Structures juridiques | Page 15

Pour celles et ceux que le mouvement progressistes intéressent, plusieurs juristes de renom s’y intéressent :

• Claude Champaud, dir, L’entreprise dans la société du 21^e siècle, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2013; Claude Champaud, Manifeste pour la doctrine de l’entreprise : Sortir de la crise du financialisme, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2011.
• Isabelle Corbisier, « L’entreprise : Quelles sont ses valeurs fondatrices et ses finalités ? » dans Nicolas Thirion, dir, Crise et droit économique, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2014, 175 et aussi Isabelle Corbisier, La société : contrat ou institution ? Droits étatsuniens, français, belge, néerlandais, allemand et luxembourgeois, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2011.
• Simon Deakin, « The Juridical Nature of the Firm » dans Thomas Clarke et Douglas Branson, dir, The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance, Londres, SAGE, 2012, 113.
• Kent Greenfield, « Saving the World With Corporate Law » (2008) 57 Emory LJ 947; Kent Greenfield, « New Principles for Corporate Law » (2005) 1 Hastings Bus LJ 87.
• Andrew R Keay, The Corporate Objective: Corporations, Globalisation and the Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013.
• Catherine Malecki, Responsabilité sociale des entreprises : Perspectives de la gouvernance d’entreprise durable, Paris, LGDJ, 2014.
• David K Millon, « Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should be Done About It? » (2002) 70 Geo Wash L Rev. 890; David K Millon, « New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and Theorisis in Corporate Law » (1993) 50 Wash. & Lee L Rev 1373 ; David K Millon, « Redefining Corporate Law » (1991) 24 Ind L Rev 233; David K Millon, « Theories of the Corporation » (1990) 39 Duke LJ 201.
• Lawrence E Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001 ; Lawrence E Mitchell, dir, Progressive Corporate Law, Boulder, Westview Press, 1995.
• Beate Sjåfjell et Benjamin Richardson, Company Law and Sustainability: Legal Barriers and Opportunities, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015 et Beate Sjåfjell, Towards A Sustainable EU Company Law: A Normative Analysis of the Objectives of EU Law, with the Takeover Directive as a Test Case, European Company Law Series, Kluwer Law International, 2009.
• Lynn A Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, San Francisco, Berrett-Koehler, 2012 ; Lynn A Stout, « Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford » (2008) 3:1 Va L & Bus Rev 163 ; Lynn A Stout, « Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May be Right » (2005) 60 Bus Lawyer 1435 ; Lynn A Stout, « Share price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law » (2005) UCLA School of Law Document de travail No 05-7, en ligne: <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=660622> ; Lynn A Stout, « Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy » (2002) 75:5 S Cal L Rev 1189.
• Alain Supiot, La gouvernance par les nombres, Paris, Éditions Fayard, 2015 ; Alain Supiot, dir, L’entreprise dans un monde sans frontières – Perspectives économiques et juridiques, Collection les sens du droit, Paris, Éditions Dalloz, 2015.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Alors que le colloque du SASE va bientôt avoir lieu à Berkeley aux Etats-Unis, je reviens aujourd’hui sur ce que j’avais présenté au colloque qui s’était tenu en 2014 à Chicago : “Enterprise” and Lawyer’s view: By by Irresponsibility and Welcome in a New Area ».

Accédez au diaporama : PPT SASE 2014 version anglaise

Voici le résumé de cette intervention :

As institutions corporations and enterprises are the basis of capitalism and the subject of great interest for legal studies. Beyond regulation, the inherent nature of corporations raises sensitive legal questions, indeed, since its first appearance in the 18^th century. Inspired by economic and financial sciences, legal theories incorporate corporations to contracts (referred to as “aggregate theory”), a private government (referred to as “artificial theory”) and an autonomous entity (“entity theory” or “doctrine de l’entreprise” in Continental Europe). It is indeed argued that incorporating corporations to a simple nexus of contracts has been the subject of great attention since the 1970s, provided that none of the above theories have definitely won unanimity in law, as seen by a comparative reading of the Canadian, American and European jurisprudence. Corporate governance rules clearly demonstrate such incorporation. In its essence, however, the contractual analysis regards the corporation as a means to serving private interests whereby the liability schemes are limited to protecting the supplier of capital. The contractual analysis’s vision is indeed restricted, and it summarizes its goals, to the sought-after maximization of the corporation’s shareholders value. At the heart of the corporation’s issues lies the financial aspect. Within this framework, non-financial concerns appear far away and are dealt with as simple externality that poses management problems. Nonetheless, the corporation’s activities are bearing an economic power that is today seen as ever increasingly significant and its financial and non-financial consequences should be the basis of further thinking. Yet, Canadian law has engaged into this pathway. On the one hand, Canadian corporate law has experienced a profound re-assessment through the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Peoples (2004) and BCE (2008). Far from being a strict contractual reading of the corporation, these decisions have shed light on the importance of different paradigms such as corporate social responsibility and the stakeholders’ theory. Indeed, new incorporated corporate concepts have reshaped the way the corporation is perceived and its relationship with the environment. On the other hand, Canadian competition law attempts at integrating social concerns into its political sphere. In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada has allowed the commencement of proceedings by indirect purchasers by way of a class action (see cases of Pros-sys, Sun-Rype and Infineon). Case law contemplates limiting the negative impact of anti-competition practices implemented by multinational corporations. The objective is to reinstate an economic balance as between corporations and its clients. The consumer is indeed called upon to play a protective role in the market in addition to the Canadian Competition authority’s competence. As affirmed by the Canadian Competition Tribunal in the decision of Visa/Master Card certain competition disputes between merchants are of common interest. Thus, the public should be made aware of the difficulties met by the businesses in the market. In light of the recent Canadian case law standpoint, it most certainly raises questions about the role that competition policies play within the corporation’s economic activities framework. This paper suggests showing the current legal positions of Canadian corporations and its competition law framework, in addition to putting them into perspective with  their US and European counterparts. In addition to demonstrating their convergence in favor of a more social concern, we stand for the proposition that corporations, as has been defined by the jurist, does not only form a contract. Indeed, it is an institution that carries responsibilities as against its own environment.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, voici un très bel article de Susan Holmberg et Mark Schmitt accessible en ligne : « The Milton Friedman Doctrine Is Wrong. Here’s How to Rethink the Corporation » (Evonomics, 9 juin 2016).

The compensation of American executives—CEOs and their “C-suite” colleagues—has long been a matter of controversy, especially recently, as the wages of average workers have stagnated and economic inequality has moved to the center of the national debate. Just about every spring, the season of corporate proxy votes, we see the rankings of the highest-paid CEOs, topped by men (they’re all men until number 21) like David Cote of Honeywell, who in 2013 took home $16 million in salary and bonus, and another $9 million in stock options.

(…)

The problem isn’t that the political system doesn’t want to deal with excessive CEO pay. There have been any number of formal efforts to rein in executive pay, involving a host of direct regulation and tax changes. But most of the specific efforts to reduce executive pay—through major policies such as a limit on the tax deductibility of high salaries, as well as more modest accounting and disclosure legislation—have fallen short. That’s because the story of skyrocketing executive pay is a story about our conception of the corporation and its responsibilities. And until we rethink our deepest assumptions about the corporation, we won’t be able to master the challenge of excessive CEO pay, or the inequality it generates. Is the CEO simply the agent of the company’s shareholders? Is the corporation’s only obligation to return short-term gains to shareholders? Or can we begin to think of the corporation in terms of the interests of all those who have a stake in its success—its customers, its community, and all of its employees? If we take the latter view, the challenge of CEO pay will become clearer and more manageable.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le BSIF a mis récemment en ligne la communication de Jeremy Rudin (surintendant, à l’Institut mondial de gestion des risques) qu’il a faite à Toronto le 14 juin 2016 intitulé : « Habiliter les institutions financières canadiennes à exercer une gouvernance plus efficace ».

Bien que le BSIF soit conscient des progrès accomplis par les conseils depuis la crise, nombre d’entre eux devront apporter d’autres améliorations à leur rendement. Cela dit, avant de les inciter à faire mieux en matière de gouvernance d’entreprise, le BSIF doit s’assurer que les conditions qu’il a créées sont propices à la réussite.

 

Pour habiliter les institutions financières canadiennes à exercer une meilleure gouvernance, le BSIF va assouplir ses attentes à l’égard des conseils d’administration et les adapter en fonction de la taille et du profil de risque de chaque institution, ainsi que de la complexité de ses activités. Cette mesure offrira aux conseils des occasions plus propices de se concentrer sur les questions de nature prudentielle qui comptent vraiment. Elle donnera aussi au BSIF l’occasion d’établir, et d’atteindre, des normes de qualité supérieure auxquelles les conseils devront souscrire en matière de gestion du risque.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

En voilà une question allez-vous me répondre et pourtant… Un récent article du Harvard Business Review de Suntae Kim, Matthew Karlesky, Christopher Myers et Todd Schifeling intitulé « Why Companies Are Becoming B Corporations » aborde la question de face.

2 raisons essentielles sont identifiées :

1. First, as large established firms have ramped up their corporate social responsibility efforts, small businesses that have long been committed to social and environmental causes want to prove that they are more genuine, authentic advocates of stakeholder benefits.
2.  The qualitative evidence, gathered from firms’ B corporation application materials, revealed that certifying firms believed “the major crises of our time are a result of the way we conduct business,” and they became a B Corporation to “join the movement of creating a new economy with a new set of rules” and “redefine the way people perceive success in the business world.”

So why do certain firms (and not others) choose to identify as B Corporations? Individual leaders are partly why some organizations broaden their purpose beyond maximizing shareholder value. We might look to Sir Richard Branson, who in 2013 co-launched the “B Team,” publicly decrying corporations’ sole focus on short-term profits and calling for a reprioritization of people- and planet-focused performance. We might also consider leaders of firms like Ben & Jerry’s or Patagonia (both B Corporations) that have prioritized societal and environmental agendas.

Clearly, such leaders can be important catalysts of social change. However, the explosive growth of B Corporations seems also to be driven by broader trends and changes in the corporate landscape that cannot be explained by individuals’ actions alone.

Two of us (Suntae Kim and Todd Schifeling) conducted research to build a more robust understanding of the rise of B corporations. By qualitatively examining the internal motives of firms in the process of becoming a B corporation, and quantitatively testing key factors in these firms’ external industry environment – including the shareholder- and stakeholder-focused behaviors of their corporate competitors – we found that there are at least two major underlying reasons why firms choose to seek B Corporation certification.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, alors que le Québec se lamente parfois du rachat de ses entreprises, la France subit également une vague de rachat de ses grandes entreprises du CAC 40. Le quotidien Les Échos.fr propose une réflexion sur le sujet que je vous relaie ici : « Quand les fleurons du CAC 40 plient bagage pour l’étranger ».

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian