Structures juridiques

Nouvelles diverses Structures juridiques

Citizens United As Bad Corporate Law : une réflexion sur ce qu’est une société

Beau papier proposé par les professeurs Macey et Strine Jr intitulé « Citizens United As Bad Corporate Law » (16 août 2018, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 18-28; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 598). Cet article vient discuter utilement de qu.est une société par actions et ses caractéristiques fondamentales.

Résumé

In this Article we show that Citizens United v. FEC, arguably the most important First Amendment case of the new millennium, is predicated on a fundamental misconception about the nature of the corporation. Specifically, Citizens United v. FEC, which prohibited the government from restricting independent expenditures for corporate communications, and held that corporations enjoy the same free speech rights to engage in political spending as human citizens, is grounded on the erroneous theory that corporations are “associations of citizens” rather than what they actually are: independent legal entities distinct from those who own their stock. Our contribution to the literature on Citizens United is that the case is as much a case about corporate law, as it is about the First Amendment. The major disagreement among the justices in Citizens United is about the applicability of settled First Amendment protections to a particular juridical entity, the corporation. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority opines that Congress may not take into account the distinctions between corporations and human beings in regulating political speech, and that corporations must be permitted the same freedom to speak as human beings. In dissent, Justice Stevens fails directly to challenge Justice Kennedy’s existential conception of the corporation notwithstanding the fact that that it constitutes the core of the majority opinion. This Article fills that void. We reject the Citizens United majority’s conception of the corporation as an “associations of citizens” and reaffirm its status as an artificial, metaphysical, and legal construct that exists separate and apart from its investors. The Citizens United view of the corporation as an association of individuals is inconsistent with the established conception of the corporation as a juridical entity with limited liability.

This conception confuses the corporation with the general partnership form of business organization. In fact, the entire point of the incorporation process is to permit the creation of a legal entity that is not an association of individuals, but rather a discrete legal entity whose rights and obligations are distinct from those of it its creators, investors, managers, and other constituents. We base our argument that corporations are separate and distinct legal entities and that they are not “associations of citizens” as Citizens United asserts on three facts about the corporate form:

(1) the treatment of corporations as separate legal entities is what distinguishes corporations from general partnerships and sole proprietorships and what justifies the legal notion of “limited liability” and other central characteristics of the corporate form, such as the ability to contract and to sue and be sued;

(2) corporations do not have owners, they have investors who have contract-based, financial interests in the firms and limited management rights; and

(3) corporations are not fiction, but fact only because the law makes them real and distinct entities with a legal identity.

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Gouvernance normes de droit Structures juridiques

“Enterprise” and Lawyer’s view: By by Irresponsibility and Welcome in a New Area (à télécharger)

Alors que le colloque du SASE va bientôt avoir lieu à Berkeley aux Etats-Unis, je reviens aujourd’hui sur ce que j’avais présenté au colloque qui s’était tenu en 2014 à Chicago : “Enterprise” and Lawyer’s view: By by Irresponsibility and Welcome in a New Area ».

Accédez au diaporama : PPT SASE 2014 version anglaise

 

Voici le résumé de cette intervention :

 

As institutions corporations and enterprises are the basis of capitalism and the subject of great interest for legal studies. Beyond regulation, the inherent nature of corporations raises sensitive legal questions, indeed, since its first appearance in the 18th century. Inspired by economic and financial sciences, legal theories incorporate corporations to contracts (referred to as “aggregate theory”), a private government (referred to as “artificial theory”) and an autonomous entity (“entity theory” or “doctrine de l’entreprise” in Continental Europe). It is indeed argued that incorporating corporations to a simple nexus of contracts has been the subject of great attention since the 1970s, provided that none of the above theories have definitely won unanimity in law, as seen by a comparative reading of the Canadian, American and European jurisprudence. Corporate governance rules clearly demonstrate such incorporation. In its essence, however, the contractual analysis regards the corporation as a means to serving private interests whereby the liability schemes are limited to protecting the supplier of capital. The contractual analysis’s vision is indeed restricted, and it summarizes its goals, to the sought-after maximization of the corporation’s shareholders value. At the heart of the corporation’s issues lies the financial aspect. Within this framework, non-financial concerns appear far away and are dealt with as simple externality that poses management problems. Nonetheless, the corporation’s activities are bearing an economic power that is today seen as ever increasingly significant and its financial and non-financial consequences should be the basis of further thinking. Yet, Canadian law has engaged into this pathway. On the one hand, Canadian corporate law has experienced a profound re-assessment through the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Peoples (2004) and BCE (2008). Far from being a strict contractual reading of the corporation, these decisions have shed light on the importance of different paradigms such as corporate social responsibility and the stakeholders’ theory. Indeed, new incorporated corporate concepts have reshaped the way the corporation is perceived and its relationship with the environment. On the other hand, Canadian competition law attempts at integrating social concerns into its political sphere. In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada has allowed the commencement of proceedings by indirect purchasers by way of a class action (see cases of Pros-sys, Sun-Rype and Infineon). Case law contemplates limiting the negative impact of anti-competition practices implemented by multinational corporations. The objective is to reinstate an economic balance as between corporations and its clients. The consumer is indeed called upon to play a protective role in the market in addition to the Canadian Competition authority’s competence. As affirmed by the Canadian Competition Tribunal in the decision of Visa/Master Card certain competition disputes between merchants are of common interest. Thus, the public should be made aware of the difficulties met by the businesses in the market. In light of the recent Canadian case law standpoint, it most certainly raises questions about the role that competition policies play within the corporation’s economic activities framework. This paper suggests showing the current legal positions of Canadian corporations and its competition law framework, in addition to putting them into perspective with  their US and European counterparts. In addition to demonstrating their convergence in favor of a more social concern, we stand for the proposition that corporations, as has been defined by the jurist, does not only form a contract. Indeed, it is an institution that carries responsibilities as against its own environment.

 

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Ivan Tchotourian

rémunération Structures juridiques Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

Changer la conception de la société par actions

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, voici un très bel article de Susan Holmberg et Mark Schmitt accessible en ligne : « The Milton Friedman Doctrine Is Wrong. Here’s How to Rethink the Corporation » (Evonomics, 9 juin 2016).

 

The compensation of American executives—CEOs and their “C-suite” colleagues—has long been a matter of controversy, especially recently, as the wages of average workers have stagnated and economic inequality has moved to the center of the national debate. Just about every spring, the season of corporate proxy votes, we see the rankings of the highest-paid CEOs, topped by men (they’re all men until number 21) like David Cote of Honeywell, who in 2013 took home $16 million in salary and bonus, and another $9 million in stock options.

(…)

The problem isn’t that the political system doesn’t want to deal with excessive CEO pay. There have been any number of formal efforts to rein in executive pay, involving a host of direct regulation and tax changes. But most of the specific efforts to reduce executive pay—through major policies such as a limit on the tax deductibility of high salaries, as well as more modest accounting and disclosure legislation—have fallen short. That’s because the story of skyrocketing executive pay is a story about our conception of the corporation and its responsibilities. And until we rethink our deepest assumptions about the corporation, we won’t be able to master the challenge of excessive CEO pay, or the inequality it generates. Is the CEO simply the agent of the company’s shareholders? Is the corporation’s only obligation to return short-term gains to shareholders? Or can we begin to think of the corporation in terms of the interests of all those who have a stake in its success—its customers, its community, and all of its employees? If we take the latter view, the challenge of CEO pay will become clearer and more manageable.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian