rémunération

Pour Paul Hodgson, il est temps de changer la done dans le domaine de la gouvernance d’entreprise : « Change to U.K. CEO pay or regulation seen as inevitable » (Compliance Week, 20 juillet 2016).

Voici un extrait :

wC’s latest report, called Time to Listen, is subtitled, “We need to find a way to respond to public concern about executive pay, or matters will be taken out of our hands.”

The report draws its conclusions on the need to address income inequality from both its own research and the British Social Attitudes 32 survey, published in 2015, which showed strong agreement, even among those voting conservative, to some stark statements:

• There is one law for the rich and another for the poor
• Ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth
• Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance
• Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers

(…) The paper concludes that CEO pay in listed companies is probably the result of market forces operating in imperfectly. It says that the current system of shareholder votes is working but has not been given time to “bed down” and that further regulation may do more harm than good. Finally, it says: “We should in any case be more concerned about pay structures than pay levels.” But the report says that action is not simply required at the top but also at the bottom; addressing stagnating pay and employment uncertainty for ordinary workers. Especially in a period of uncertainty caused by Brexit, “companies will be judged by how they treat the most vulnerable in their workforce.”

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Critique acerbe du professeur Stephen Bainbridge sur la récente réforme française du Say on pay : « Binding say on pay coming (probably) to France: What a terrible idea » (14 juin 2016). Au regard de sa réputation et de la grande qualité de son travail dans le domaine de la gouvernance d’entreprise, cette critique est à prendre en compte.

Voici un extrait :

Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues that the U.K. experience with say on pay makes a mandatory vote a “dubious choice.” First, because individualized review of compensation schemes at the 10,000-odd U.S. reporting companies will be prohibitively expensive, activist institutional investors will probably insist on a narrow range of compensation programs that will force companies into something close to a one size fits all model. Second, because many institutional investors rely on proxy advisory firms, a very small number of gatekeepers will wield undue influence over compensation. This likely outcome seriously undercuts the case for say on pay. Proponents of say on pay claim it will help make management more accountable, but they ignore the probability that say on pay really will shift power from boards of directors not to shareholders but to advisory firms like RiskMetrics. There is good reason to think that boards are more accountable than those firms. “The most important proxy advisor, RiskMetrics, already faces conflict issues in its dual role of both advising and rating firms on corporate governance that will be greatly magnified when it begins to rate firms on their compensation plans.” Ironically, the only constraint on RiskMetrics’ conflict is the market—i.e., the possibility that they will lose credibility and therefore customers—the very force most shareholder power proponents claim does not work when it comes to holding management accountable.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, 6 agences fédérales américaines (dont la SEC) ont publié pour commentaire (jusqu’au 22 juillet 2016) leur proposition de mise en place de l’article 956 du Dodd-Frank Act visant à interdire les rémunérations incitatives qui encourageraient une prise de risque inconsidéré des institutions financières. Ce document est intitulé : « Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements ».

The OCC, Board, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA, and SEC (the Agencies) are seeking comment on a joint proposed rule (the proposed rule) to revise the proposed rule the Agencies published in the Federal Register on April 14, 2011, and to implement section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Section 956 generally requires that the Agencies jointly issue regulations or guidelines: (1) prohibiting incentive-based payment arrangements that the Agencies determine encourage inappropriate risks by certain financial institutions by providing excessive compensation or that could lead to material financial loss; and (2) requiring those financial institutions to disclose information concerning incentive-based compensation arrangements to the appropriate Federal regulator.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian