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L’“Associated Press/Equilar S&P 500 CEO Pay Study 2016” vient d’être publié. Since 2011, Equilar has worked together with the Associated Press on various executive compensation studies. This latest version of an ongoing annual study identifies total compensation for 341 CEOs who served in that role at an S&P 500 company for at least two years as of fiscal year-end.

Voici les éléments essentiels :

• Median total compensation* for S&P 500 CEOs in this year’s study totaled $10.8 million. For those executives, the median pay increase was 4.5% from the year prior.
• Of the 341 executives in the study, just 17 were female. However, those female executives earned a median $18.0 million, compared to $10.5 million at the median for the 324 male executives.
• Healthcare companies in the S&P 500 saw the highest pay packages at the median, reaching $14.5 million. Utilities CEOs earned a median $9.3 million, the lowest of the industry sectors in the study.
• CEOs based in New Jersey earned more at the median—$20.7 million—than executives in any other state. New York had the second-highest median CEO pay at $14.5 million. While the number of S&P 500 CEOs varies widely, New Jersey also boasted the sixth-highest number of S&P 500 executives with 14, trailing New York (39), California (36), Texas (36), Illinois (22) and Massachusetts (17).

Vous trouverez une synthèse publiée au Chicago Tribune sous le titre “CEO pay climbs again, even as their stock prices don’t”.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

En mai 2016, l’Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) a publié avec Ernst & Young un rapport sur le rôle du comité de nomination : « The Nomination Committee – Coming out of the Shadows ».

While its role may be less clearly defined than that of the audit committee, and its profile lower than that of the remuneration committee, it is arguably the most important of the three. It plays a pivotal role in appointing directors to the board and, if the board lacks the right balance, knowledge, skills and attributes, the likelihood of it and its committees operating effectively is greatly reduced.

Concernant sa mission et ses membres, il est précisé les points suivants :

1. What the appropriate role of the committee should be, e.g., whether the committee should look at executive talent if it does not already do so, and whether the board would benefit from combining the committee into a nomination and governance committee.

2. Whether the following processes are clearly linked: the discussion of current board composition and future composition in light of the company’s strategy, the executive and senior talent succession planning and company strategy, the outcome of the board evaluation exercise and board succession plans, and the link between board evaluations and development and training plans.

3. The existence of a two-pronged approach to identify succession plans in both emergency and steady-state situations.

À propos de la planification de la relève et la détection de talent, le rapport mentionne relativement au comité :

1. The extent to which nomination committee looks across the market and internally to identify four or five potential successors to the CEO.

2. How deeply into the organisation the committee should be looking to identify future talent.

3. The best way to develop the skills of future executive leaders in the business.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

L’EHRC vient de publier un guide « Business and human rights – A five-step guide for company boards » bien intéressant pour les CA. Comme le précise ce document : « We recommend that boards should follow five steps to ensure that their company is fulfilling its responsibility to respect human rights in a robust and coherent manner that meets the expectations of the UN Guiding Principles and UK statutory reporting obligations. Boards should be aware of the company’s salient, or most severe, human rights risks, and ensure ».

The following are the five steps that it is recommended boards should follow to ensure that their company is fulfilling its responsibility to meet human rights in a robust and coherent manner that meets the expectations of the UN Guiding Principles and UK statutory reporting obligations:

1. the company should embed the responsibility to respect human rights into its culture, knowledge and practices;
2. the company should identify and understands its salient, or most severe, risks to human rights;
3. the company should systematically address its salient, or most severe, risks to human rights and provide for remedies when needed;
4. the company should engage with stakeholders to inform its approach to addressing human rights risks; and
5. the company should report on its salient, or most severe, human rights risks and meet regulatory reporting requirements.

Attention : encore une fois, tout cela n’est que du droit international et donc du droit « mou ». Ce guide l’exprime très bien en ces termes : « The Guiding Principles do not create any new international legal obligations on companies, but they can help boards to operate with respect for human rights and meet their legal responsibilities set out in domestic laws ».

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourain

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, 6 agences fédérales américaines (dont la SEC) ont publié pour commentaire (jusqu’au 22 juillet 2016) leur proposition de mise en place de l’article 956 du Dodd-Frank Act visant à interdire les rémunérations incitatives qui encourageraient une prise de risque inconsidéré des institutions financières. Ce document est intitulé : « Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements ».

The OCC, Board, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA, and SEC (the Agencies) are seeking comment on a joint proposed rule (the proposed rule) to revise the proposed rule the Agencies published in the Federal Register on April 14, 2011, and to implement section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Section 956 generally requires that the Agencies jointly issue regulations or guidelines: (1) prohibiting incentive-based payment arrangements that the Agencies determine encourage inappropriate risks by certain financial institutions by providing excessive compensation or that could lead to material financial loss; and (2) requiring those financial institutions to disclose information concerning incentive-based compensation arrangements to the appropriate Federal regulator.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian