Gouvernance rémunération
The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs: Are Fund Managers Asleep at the Wheel?
Ivan Tchotourian 15 mars 2017
Bonjour à toutes et à tous, un article intitulé « The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs: Are Fund Managers Asleep at the Wheel? » expose la synthèse du 3e rapport de l’agence As You Know. Quel bilan dresse-t-elle ? Rien de surprenant si j’osais le dire !
According to the Economic Policy Institute, “CEO pay grew an astounding 943% over the past 37 years, greatly outpacing the
growth in the cost of living, the productivity of the economy, and the stock market, disproving the claim that the growth in CEO pay reflects the ‘performance’ of the company, the value of its stock, or the ability of the CEO to do anything but disproportionately raise the amount of his pay.”
For the past two years we have highlighted the 100 most overpaid CEOs of S&P 500 companies, and the votes of large shareholders, including mutual funds and pension funds on their pay packages.
What has changed since the first report? Not much. Executive pay has continued to increase. Although mutual funds and pension funds are doing better at exercising their fiduciary responsibility by more frequently voting their proxies against some of the most outrageous CEO pay packages. Of the mutual funds with the largest changes in voting habits from last year, all of them opposed more of the pay packages than they had the prior year.
As we noted in our prior reports, the system in place to govern corporations has failed in the area of executive compensation. Like all the best governance systems, corporate governance relies on a balance of power. That system envisions directors representing shareholders and guarding the company’s assets from waste. It also envisions shareholders holding companies and executives accountable.
Point essentiel à souligner :
KEY FINDINGS
Of the top 25 most overpaid CEOs, 15 made the list for the second year in a row, and 10 have been on the list for the third time. These rankings are based on a statistical analysis of company financial performance with a regression to identify predicted pay, as well as an innovative index developed by As You Sow that considers more than 30 additional factors.
The companies we listed in first report on overpaid CEOs has markedly underperformed the S&P 500 since that time. The 10 companies we identified as the most overpaid firms as a group underperformed the S&P 500 index by a gaping 10.5% and actually demolished shareholder value as a group with –5.7% financial returns. In summary, the most overpaid CEO firms destroyed shareholder value since our first report.
Many of the overpaid CEOs are insulated from shareholder votes, suggesting that shareholder scrutiny can be an important deterrent to outrageous pay packages. A number of the most overpaid CEOs are at companies with unequal voting structures and/or triennial votes, so shareholders did not have the opportunity to vote this year on the extraordinary packages. While the Say-on-Pay law allows less frequent votes, and shareholders can decide if they prefer to vote every one, two, or three years, the vast majority of companies hold annual votes on pay. We believe that the fact that our list of the top 25 overpaid CEOs includes several companies that do not hold annual votes on pay implies that such insulated companies are more willing to flaunt best practices on pay and performance.
The most overpaid CEOs represent an extraordinary misallocation of assets. Regression analysis showed 14 companies whose CEOs received compensation at least $20 million more 2015 than they would have garnered if their pay had been aligned with performance.
Shareholder votes on pay are wide-ranging and inconsistent, with pension funds engaging in more quantitative analysis. This report, representing the broadest survey of institutional voting ever done on the topic, shows that pension funds are more likely to vote against overpaid packages than mutual funds. Using various state disclosure laws, we were able to collect data from over 30 pension funds. The data shows some pension funds approving just 18% of these overpaid CEO pay packages, to others approving as many as 93% of them.
Mutual funds, on the other hand, are far more likely approve of these overpaid CEO pay packages even though among mutual funds there is wide variation. Of the mutual funds with the largest changes in voting habits from last year, all of them opposed more of the pay packages than they had the prior year. In addition to the trending votes, several funds have indicated that, at a minimum, they will be reviewing pay more closely. Of the largest mutual funds, Dimensional Fund Advisors opposed 53% of these packages, while Blackrock opposed only 7% of them. Some funds seem to routinely rubber stamp management pay practices, enabling the worst offenders and failing in their fiduciary duty. TIAA-CREF, the leading retirement provider for teachers and college professors, is more likely to approve high-pay packages than almost any other institution of its size with support level of 90%.
Directors, who should be acting as stewards of shareholder interests, should be held individually accountable for overseeing egregious pay practices. A number of directors serve on two or more overpaid S&P 500 compensation committees. We list the companies that over-paying directors serve on, and identify individuals who serve on two or more ‘overpaid’ S&P 500 compensation committees.
A primary goal of the report is to focus on mutual fund voting data. This data is disclosed on an annual basis according to a proxy season that covers shareholder meetings held from July 1 of the previous year to June 30 of the present year.
Pour accéder au rapport complet : cliquez ici.
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
autres publications Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration Normes d'encadrement
Féminisation des CA : rapport 2016 par Osler
Ivan Tchotourian 31 octobre 2016
Le Cabinet Osler a publié en septembre 2016 un rapport sur les « Pratiques de divulgation en matière de diversité 2016 : Femmes occupant des postes de direction dans les entreprises inscrites à la cote de la TSX ».
En décembre 2014, les émetteurs canadiens dans les provinces participantes, à l’exception des émetteurs inscrits à la cote de la Bourse de croissance TSX et des fonds de placement, sont devenus assujettis aux nouvelles exigences de divulgation sur la représentation des femmes au sein des conseils d’administration et des équipes de haute direction. L’an dernier, le cabinet Olser avait déjà rédigé un rapport exhaustif sur les pratiques de divulgation en matière de diversité qui abordait la divulgation relative aux femmes occupant des postes de direction dans les sociétés inscrites à la cote de la TSX, autres que les fonds de placement à capital fixe et les fonds négociés en bourse, qui ont fait leur déclaration avant le 31 juillet 2015. La situation globale était décevante.
Dans le rapport sur la divulgation en matière de diversité de cette année, le cabinet Olser résume ses résultats définitifs pour l’ensemble de l’année civile 2015. Le cabinet Osler compare également les résultats de l’analyse de la divulgation qu’il avait réalisée en 2016 (avant le 31 juillet 2016) avec les résultats pour la même période en 2015 afin d’établir si les sociétés inscrites à la cote de la TSX ont fait des progrès.
Qu’en retenir ?… c’est qu’il y a encore du travail comme le démontrent les chiffres suivants !
- Le pourcentage d’entreprises qui se sont dotées d’une politique écrite sur la diversité au sein du conseil d’administration a augmenté pour s’établir à 34 %
- 39 % des entreprises du S&P/TSX 60 ont adopté des cibles pour le nombre de femmes administratrices
- Peu d’entreprises, d’entreprises du S&P/TSX 60 ou autres, se fixent des cibles en ce qui concerne le nombre de femmes à la haute direction
- Il n’y a eu aucun changement dans le pourcentage d’entreprises ne comptant aucune femme au sein du conseil d’administration
- Le nombre moyen de femmes administratrices par entreprise a été à peu près le même que l’an dernier (0,96 en 2016; 0,93 en 2015) et, en moyenne, les femmes représentaient plus ou moins la même proportion d’administrateurs pour chacun des conseils (12 % en 2015 et 13 % en 2016).
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
Gouvernance normes de droit Nouvelles diverses
Une information financière à améliorer
Ivan Tchotourian 26 septembre 2016
« Comment informer plus peut semer la confusion » (Le Devoir, 22 septembre 2016), c’est sous ce titre que François Desjardins revient sur le dernier rapport de surveillance de l’AMF concernant la manière dont les entreprises présentent leur performance financière aux investisseurs.
Les entreprises ont de plus en plus recours aux mesures comptables hors normes pour présenter leur performance financière aux investisseurs, affirme l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) dans son dernier rapport de surveillance.
(…) Les entreprises doivent présenter leurs états financiers selon des règles strictes, mais peuvent, en parallèle, avoir recours à des formats qui ne font l’objet d’aucune définition consensuelle. Par exemple, rien n’empêche de présenter un « bénéfice net » et, dans le même document aux actionnaires, ajouter ou retrancher certains éléments pour arriver à un « bénéfice net ajusté ». À condition, bien sûr, de bien l’expliquer aux investisseurs, car le mot « ajusté » peut vouloir dire bien des choses.
Sans le quantifier, l’AMF a écrit que le phénomène « a augmenté au cours des dernières années ».« Bien que les mesures non conformes aux principes comptables généralement reconnus [PCGR] puissent donner aux investisseurs de l’information supplémentaire qui leur permet de mieux comprendre les principales composantes de leur performance financière, ces mesures peuvent aussi rendre confuses ou obscures les mesures présentées dans les états financiers et induire les investisseurs en erreur », a écrit l’AMF dans son Rapport d’activité du Programme d’examen d’information continue.
Quand on sait que l’information est le nerf de la guerre d’une bonne gouvernance, il faut travailler sans tarder à ce chantier.
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
divulgation financière Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement
Résultat de la consultation du FRC sur la transparence financière en matière de changement climatique
Ivan Tchotourian 20 août 2016
Un groupe de travail du Financial Reporting Council (FRC) a publié fin avril 2016 un bilan de la 1e phase de son travail : « Phase 1 Report of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) ». Qu’en retenir ?
Objectifs
We support the objectives of the TCFD and welcome that it is focussing on financial risks and in particular those that could have a potential impact on future cash flows. We believe that this is important in identifying the boundary of information that would be relevant to investors’ decision-making. As with any project with multiple objectives there will be instances where a trade-off is necessary. Consistent principles are important, but absolute uniformity in disclosures detracts from careful consideration and communication of information that is relevant for its users. Whilst climate related risks will be important to many companies any recommendations must be proportionate and balanced, to avoid excessive focus on one set of risks to the detriment of disclosures of the other principal risks and uncertainties a company faces. Boards must retain responsibility for determining what disclosures, if any, on climate related risks are relevant and material. This requires an understanding of the potential impacts of climate change and legislative responses, and the application of judgement. Identification of factors to be considered by management when making such an assessment will be helpful.
Portée
The recommendation should provide preparers and their boards an understanding of the factors to consider when assessing, mitigating and, where necessary, reporting the climate change risks they might face. Factors to consider might include the sensitivity of its business model to climate related legislation (for example, the existence of low carbon substitute products or processes); the energy use and carbon emissions of the company, its products and suppliers; the company’s investment planning periods; and the geographical location of operations and its distribution channels. High risk sectors could then be used to illuminate those factors.
Utilisateurs
We note from the Phase 1 Report that the intended users for the information goes beyond those making direct investments in companies to those further back in the capital supply chain. We welcome this to ensure more informed capital allocation decisions. However the disclosure recommendations will need to take into consideration the needs of the intended audience and be dependent on the type of preparer as different considerations will apply for climate related risks arising from companies reporting on their own operational activities in their annual report and those investing in a portfolio of assets or advising on investment activities. We also encourage the TCFD to consider the placement of information outside the annual report when recommending disclosures that might go beyond the needs of the annual report’s intended audience. We encourage reporting of more detailed voluntary information for investors or other users outside the annual report so that it does not detract from the key messages.
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
