Gouvernance

Gouvernance Nouvelles diverses

Gouvernance d’entreprise : mettez-vous à jour sur des questions d’actualité

Ivan Tchotourian 3 janvier 2017

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, quelle belle initiative de l’ECGI !

 

La seconde conférence de l’ECGI qui s’est tenue en Suède en juin 2016 est maintenant disponible. Vidéos, papiers et diaporamas sont maintenant disponibles au lien suivant : http://gcgc.global/events/stockholm-2016/#presentations.

 

Le programme était alléchant. Le voici :

  • Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance

Prof. Simone Sepe University of Arizona

  • Contracts versus Institutions: A Critique of Corporate Governance Theory

Prof. Martin Hellwig Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

  • Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions

Prof. Vicente Cunat London School of Economics

  • Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Evidence from the Massachusetts Natural Experiment

Prof. Robert Daines​ Stanford University

  • Corporate Leverage and Employee Protection in Bankruptcy

Prof. Marco Pagano University of Naples

  • Three Ages of Bankruptcy

Prof. Mark Roe Harvard Law School

  • Political Determinants of Competition

Prof. Luigi Zingales University of Chicago Booth School of Business

  • Panel: The Corporate Governance of Infrastructure

Prof. Erik Berglof  London School of Economics Mr. Gordon Bajnai  Meridiam Prof. Patrick Bolton Columbia Business School Dr. Rajiv B. Lall  IDFC Bank, India

  • Are Foreign Investors Locusts? The Long-Term Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership

Prof. Pedro Matos University of Virginia

  • Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?

Prof. Jill Fisch University of Pennsylvania

  • Bonded to the State: A Network Perspective on China’s Corporate Debt Market

Prof. Curtis Milhaupt Columbia Law School

  • Corporate Governance Indices and Construct Validity

Prof. Bernard Black  Kellogg School of Management

  • Panel: The Governance of Business Groups

Prof. Gerard Hertig ETZ Ms. Claudia Biedermann Zurich Insurance Group AG Ms. Petra Hedengran Investor AB Ms. Daniela Weber-Rey Deutsche Bank AG

  • Are CEOs Different? Characteristics of Top Managers

Prof. Steven Kaplan  University of Chicago Booth School of Business

  • Executive Remuneration Standards and the “Conformity Gap” at Controlled Corporations

Prof. Guido Ferrarini  University of Genoa

  • The Responsibility of Business is to Pursue Shareholder Value: True or False?

Prof. Oliver Hart Harvard University

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

engagement et activisme actionnarial Normes d'encadrement

Weak Governance by Informed Large Shareholders

Ivan Tchotourian 23 juin 2016

Eitan Goldman (Indiana University) et Wenyu Wang (Indiana University) publient un article intitulé : « Weak Governance by Informed Large Shareholders » (Finance Working Paper No. 469/201, avril 2016).

 

A commonly held belief is that better informed large shareholders with greater voting power improve corporate governance.

We argue that this may not be true in general and demonstrate our argument in a model of corporate takeovers. We show that a large shareholder’s ability to collect information and trade ex post may cause him to vote ex ante in favor of pursuing takeovers, even if such takeovers generate a negative expected return.

We test the model’s main predictions regarding how institutional investors trade around corporate takeovers. Consistent with the model, we find that institutional investors increase their holdings in firms that subsequently pursue acquisitions with greater performance variability and that following takeover initiation, institutional trading positively correlates with long-run deal performance.

We further document that these trading patterns are more pronounced when the institutional investor has larger initial holdings of acquirer shares, when the acquirer accounts for a larger fraction of the institution’s portfolio, and when the institutional investor demonstrates better trading ability prior to acquisitions.

Overall, our study sheds light on the limits of relying on better informed large shareholders to improve corporate governance.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian