devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration Normes d'encadrement normes de droit normes de marché Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale
Étude de l’UE sur les devoirs des administrateurs : une gouvernance loin d’être durable !
Ivan Tchotourian 12 août 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
Belle étude qu’offre l’Union européenne sur les devoirs des administrateurs et la perspective de long-terme : « Study on directors’ duties and sustainable corporate governance » (29 juillet 2020). Ce rapport document le court-termisme de la gestion des entreprises en Europe. En lisant les grandes lignes de ce rapport, on se rend compte d’une chose : on est loin du compte et la RSE n’est pas encore suffisamment concrétisée…
Résumé :
L’accent mis par les instances décisionnelles au sein des entreprises sur la maximisation à court terme du profit réalisé par les parties prenantes, au détriment de l’intérêt à long terme de l’entreprise, porte atteinte, à long terme, à la durabilité des entreprises européennes, tant sous l’angle économique, qu’environnemental et social.
L’objectif de cette étude est d’évaluer les causes du « court-termisme » dans la gouvernance d’entreprise, qu’elles aient trait aux actuelles pratiques de marché et/ou à des dispositions réglementaires, et d’identifier d’éventuelles solutions au niveau de l’UE, notamment en vue de contribuer à la réalisation des Objectifs de Développement Durable fixés par l’Organisation des Nations Unies et des objectifs de l’accord de Paris en matière de changement climatique.
L’étude porte principalement sur les problématiques participant au « court-termisme » en matière de droit des sociétés et de gouvernance d’entreprises, lesquelles problématiques ayant été catégorisées autour de sept facteurs, recouvrant des aspects tels que les devoirs des administrateurs et leur application, la rémunération et la composition du Conseil d’administration, la durabilité dans la stratégie d’entreprise et l’implication des parties prenantes.
L’étude suggère qu’une éventuelle action future de l’UE dans le domaine du droit des sociétés et de gouvernance d’entreprise devrait poursuivre l’objectif général de favoriser une gouvernance d’entreprise plus durable et de contribuer à une plus grande responsabilisation des entreprises en matière de création de valeur durable. C’est pourquoi, pour chaque facteur, des options alternatives, caractérisées par un niveau croissant d’intervention réglementaire, ont été évaluées par rapport au scénario de base (pas de changement de politique).
Pour un commentaire, voir ce billet du Board Agenda : « EU urges firms to focus on long-term strategy over short-term goals » (3 août 2020).
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actualités internationales devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance normes de droit Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises
Entreprises et parties prenantes : focus sur les Pays-Bas
Ivan Tchotourian 2 août 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
Le 2 août 2020, Christiaan de Brauw a publié un intéressant billet sur l’Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance sous le titre « The Dutch Stakeholder Experience ».
Extrait :
Lessons learned
The Dutch experience shows that the following lessons are key to make the stakeholder-oriented governance model work in practice.
Embed a clear stakeholder mission in the fiduciary duties of the board
To have a real stakeholder model, the board must have a duty to act in the interests of the business and all the stakeholders, not only the shareholders. In shareholder models there may be some room to consider stakeholder interests. For example, in Delaware and various other US states, the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders may be considered in the context of achieving overall long-term shareholder value creation. In US states with constituency statutes, the board’s discretion is preserved: the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders can be, but do not have to be, taken into account. A meaningful stakeholder model requires the board to act in the interests of the business and all stakeholders. This is a “shall” duty, in the words of Leo Strine and Robert Eccles (see Purpose With Meaning: A Practical Way Forward, Robert G. Eccles, Leo E. Strine and Timothy Youmans, May 16, 2020). Rather than allowing for the possibility that all stakeholders’ interests will be taken into account; it should create a real duty to do so. Since 1971, boards of Dutch companies have had such a “shall” duty to follow a stakeholder mission, similar to that of a benefit corporation in, for example, Delaware.
