back from working together with other parts of society, but disagreements about the scale and urgency of the problem. The collective response to coronavirus is the result of a broadly shared agreement on what companies are expected to do in the crisis that has emerged in almost every affected nation. Remarkably, companies are behaving differently even in the absence of legal reforms – laws on corporate purpose and directors’ duties are the same today as they were at the outset of the crisis.

Company founders and managers are a diverse group, and so are their preferences. Some may have serious concerns about global challenges facing humanity, such as inequality—whether of income, gender, race, or opportunities—or climate risks. But even these businesses may struggle in behaving responsibly because of concerns about becoming uncompetitive against less enlightened businesses. The classic collective action problem forces would-be responsible businesses to make the rational decision of ignoring inequality and environmental problems.

Where market failures like this are strong, the usual response is government intervention, for example, through the adoption of stricter employment protections or environmental standards. The reaction to the virus shows the power of a decentralized solution to the problem through collective social backlash. By increasing the costs of ignorant behaviour, broad society consensus promotes responsible business practices across markets and nations.

Second, businesses need clear guidelines as to what practical steps they are expected to take to meet the common goal. Governments have been clear about their expectations from businesses during the COVID-19 crisis by recommendations to preserve employment, cut dividends and share buybacks, and lower rents by property owners. Similarly, society in general has been sending clear signals about the expected behaviour by approving some actions taken by companies and showing discontent over undesired conduct in the form of widespread backlash.

For example, when Johnson & Johnson, a medical company, announced plans to invest US $1bn in developing a COVID-19 vaccine, the company’s shares jumped despite the not-for-profit nature of the project. By contrast, the decision by Sports Direct to keep shops open as essential or the decision by Adidas to skip rental payments on its stores led to public outcry and calls to boycott products in tabloid and social media. Similarly, the reluctance by the UK’s largest banks and German carmakers to cut dividends raised many eyebrows. Not only were some of these companies forced to apologize and reverse course, but their reputations were damaged too. Widely shared public reaction can thus send a clear message to all other businesses what to do and how not to behave.

Third, developing consensus over global challenges requires international cooperation. The exceptional scale of the current crisis coupled with the fear that governments responding to the crisis differently to others will face fierce questions explains why, even in the absence of coordination, all nations individually have acted similarly. But countries are likely to be affected differently, at least in the short run, on many other important matters. For example, the degree of underlying inequality varies across countries and some countries experience more acute climate-related risks, like forest fires or rising sea levels, than other nations. This means that atomistic development of consensus through peer pressure, unlike in the case of COVID-19, is highly unlikely. Local action, meanwhile, cannot offer meaningful solutions because markets are still global and responsible governments and businesses will not be able to compete if others do not act similarly.

To sum up, if we want businesses to act responsibly, we need to deliver a clear message by developing consensus over global challenges and communicating it clearly to businesses as one shared global voice. We also need to set out what practical steps businesses need to take to achieve the common goal – whether through government nudges or endorsements in social and news media. Where threats affect nations differently, this can be achieved only through cooperation on a global scale. Given the rise of national sovereign interests and national governments, we are facing a huge task in developing broad consensus on matters that are important. The arrival of responsible capitalism may thus take time. For now, until this consensus is formed, blame us and our elected governments, not businesses, for the failures of capitalism.

À la prochaine…

« Quel effet la crise aura-t-elle sur la gouvernance des entreprises ? » En voilà une belle question que pose le journaliste de Le Devoir François Desjardins (1er mai 2020). Je vous invite à lire son article court mais intéressant. Merci à lui pour cet éclairage…

Extrait :

Au-delà de l’impact financier immédiat que la crise entraîne pour les entreprises, la pandémie pourrait accroître l’importance qu’accordent les investisseurs aux critères environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance (ESG), estime un expert, selon lequel les conseils d’administration des entreprises devront également se pencher sur la rémunération future des dirigeants, présentement réduite ou suspendue dans certains cas.

« Vous voyez plein de dirigeants qui se sentent obligés de prendre des coupes présentement, ils pensent que c’est temporaire, le temps que les gens sont mis à pied », a dit en entrevue le président exécutif du conseil de l’Institut sur la gouvernance des organisations privées et publiques, Yvan Allaire. « Mais je pense qu’il y aura une réflexion de plus longue portée, nécessaire, sur le sujet. Je ne suis pas sûr de la même tolérance pour les disparités de revenus que l’on observe. »

Si les conseils d’administration ne mettent pas en œuvre cette réflexion, il n’est pas impossible que des gouvernements soient un jour tentés de le faire à leur place, prévient M. Allaire. « Les gouvernements ont découvert que c’était bien, d’avoir tous ces pouvoirs-là. Ils gouvernent quasiment sans Parlement, sans Assemblée nationale. Il y a énormément de pouvoirs entre leurs mains. Ils pourraient être tentés d’intervenir dans des secteurs où, selon moi, ils ne devraient pas intervenir, mais si vous ne faites rien, vous les conseils et directions d’entreprises, eh bien, ils vont bouger. »

Au lieu de prévoir l’imprévisible, les entreprises doivent désormais s’assurer d’avoir en place un coffre suffisamment résistant pour survivre à des événements extrêmes. Ces mesures auront un impact sur les bénéfices et la structure de capital, mais les conseils pourraient être ouverts à cette idée, croit M. Allaire, car les critères ESG, qui tiennent compte d’un ensemble de parties prenantes, ont gagné beaucoup de terrain.

La crise a rapidement remis la gestion du risque à l’avant-plan et de nombreuses organisations ont produit des guides exhaustifs. Le cabinet Stikeman Elliott, par exemple, a récemment publié un document dans lequel il revient sur les notions de gestion immédiate, mais aussi sur des aspects comme la stratégie à long terme des entreprises et la résilience.

À la base, « il faut se poser la question de savoir quel est le risque qui se présente, mais aussi quels sont les moyens pour minimiser » ce risque, a récemment rappelé en entrevue M^e Marc Barbeau, président du conseil et associé chez Stikeman Elliott. La dynamique d’évaluation du risque et de sa gestion est une équation « avec laquelle on a composé dans l’urgence de confiner tout le monde », a-t-il souligné. « Mais cette même dynamique, on va la revoir dans le déconfinement, ainsi qu’au niveau sociétal et au niveau des entreprises. »

À la prochaine…