engagement et activisme actionnarial

engagement et activisme actionnarial Gouvernance

En direct de l’ICGN conference de Boston : le vote en débat

Bonsoir à toutes et à tous, sur le blog Corporate Governance – CorpGov.net: improving accountability through democratic corporate governance since 1995, Jamse McRitchie vous propose de suivre – par le biais de résumés – les débat qui ont lieu lors de la conférence de Boston de l’ICGN (ici).

La 3e partie de cette conférence (ICGN Boston 2015, Part 3: Differential Voting Rights) est particulièrement intéressante pour le blogue.


Morceaux choisis :

Public investors need protection from controlling shareholders in controlled companies and managers in widely-held companies. Rules that increase the power of majority shareholders might protect all shareholders in widely-held companies but not in controlled companies. Similarly, rules that improve the rights of minority shareholders will probably help in controlled companies but not widely-held companies. Rules to help overcome collective action are helpful for widely-held but less so in controlled companies.

Brazil had dual-class for many many years. Encouraged but led to problems.

Creativity. Companies assign more voting rights and then creates super-nonvoting rights where nonvoting shares are worth 35 times. Controlling shareholders provided a number of sweeteners as they moved to consolidate control. Investors respond to incentives… timeframe is not infinity. Flaws in misalignment are not likely show up in five years. If we forbid differential voting rights they will create through other control mechanisms.

We need to ensure non-voting shares are priced less in the market.

In France, 22 companies double voting rights in bylaws. Institutional investors pushed for one share one vote. French state controlling shareholder in 13 companies. Gave a few examples of double voting rights. One actually asked to opt out of dual-class. Most in favor of one-share one-vote.

Stephen Erlichman noted that Canada has had examples of dual class share companies that have voluntarily converted into normal companies, without any premium being paid.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian