autres publications | Page 10

Les 13 bonzes du secteur économique américains ont exposé une série de principes auxquels ils voudraient voir adhérer les entreprises américaines inscrites en Bourse (voir les affaires.com) : Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles. Ces principes touchent le rôle, les responsabilités et la composition des conseils d’adminstration; les plans de succession; la rémunération des dirigeants; les droits des actionnaires; le rôle des grands gestionnaires de portefeuille; et la communication des données financières.

Voici un résumé des principes (ici) :

Truly independent corporate boards are vital to effective governance, so no board should be beholden to the CEO or management. Every board should meet regularly without the CEO present, and every board should have active and direct engagement with executives below the CEO level;

Diverse boards make better decisions, so every board should have members with complementary and diverse skills, backgrounds and experiences. It’s also important to balance wisdom and judgment that accompany experience and tenure with the need for fresh thinking and perspectives of new board members;

Every board needs a strong leader who is independent of management. The board’s independent directors usually are in the best position to evaluate whether the roles of chairman and CEO should be separate or combined; and if the board decides on a combined role, it is essential that the board have a strong lead independent director with clearly defined authorities and responsibilities;

Our financial markets have become too obsessed with quarterly earnings forecasts. Companies should not feel obligated to provide earnings guidance — and should do so only if they believe that providing such guidance is beneficial to shareholders;

A common accounting standard is critical for corporate transparency, so while companies may use non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) to explain and clarify their results, they never should do so in such a way as to obscure GAAP-reported results; and in particular, since stock- or options-based compensation is plainly a cost of doing business, it always should be reflected in non-GAAP measurements of earnings; and

Effective governance requires constructive engagement between a company and its shareholders. So the company’s institutional investors making decisions on proxy issues important to long-term value creation should have access to the company, its management and, in some circumstances, the board; similarly, a company, its management and board should have access to institutional investors’ ultimate decision makers on those issues.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Michael J. Mauboussin et Alfred Rappaport ont publié il y a quelques jours un article dans la Harvard Business Review qui revient sur la valeur actionnariale : « Reclaiming the Idea of Shareholder Value ». Les auteurs insistent sur l’importance de définir et de communiquer clairement l’objectif des entreprises.

Corporate governance issues are constantly in the headlines. Activist investors challenge management strategies. Investors and others ask why companies binge on buybacks while skimping on value-creating investment opportunities. But discussions of corporate governance invariably miss the real problem: most public companies have extensive governance procedures but no governing objective. As a result, there is no sound basis for stakeholders, including shareholders, to assess the performance of the company and its executives.

Corporate governance is a system of checks and balances that a company designs to ensure that it faithfully serves its governing objective. The governing objective is the cornerstone upon which the organization builds its culture, communications, and choices about how it allocates capital. Think of it as a clear statement of what a company is fundamentally trying to achieve.

Today there are two camps that aim to define the idea of governing objective, but neither is effective. The first believes the company’s goal is to maximize shareholder value. Countries that operate under common law, including the United States and the United Kingdom, lean in this direction.

The second advocates that the company balance the interests of all stakeholders. Countries that operate under civil law, including France, Germany, and Japan, tend to be in this camp.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

The conversation relaie l’introduction de la Conférence internationale de gouvernance CIG 2016 à l’Université de Montpellier : « Gouvernance et gouvernementalité à l’heure du big data : quels enjeux pour les entreprises ? ».

La 15e conférence internationale de gouvernance (CIG 2016) de l’AAIG (Association Académique Internationale de Gouvernance) qui s’est tenue les 17 et 18 mai 2016 à l’IAE de Montpellier a été l’occasion de débattre sur les nouveaux enjeux de la gouvernance d’entreprise. Les chercheurs en gouvernance sont au carrefour de plusieurs disciplines de management.

À l’origine, les recherches en gouvernance se sont principalement appuyées sur la théorie de l’agence (…) et centrées sur la grande entreprise de type managérial, où la relation plus ou moins conflictuelle entre actionnaires et dirigeants est prééminente. Ces problématiques classiques ne sont pas figées, elles sont régulièrement revisitées et restent d’actualité, comme en témoigne l’étendue des sujets abordés lors la CIG 2016, mais aussi l’actualité récente (…).

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Sur le blogue de l’Université d’Oxford, Idoya Ferrero-Ferrero et Robert Ackrill publie une synthèse de leur dernier article : « Is Europeanization Though Soft-Law a Reality in Corporate Governance Policies? ». La question qu’il aborde est simple mais très pertinente pour les juristes : Est-ce que la soft law européenne en matière de gouvernance d’entreprise fait évoluer les cadres juridiques étatiques (et ce, sans avoir besoin d’édicter des règles contraignantes !) ? La réponse est oui…

Europeanization addresses the impacts of EU membership on national politics and policies, via both the processes by which EU decision-making manifests itself at the national level; and the outcomes of that EU decision-making. Over time, as EU membership and policy scope have expanded, new approaches to policy-making have been developed and, therefore, new channels created by which Europeanization can occur. One such has been the use of ‘soft law’ processes. These have allowed for greater discussion of ‘sensitive’ policy issues, where national policy sovereignty continues to dominate, given that these discussions do not result in legal texts binding on the member states. That said, the purpose of soft law is still to deliver national policy change. Which begs the question – can they work?

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian