Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale | Page 12

Voilà la théorie des parties prenantes pleinement appréhendée par le droit ! Le cas de l’entreprise française Morlex démontre que le droit français protège d’autres parties prenantes que les simples actionnaires et que le droit a pleinement un rôle à jouer. Le Monde vient de publier l’issue d’un litige qui opposait entreprise et salariés dans le cadre d’une décision prise en faveur des actionnaires : « Molex : le licenciement de 191 salariés jugé « sans cause réelle ni sérieuse » »

Après des années de combat, les « Molex » obtiennent une victoire de taille. Mardi 9 août, la cour d’appel de Toulouse a jugé « sans cause réelle ni sérieuse » le licenciement de 191 salariés du groupe de connectique automobile Molex, dont l’usine de Villemur-sur-Tarn (Haute-Garonne) a fermé en 2009. La justice a estimé que l’employeur avait agi « avec légèreté » dans ces licenciements et a accordé au total environ 7 millions d’euros d’indemnités

(…) La décision de fermer l’usine de Villemur-sur-Tarn a été prise « alors que le secteur n’était pas en difficulté », a encore jugé la cour d’appel, selon l’avocat. « Tous les rapports révèlent qu’au cours de la période 2004-2009, les dividendes versés aux actionnaires par le groupe ont été multipliés par six et représentaient en 2009 un montant total de 100 millions de dollars (environ 72 millions d’euros, au taux de l’époque) », peut-on en effet lire dans l’arrêt.

« Big funds push back against activist investor settlements » (Reuters, 18 juillet 2016)… Cet article est à lire, tant il témoigne d’une évolution lente et progressive vers un modèle de gouvernance moins axé vers le court-termisme. Le temps de faire siéger les investisseurs court-termistes (tels les fonds de couverture) dans les CA serait-il révolu ?

After years of support for companies that hand board seats to activists to avoid a bruising public fight, some of the world’s largest institutional investors are pushing back.

BlackRock Inc (BLK.N), the world’s largest asset manager, and Norges Bank Investment Management, Norway’s $872 billion sovereign wealth fund are among the major funds resisting, encouraging companies to consult them before responding to an activist.

These investors argue that in certain cases, giving board seats to frustrated shareholders with a shorter-term investment horizon could jeopardize the company’s long-term performance.

Activist investors, which Thomson Reuters data show launched a record 511 campaigns last year, are usually hedge funds that buy up a minority stake in a company they believe is undervalued, and push publicly for changes to boost the stock.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Michael J. Mauboussin et Alfred Rappaport ont publié il y a quelques jours un article dans la Harvard Business Review qui revient sur la valeur actionnariale : « Reclaiming the Idea of Shareholder Value ». Les auteurs insistent sur l’importance de définir et de communiquer clairement l’objectif des entreprises.

Corporate governance issues are constantly in the headlines. Activist investors challenge management strategies. Investors and others ask why companies binge on buybacks while skimping on value-creating investment opportunities. But discussions of corporate governance invariably miss the real problem: most public companies have extensive governance procedures but no governing objective. As a result, there is no sound basis for stakeholders, including shareholders, to assess the performance of the company and its executives.

Corporate governance is a system of checks and balances that a company designs to ensure that it faithfully serves its governing objective. The governing objective is the cornerstone upon which the organization builds its culture, communications, and choices about how it allocates capital. Think of it as a clear statement of what a company is fundamentally trying to achieve.

Today there are two camps that aim to define the idea of governing objective, but neither is effective. The first believes the company’s goal is to maximize shareholder value. Countries that operate under common law, including the United States and the United Kingdom, lean in this direction.

The second advocates that the company balance the interests of all stakeholders. Countries that operate under civil law, including France, Germany, and Japan, tend to be in this camp.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Un article de The Wall Street Journal « The End of Economic Forecasting » revient (pour la critiquer sévèrement) sur la domination de la logique financière sur les grandes entreprises actuelles.

Because financial markets and financial investors are increasingly driving the world economy and it is inherently volatile. Total global assets under professional management have now increased to an astonishing $75 trillion, according to Boston Consulting Group. These gigantic amounts are rocketing around the globe looking for returns. The result is that commodity markets, corporations, governments and other sectors are being relentlessly financialized—or tied to the fortunes of investments in markets—and thus less predictable.

(…) Financial factors also are increasingly dominating corporations—and the result is very short-term behavior. The rise of shareholder activism, hostile takeovers and newer techniques of executive compensation have put managements and boards of directors under tremendous pressure to deliver returns to shareholders now. The result is increasing focus on immediate earnings and share-price movements.

Nearly 80% of respondents to a 2014 CFO survey in the Harvard Business Review said they would sacrifice “economic value” to meet Wall Street targets. This is why so much capital has been used for share-buyback programs, rather than for long-term investment. With corporations themselves losing focus on the long term, it is harder for anyone to forecast their performance.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Pour celles et ceux que le mouvement progressistes intéressent, plusieurs juristes de renom s’y intéressent :

