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COVID-19 : l’ICGN prend position sur ce qui devrait être fait

L’influent ICGN a pris récemment position sur les conséquences du COVID-19 pour la gouvernance d’entreprise, sachant que ce réseau international fait de cette pandémie un risque systémique (rien de moins !). Vous pourrez lire les préconisation de l’ICGN dans le document suivant : ICGN Viewpoint, « Coronavirus as a new systemic risk: implications for corporate governance and investor stewardship », 12 mars 2020.

Extrait concernant les investisseurs

Despite these negative economic events investors should avoid focusing on the crisis in terms of its short-term shareholder value implications. It is here where a long-term perspective, and perhaps a grounding ethics and values more generally, should also guide investor responses. In the language of modern finance, this may be less an opportunity for investors seeking alpha generation in individual companies than it is a question of addressing ‘beta’ issues—the volatility/stability of the markets and financial system as a whole. This may be fiendishly complicated, but an important guiding principle for investors relates to their fundamental fiduciary duty of care to their beneficiaries. This confirms the importance of taking a long-term perspective, since most ICGN Members, and large institutional investors more generally, are managing assets for pension plans or retirement saving plans, where the investment horizon is intrinsically long-term, or in theory infinite.

It is beyond the scope of this Viewpoint to suggest specific investment or trading strategies for investors in addressing the impacts of COVID-19. There is no generic solution. These will differ depending on individual investor mandates and beneficiary requirements. But from the perspective of investor stewardship and fiduciary duty — and consistent with ICGN’s Global Stewardship Principles and Policy Priorities3 — it is fair to suggest that in reacting to this crisis investors should generally seek to maintain an approach that promotes long-term investment horizons and sustainable value creation for individual companies and markets.

As a practical matter this requires investors to appreciate that companies will be facing difficult questions in response to the impacts of COVID-19. The first priority for managers and boards will be to ensure the company’s own financial sustainability. Investors must also understand that capital allocation questions may surface where compromise is required. Companies may have to choose between cutting dividend payments, cutting capital spending or cutting costs, possibly leading to redundancies. Investors should demonstrate support for companies as they navigate potentially acute financial threats and market pressures. Investors should also avoid encouraging companies to undertake undue risks that might provide a short-term investor benefit but could also jeopardise a company’s financial stability or the sustainability of its business model. This reflects not only some level of enlightened self-interest, but also the moral imperative to contribute positively to the broader threats to public health and social stability.

À la prochaine…

engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement

ICGN: ‘Investors faced with regulatory schizophrenia on governance’

IPE Investment & Pensions Europe publie un article intéressant sur la position de l’ICGN sur le principe « une action=une voix » : « ICGN: ‘Investors faced with regulatory schizophrenia on governance' ». Même si l’on peut se douter que l’ICGN soit farouchement hostile à toute dérogation, la schizophrénie résultant de la situation actuelle est pertinente à mettre en lumière. Il est vrai que si on responsabilise de plus en plus les actionnaires, les dérogations trop fréquemment acceptées du principe « une action=une voix » mine les prérogatives des actionnaires.

 

High corporate governance standards and shareholders’ rights are under threat from a race to the bottom by regulators and stock exchanges, the executive director of the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) has argued.

In a comment on the organisation’s website, Kerrie Waring said the principle of ’one share, one vote’ was under attack. ICGN is an investor-led organisation seeking to promote effective standards of corporate governance and investor stewardship; several major pension investors, like France’s Fonds de réserve pour les retraites and Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, are represented on its board.

According to Waring, a growing number of companies were seeking to adopt multi-class share structures at the same time as stock exchanges and regulators were showing signs of being willing to accommodate companies with such share structures.

(…) It was ironic, said Waring, that the threat to shareholder rights was coming at the same time as politicians and regulators were putting pressure on investors to do more to monitor and engage with boards to safeguard the value of underlying investments and protect shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests.

This was “regulatory schizophrenia of the worst kind”, she said.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance

En direct de l’ICGN conference de Boston : le vote en débat

Bonsoir à toutes et à tous, sur le blog Corporate Governance – CorpGov.net: improving accountability through democratic corporate governance since 1995, Jamse McRitchie vous propose de suivre – par le biais de résumés – les débat qui ont lieu lors de la conférence de Boston de l’ICGN (ici).

La 3e partie de cette conférence (ICGN Boston 2015, Part 3: Differential Voting Rights) est particulièrement intéressante pour le blogue.


Morceaux choisis :

Public investors need protection from controlling shareholders in controlled companies and managers in widely-held companies. Rules that increase the power of majority shareholders might protect all shareholders in widely-held companies but not in controlled companies. Similarly, rules that improve the rights of minority shareholders will probably help in controlled companies but not widely-held companies. Rules to help overcome collective action are helpful for widely-held but less so in controlled companies.

Brazil had dual-class for many many years. Encouraged but led to problems.

Creativity. Companies assign more voting rights and then creates super-nonvoting rights where nonvoting shares are worth 35 times. Controlling shareholders provided a number of sweeteners as they moved to consolidate control. Investors respond to incentives… timeframe is not infinity. Flaws in misalignment are not likely show up in five years. If we forbid differential voting rights they will create through other control mechanisms.

We need to ensure non-voting shares are priced less in the market.

In France, 22 companies double voting rights in bylaws. Institutional investors pushed for one share one vote. French state controlling shareholder in 13 companies. Gave a few examples of double voting rights. One actually asked to opt out of dual-class. Most in favor of one-share one-vote.

Stephen Erlichman noted that Canada has had examples of dual class share companies that have voluntarily converted into normal companies, without any premium being paid.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian