engagement et activisme actionnarial normes de droit rémunération
Say on pay : l’UE vers un accord
Ivan Tchotourian 10 décembre 2016
Le bien informé Financial Times (« Brussels deal to give shareholders more clout on directors’ pay« , 8 décembre 2016) vient de révéler une information qui fera réagir les lectrices et lecteurs de ce blogue. L’UE serait sur le point d’adopter un accord donnant plus de pouvoir aux actionnaires en matière de rémunération des dirigeants, l’objectif étant de contrecarrer le court-termisme dont feraient preuve les CA.
Pour les points essentiels, voici ce qui a été décidé :
Under the deal struck between negotiators from the European Parliament and Slovakia, which holds the EU’s presidency, shareholders will get a vote on companies’ pay policy at least every four years.
The agreement reached will leave individual nations to decide whether to opt for a system of binding shareholder votes on pay, or to allow votes to be advisory. However, even an advisory vote against pay structures would require companies to present a revised policy for another vote at the next general meeting of shareholders.
Investors will also get an advisory say on listed companies’ annual remuneration reports, which provide an individual breakdown of pay and benefits given to individual directors over the last financial year.
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
engagement et activisme actionnarial Normes d'encadrement
Retour sur la consultation de l’ESMA conernant les OPA
Ivan Tchotourian 20 août 2015
Bonjour à toutes et à tous, vous pourrez lire avec intérêt cet article de Martin Winner intitulé : « Active Shareholders and European Takeover Regulation » (European Company and Financial Law Review, 2014, Vol. 11, no 3, p. 364-392). L’auteur y aborde la proposition de l’ESMA dans le domaine des OPA, notamment sur le comportement des actionnaires.
In November 2013 ESMA published a public statement on active shareholders and acting in concert according to the Takeover Bids Directive. The document addresses institutional investors’ fears that cooperation with other investors may trigger an obligation to launch a bid. This runs contrary to the European Commission’s aim to encourage shareholders to exercise their rights as a means to combat short-termism. Although the contents of the statement may not be all that the Commission and institutional investors hope for, this article argues that the Takeover Bids Directive gives the Member States considerable leeway in implementing the concept of acting in concert. Hoping to achieve a consistent supervisory practice in Europe without changing the Directive is a wish to square the circle.
À la prochaine…
Ivan Tchotourian