• Claude Champaud, dir, L’entreprise dans la société du 21^e siècle, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2013; Claude Champaud, Manifeste pour la doctrine de l’entreprise : Sortir de la crise du financialisme, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2011.
• Isabelle Corbisier, « L’entreprise : Quelles sont ses valeurs fondatrices et ses finalités ? » dans Nicolas Thirion, dir, Crise et droit économique, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2014, 175 et aussi Isabelle Corbisier, La société : contrat ou institution ? Droits étatsuniens, français, belge, néerlandais, allemand et luxembourgeois, Bruxelles, Larcier, 2011.
• Simon Deakin, « The Juridical Nature of the Firm » dans Thomas Clarke et Douglas Branson, dir, The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance, Londres, SAGE, 2012, 113.
• Kent Greenfield, « Saving the World With Corporate Law » (2008) 57 Emory LJ 947; Kent Greenfield, « New Principles for Corporate Law » (2005) 1 Hastings Bus LJ 87.
• Andrew R Keay, The Corporate Objective: Corporations, Globalisation and the Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013.
• Catherine Malecki, Responsabilité sociale des entreprises : Perspectives de la gouvernance d’entreprise durable, Paris, LGDJ, 2014.
• David K Millon, « Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should be Done About It? » (2002) 70 Geo Wash L Rev. 890; David K Millon, « New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and Theorisis in Corporate Law » (1993) 50 Wash. & Lee L Rev 1373 ; David K Millon, « Redefining Corporate Law » (1991) 24 Ind L Rev 233; David K Millon, « Theories of the Corporation » (1990) 39 Duke LJ 201.
• Lawrence E Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001 ; Lawrence E Mitchell, dir, Progressive Corporate Law, Boulder, Westview Press, 1995.
• Beate Sjåfjell et Benjamin Richardson, Company Law and Sustainability: Legal Barriers and Opportunities, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015 et Beate Sjåfjell, Towards A Sustainable EU Company Law: A Normative Analysis of the Objectives of EU Law, with the Takeover Directive as a Test Case, European Company Law Series, Kluwer Law International, 2009.
• Lynn A Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth, San Francisco, Berrett-Koehler, 2012 ; Lynn A Stout, « Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford » (2008) 3:1 Va L & Bus Rev 163 ; Lynn A Stout, « Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May be Right » (2005) 60 Bus Lawyer 1435 ; Lynn A Stout, « Share price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law » (2005) UCLA School of Law Document de travail No 05-7, en ligne: <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=660622> ; Lynn A Stout, « Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy » (2002) 75:5 S Cal L Rev 1189.
• Alain Supiot, La gouvernance par les nombres, Paris, Éditions Fayard, 2015 ; Alain Supiot, dir, L’entreprise dans un monde sans frontières – Perspectives économiques et juridiques, Collection les sens du droit, Paris, Éditions Dalloz, 2015.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, voici un très bel article de Susan Holmberg et Mark Schmitt accessible en ligne : « The Milton Friedman Doctrine Is Wrong. Here’s How to Rethink the Corporation » (Evonomics, 9 juin 2016).

The compensation of American executives—CEOs and their “C-suite” colleagues—has long been a matter of controversy, especially recently, as the wages of average workers have stagnated and economic inequality has moved to the center of the national debate. Just about every spring, the season of corporate proxy votes, we see the rankings of the highest-paid CEOs, topped by men (they’re all men until number 21) like David Cote of Honeywell, who in 2013 took home $16 million in salary and bonus, and another $9 million in stock options.

(…)

The problem isn’t that the political system doesn’t want to deal with excessive CEO pay. There have been any number of formal efforts to rein in executive pay, involving a host of direct regulation and tax changes. But most of the specific efforts to reduce executive pay—through major policies such as a limit on the tax deductibility of high salaries, as well as more modest accounting and disclosure legislation—have fallen short. That’s because the story of skyrocketing executive pay is a story about our conception of the corporation and its responsibilities. And until we rethink our deepest assumptions about the corporation, we won’t be able to master the challenge of excessive CEO pay, or the inequality it generates. Is the CEO simply the agent of the company’s shareholders? Is the corporation’s only obligation to return short-term gains to shareholders? Or can we begin to think of the corporation in terms of the interests of all those who have a stake in its success—its customers, its community, and all of its employees? If we take the latter view, the challenge of CEO pay will become clearer and more manageable.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

« The American corporation has been transformed by globalization and new technology. But equally powerful is the belief on Wall Street and in boardrooms that the sole responsibility of a corporation is to maximize profits for its shareholders ». Ce résumé du rapport de Marketplace « The price of profits » illustre parfaitement les 5 beaux chapitres (pas trop longs et accessibles à tout public) qu’il nous est donné de lire. Revoilà la primauté de la valeur actionnariale sur le devant de la scène pour être critiquée…

Listen to business news on cable TV, and you’ll hear bankers, fund managers and CEOs talk about a corporation’s legal responsibility to “maximize shareholder value.” The idea that the product of a corporation is profits is gospel. It’s taught in business school. But it’s not true.

(…) If jobs were the first target, how to spend a company’s profits was next. A corporation can invest in itself and grow or — what? Giant investment funds pressed for higher returns — higher share prices. An increasingly favorite strategy was to spend profits buying back the company’s own shares. It was financial engineering: fewer shares, higher share price.

The former corporate raider Carl Icahn, for example, started buying shares of Apple in 2013, and eventually owned more than 50 million, nearly 1 percent. He pressured Apple to buy back shares — and Apple is spending more than $100 billion doing so.

Icahn sold his shares this spring. Economist William Lazonick, the author of a shareholder-value analysis, “Profits Without Prosperity,” noted that Icahn was a share-renter, not a shareholder. He never invested a dollar in Apple itself.

Icahn said his investment in Apple shares netted him $2 billion. Apple? Its shares are below what the company paid for them. So far, Apple is a loser.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian