engagement et activisme actionnarial

Yin Wilczek synthétise une intéressante étude qui remet en question le dogme de la souveraineté actionnariale. Dans « Study : Executives Act in Company Interest when Challenging Résolutions » (30 décembre 2016), l’auteure résume habillement un article publié récemment établissant que des dirigeants d’une entreprise agissent dans le meilleur intérêt de cette dernière lorsqu’ils contestent une proposition actionnariale.

This may surprise some shareholder advocates, but executives appear to act in the company’s best interest when they challenge shareholder resolutions via the Securities and Exchange Commission’s no-action process.

(…) The study concluded that corporate managers resist these shareholder resolutions because they could hurt the company’s bottom line, and that investors agree the proposals are “value-destroying.” The study also found that investors are especially skeptical of resolutions by so-called “gadfly” proponents, i.e., individual shareholders who submit numerous resolutions at companies.

“Among the different types of shareholders whose proposals are challenged by managers, we find that proposals from individual shareholders are the most value-destroying,” the study said.

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Ivan Tchotourian