The stakeholder duty must be clear and realistic for boards in the economic environment in which they operate. To define the contours of such a mission in a clear and practical way is not easy, as the journey of the Dutch stakeholder model shows. Today, the Netherlands has a meaningful and realistically defined fiduciary duty for boards. The primary duty is to promote the sustainable success of the business, focused on long-term value creation, while taking into account the interests of all stakeholders and ESG and similar sustainability perspectives. These principles are broadly similar to the corporate purpose and mission proposed by Martin Lipton and others (see On the Purpose of the Corporation, Martin Lipton, William Savitt and Karessa L. Cain, posted May 27, 2020).
Critics of the stakeholder model sometimes point to the ambiguity and lack of clarity of such a pluralistic model. The developments of the Dutch stakeholder model since its inception show that a pluralistic model can work in practice. By now, Dutch boards’ overriding task is adequately clear and aligned with what is typically expected of a company’s executives: pursuing the strategic direction that will most likely result in long-term and sustainable business success. The Dutch stakeholder model also has a workable roadmap to deal with stakeholders’ interests, particularly if they diverge or cannot all be protected fully at the same time, which necessarily results in trade-offs between stakeholders. A realistic approach to governance acknowledges that a stakeholder model does not mean that boards can or should seek to maximize value for all the stakeholders equally and at the same time. It is simply unrealistic to simultaneously pay (and progressively increase) dividends, increase wages and improve contract terms, while also promoting the success of the business. The Dutch interpretation of the stakeholder model, as developed through practice over decades, boils down to the focus on the sustainable success of the business and long-term value creation. As said above, stakeholders are protected by the board’s duty to prevent disproportionate or unnecessary harm to any class of stakeholders. Boards should avoid or mitigate such harm, for example, by agreeing “non-financial covenants” in a takeover. This makes sense as a way to protect stakeholder interests in a realistic manner, much more so than merely requiring boards—without any further guidance—to create value for all the stakeholders.
A stakeholder-oriented model should also be modern and flexible enough to address and incorporate important developments. The Dutch model is especially well positioned to embrace ESG and similar sustainability perspectives. For example, the Dutch company DSM has successfully illustrated this, while being profitable and attractive for investors. There is growing appreciation that being a frontrunner in ESG is required for sustainable business success. In addition to the fact that ESG is required for continuity of the business model and can often give a company a competitive edge, stakeholders increasingly require it. Simply “doing the right thing”, as an independent corporate goal, is more and more seen as important by (new millennial) employees, customers, institutional investors and other stakeholders.
There is no standard test to determine whether a business has achieved sustainable success. There will be different ways to achieve and measure success for different companies, depending on the respective circumstances. Therefore, the test will always have to be bespoke, implemented by the board and explained to stakeholders.
The Dutch stakeholder model has proven to work quite well in times of crisis, such as today’s Covid-19 crisis, as it bolsters the board’s focus on the survival and continuity of the business. The board must first assess whether there is a realistic chance of survival and continuity of the business. If not, and if insolvency becomes imminent, the board’s duties transform to focus on creditors’ interests, such as preventing wrongful trading and the winding down or restarting of the business in line with applicable insolvency/restructuring proceedings. Driven by the economic reality and the need to survive, in times of crisis, boards typically have more freedom to do what it takes to survive: from pursuing liquidity enhancing measures, implementing reorganizations, suspending dividends to shareholders and payments to creditors and so on. The success of the business remains the overriding aim, and in some cases harm to one or more classes of stakeholders may need to be accepted. In addition, in a true stakeholder model, in times of crisis there may not be sympathy for corporate raiders or activists (so-called “corona profiteers” in the current case) who want to buy listed companies on the cheap. A just say not now defense in addition to the just say no defense will readily be available for boards who are occupied with dealing with the crisis and revaluating the best strategic direction. This idea that during the Covid-crisis protection against activists and hostile bidders may be needed seems to be understood as well by, for example, ISS and Glass Lewis, evidenced by their willingness to accept new poison pills for a one year duration (see, for example, ISS and Glass Lewis Guidances on Poison Pills during COVID-19 Pandemic, Paul J. Shim, James E. Langston, and Charles W. Allen, posted on April 26, 2020).
Teeth to protect the stakeholder mission and appropriate checks and balances
The Netherlands has adopted a model in which matters of strategy are the prerogative of the executive directors under supervision of the non-executive directors or, in the still widely used two-tier system, of the management board under supervision of the supervisory board. Similar to the discretion afforded to directors under Delaware’s business judgment rule, a Dutch board has a lot of freedom to choose the strategic direction of the company. In a dispute, the amount of care taken by the board in the decision-making process will be scrutinized by courts, but normally objectively reasonable decisions will be respected. In the Dutch model the board is the captain of the ship; it is best equipped to determine the course for the business and take difficult decisions on how to serve the interests of stakeholders. Generally, the board has no obligation to consult with, or get the approval of, the shareholders in advance of a decision.
At the same time, in recognition of the significant power that boards have in the Dutch stakeholder model, there should be checks and balances to ensure the board’s powers are exercised in a careful manner, without conflicts of interest and without entrenchment. Non-executive/supervisory directors will need to exercise critical and hands-on oversight, particularly when there are potential conflicts of interest. Further, shareholders and other stakeholders are entitled to hold boards to account: boards need to be able to explain their strategic decisions. Shareholders can use their shareholder rights to express their opinions and preferences. Shareholders can also pursue the dismissal of failing and entrenched boards. Boards need regular renewed shareholder mandates through reappointments. The courts are the ultimate guardian of the stakeholder model. The Dutch Enterprise Chamber at the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, which operates in a comparable manner to the Delaware Chancery Court, is an efficient and expert referee of last resort.
The stakeholder model should not convert to a shareholder model in takeover scenarios. The board should focus on whether a takeover is the best strategic option and take into account the consequences for all the stakeholders. In most cases, the best strategic direction for the business will create the highest valuation of the business. But, and this is a real difference with shareholder models, it should be acknowledged that the stand-alone (or other best strategic) option can be different from the strategic option favored by a majority of the shareholders and the option that creates the most shareholder value. This principle was confirmed by the Dutch Enterprise Chamber in 2017 in the AkzoNobel case.
A meaningful stakeholder model requires teeth. The right governance structures need to be put in place to create and protect the long-term stakeholder mission in the face of short-term market pressure. The reality—in the Netherlands as well as in the US—is that shareholders are the most powerful constituency in the stakeholder universe, with the authority to replace the board. In Dutch practice, various countervailing measures can be used to protect the stakeholder mission. A commonly used instrument is the independent protection foundation, the Dutch poison pill. The independent foundation can exercise a call option and acquire and vote on preference shares. It can neutralize the newly acquired voting power of hostile bidders or activists and is effective against actions geared at replacing the board, including a proxy fight. Once the threat no longer exists, the preference shares are cancelled. These measures have been effective, for example, against hostile approaches of America Movil for KPN (2013) and Teva for Mylan (2015).
Foster a stakeholder mindset, governance and environment
Perhaps the most important prerequisite for a well-functioning stakeholder model is the actual mindset of executives and directors. This mindset drives how they will use their stakeholder powers. Fiduciary duties—also in a stakeholder model—are “open norms” and leave a lot of freedom to boards to pursue the strategic direction and to use their authority as they deem fit. The prevailing spirit and opinions about governance are important, as they influence how powers are interpreted and exercised. As an example, the Dutch requirement that boards need to act in the interest of the company and its business dates from 1971, but that did not prevent boards in the 2000s from seeing shareholders as the first among equals. Today, the body of ideas about governance in the developed world is tending to converge towards stakeholder-oriented governance. This seems to indicate a fundamental change in mindset, not merely a fashionable trend or lip service. Board members with a stakeholder conviction should not be afraid to follow their mission, even if it runs counter to past experience or faces shareholder opposition. Of course, the future will hold the ultimate test for the stakeholder model. Can it, in practice, deliver on its promise to create sustainable success and long-term value and provide better protection for stakeholders? If so, this will create a positive feedback loop in which more boards embrace it.
Stakeholder-based governance models remain works in progress. In order to succeed in the long term, models that grant boards the authority to determine the strategy need to stay viable and attractive for shareholders. Going forward, boards following a stakeholder-based model will likely need to focus more on accountability, for example by concretely substantiating their strategic plans and goals and, where possible, providing the relevant metrics to measure their achievements. In reality, stakeholder models are already attractive for foreign investors: about 90% of investors in Dutch listed companies are US or UK investors. In addition, developments in the definition of the corporate purpose will further refine the stakeholder model. In the Netherlands, there has been a call to action by 25 corporate law professors who argue that companies should act as responsible corporate citizens and should articulate a clear corporate purpose.
To make stakeholder governance work, ideally, all stakeholders are committed to the same mission. It is encouraging that key institutional investors are embracing long-term value creation and the consideration of other stakeholders’ interests, for instance by supporting the New Paradigm model of corporate governance and stewardship codes to that effect. However, the “proof of the pudding” is whether boards can continue to walk the stakeholder talk and pursue the long-term view in the face of short-term pressure, either through generally accepted goals and behavior or, if necessary, countervailing governance arrangements. Today, it is still far from certain whether institutional investors will reject pursuing a short-term takeover premium, even where they consider the offer to be undervalued or not supportive of long-term value creation. Annual bonuses of the deciding fund manager may depend on accepting that offer. Until the behavior of investors in such scenarios respects the principle of long-term value creation, appropriate governance protection is important to prevent a legal pathway for shareholders to impose their short-term goals. Therefore, even in jurisdictions where stakeholder-based approaches have been embraced, and are actually pursued by boards, governance arrangements might need to be changed to make the stakeholder mission work in practice. Clear guidance for boards is needed on what the stakeholder mission is and how to deal with stakeholders’ interests, as well as catering for adequate powers and protection for boards.
The Dutch model, which requires a company to be business success-driven, have a “shall duty” to stakeholders that applies even in a sale of the company, and that recognizes that corporations are dependent on stakeholders for success and have a corresponding responsibility to stakeholders, has been demonstrated to be consistent with a high-functioning economy. By highlighting the Dutch system, however, I do not mean to claim that it is unique. For policymakers who are considering the merits of a stakeholder-based governance model, the Dutch system should be seen as one example among many corporate governance systems in successful market economies (such as Germany) that embrace this form of stakeholder-based governance. There is likely no one-size-fits-all approach; each jurisdiction should find the tailor-made model that works best for it, like perhaps the introduction of the corporate purpose in the UK and France. In any event, there is a great benefit in exchanging ideas and learning from experiences in different jurisdictions to find common ground and best practices in order to increase the acceptance and appreciation of stakeholder-oriented governance models.
US governance practices have been, and are, influential around the world. In the 2000s the pendulum in developed countries, including to some extent in the Netherlands, clearly swung in the direction of shareholder-centric governance as championed in the US. In the current environment, if the US system’s focus on shareholders is not adjusted to protect stakeholder interests, it may over time perhaps become an outlier among many of the world’s leading market economies that in one way or the other have adopted a stakeholder approach. Adjustment towards stakeholder governance seems certainly possible in the US, for example through the emerging model of corporate governance, the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation. The benefit corporation seems to have many if not all of the key attributes of the Dutch system and could provide a promising path forward if American corporate governance is to change in a way that makes the US model truly focused on the long-term value for all stakeholders. The question for US advocates of stakeholder governance is whether they will embrace it, or adopt another effective governance change, and make their commitment to respect stakeholders rea
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Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises
Projet de résolution du Parlement européen sur la RSE : souvenir
Ivan Tchotourian 16 juillet 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
Le projet de résolution du Parlement européen déposé le 12 mars 2018 sur la responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE) (2018/2633(RSP) se révèle être une source d’enseignement !
Extrait :
(…) 9. souligne que ce plan d’action révisé devrait également intégrer dans une définition actualisée de la RSE le respect des principes et des droits fondamentaux, y compris ceux qui sont définis dans la charte sociale européenne et dans les normes fondamentales du travail de l’OIT, ainsi que la promotion d’un taux d’emploi élevé, de conditions de travail d’une qualité élevée et de la cohésion sociale; ajoute que ce plan devrait aussi prévoir l’introduction d’un label social européen pour la RSE;
10. invite les États membres à faire pleinement usage de la possibilité d’inclure des critères environnementaux et sociaux, y compris la RSE, dans leurs procédures de passation de marchés publics; demande à la Commission de promouvoir ces initiatives et de faciliter les échanges de bonnes pratiques en la matière;
11. invite la Commission et les États membres à soutenir les efforts visant à mettre en place un traité contraignant, au niveau des Nations unies, sur les sociétés multinationales et à œuvrer en faveur d’un accord ambitieux, qui installe des mécanismes efficaces et applicables pour garantir le plein respect des droits de l’homme dans les activités économiques des ces sociétés;
12. insiste sur le fait que la première considération de la RSE doit être la haute qualité des relations industrielles au sein de l’entreprise; est fermement convaincu que le dialogue social entre les entreprises et les travailleurs joue un rôle essentiel lorsqu’il s’agit d’anticiper et de gérer les changements, et de trouver des solutions aux défis industriels;
13. estime que la RSE doit également se fonder sur l’amélioration de l’information, de la consultation et de la participation des travailleurs; demande à la Commission de prendre des mesures dans ce domaine, notamment dans le cadre de la proposition de révision de la directive sur le comité d’entreprise européen et du renforcement de la participation des salariés aux affaires de l’entreprise; demande à la Commission de présenter dans les plus brefs délais, après consultation des partenaires sociaux, une proposition de cadre législatif sur l’information et la consultation des travailleurs et sur l’anticipation et la gestion des restructurations, selon les recommandations détaillées que le Parlement a formulées dans sa résolution du 15 janvier 2013 concernant l’information et la consultation des travailleurs, et l’anticipation et la gestion des restructurations;
14. estime qu’un élément d’une importance primordiale dans la RSE devrait être l’engagement des entreprises à améliorer les qualifications et le savoir-faire des travailleurs, grâce à des mesures efficaces et adéquates d’éducation et de formation tout au long de la vie;
15. estime que les entreprises qui délocalisent des activités économiques devraient être chargés de contribuer, également sur le plan économique, à mettre en place des activités de remplacement appropriées pour les sites de production et les travailleurs concernés; demande à la Commission de proposer des mesures législatives pour veiller à ce que les entreprises qui bénéficient de fonds publics puissent être obligées, en cas de délocalisation de leurs activités, de restituer les fonds qu’elles ont reçus;
16. demande à la Commission d’enquêter sur les cas des entreprises qui décident de délocaliser leur production à l’intérieur de l’Union européenne, afin notamment de vérifier si des fonds européens n’ont pas été utilisés abusivement pour promouvoir la concurrence entre les États membres; lui demande également de vérifier que les États membres ne fassent pas eux non plus une utilisation abusive de fonds publics, en particulier pour attirer les entreprises d’autres États membres, notamment au moyen de formes de dumping social et fiscal;
17. est convaincu que l’industrie devrait être considérée comme un atout stratégique pour de la compétitivité de l’Union et sa viabilité à long terme; souligne que seules une industrie forte et solide et une politique industrielle orientée vers l’avenir, soutenues par les indispensables investissements publics, permettront à l’Union de relever les différents défis qui se profilent à l’horizon, notamment sa réindustrialisation, sa transition vers le développement durable et la création d’emplois de qualité;
18. souligne que la Commission et les États membres doivent garantir la compétitivité et la pérennité à long terme de la base industrielle de l’Union et mieux anticiper les situations de crise socio-économique ou d’éventuelles délocalisations; rappelle que la crise économique a eu de profondes répercussions sur la production industrielle, avec de lourdes pertes d’emplois et la disparition d’un savoir-faire industriels et des compétences des travailleurs de l’industrie; souligne que l’Union doit défendre et promouvoir la valeur ajoutée des entreprises et de leurs sites de production, comme Embraco à Riva di Chieri, qui demeurent compétitives sur le marché européen et et le marché mondial;
19. estime qu’il est essentiel de garantir des conditions de concurrence équitables dans l’ensemble de l’Union et invite la Commission à prendre des mesures législatives et non législatives visant à lutter contre le dumping social, fiscal et environnemental; condamne fermement les situations dans lesquelles les entreprises font le choix de délocaliser leurs activités économiques, surtout lorsqu’elles sont rentables, afin simplement de payer moins d’impôts, de bénéficier d’un moindre coût du travail ou d’être soumises à des normes environnementales moins strictes; souligne que ce phénomène est fortement préjudiciable au fonctionnement du marché intérieur et à la confiance des citoyens dans l’Union européenne;
20. invite instamment la Commission à prendre des initiatives pour améliorer le niveau de vie des citoyens de l’Union grâce à la réduction des déséquilibres économiques et sociaux; souligne la nécessité de prendre des mesures efficaces concernant les enjeux sociaux, afin d’améliorer les conditions sociales et de travail dans l’Union grâce à une convergence progressive vers le haut, notamment dans le contexte du socle européen des droits sociaux, et afin d’éviter le dumping social et un nivellement par le bas sur le plan des normes du travail;
21. invite la Commission à promouvoir des conventions collectives assurant une couverture élargie, dans le respect des traditions et pratiques nationales des États membres et de l’autonomie des partenaires sociaux; recommande la mise en place, en coopération avec les partenaires sociaux, de planchers salariaux sous la forme d’un salaire minimum national, sur la base du salaire médian;
22. déplore que les instruments de protection sociale en place dans la plupart des États membres ne soient pas suffisants lorsqu’il s’agit de faire face à la fermeture de sites de production; exhorte les États membres à garantir une protection sociale adéquate, qui permette aux personnes de rester économiquement actives et de vivre dans la dignité; invite la Commission à aider les États membres à prévoir des allocations de chômage suffisantes et à mettre en place des services de formation professionnelle et d’accompagnement pour les personnes qui ont perdu leur emploi, en accordant une attention particulière aux travailleurs faiblement qualifiés et à ceux âgés de plus de 50 ans;
23. rappelle que la mise en œuvre d’une stratégie fiscale responsable doit être considérée comme un pilier de la RSE et qu’une planification fiscale agressive est incompatible avec elle; regrette que la plupart des entreprises n’intègrent pas cet élément dans leurs rapports sur la RSE; demande à la Commission de l’inclure dans son plan d’action révisé et de le définir correctement;
24. invite la Commission et les États membres à assurer le suivi approprié des recommandations du Parlement pour lutter efficacement contre l’évasion et la fraude fiscales et éviter le dumping fiscal au sein de l’Union européenne, notamment en mettant en place la déclaration pays par pays, en instaurant d’une assiette commune consolidée pour l’impôt sur les sociétés, en interdisant les sociétés «boîtes aux lettres» et en luttant contre les paradis fiscaux, à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur de l’Union européenne; souligne l’importance d’établir un taux minimal effectif d’imposition des sociétés au niveau européen;
25. salue le rôle central de la Commission en tant qu’autorité de la concurrence compétente dans les enquêtes en cours sur les aides d’État relatives aux rescrits fiscaux; encourage la Commission à faire pleinement usage des pouvoirs que lui confèrent les règles de concurrence pour lutter contre les pratiques fiscales dommageables et sanctionner les États membres et les entreprises reconnus coupables de telles pratiques et, plus généralement, de pratiques de dumping fiscal; souligne la nécessité pour la Commission de consacrer davantage de ressources – financières et humaines – au renforcement de sa capacité à mener de front toutes les enquêtes nécessaires sur les aides d’État fiscales
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actualités internationales Gouvernance Normes d'encadrement normes de droit objectifs de l'entreprise parties prenantes Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Structures juridiques
Intéressantes dispositions du Code civil chinois
Ivan Tchotourian 11 juin 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
Le Code civil chinois a été adopté le 28 mai 2020. Il ne rentrera en vigueur qu’au 1er janvier 2021. Deux articles ont attirés mon attention dans une perspective de responsabilité sociétale, articles qui concerne le régime des For-Profit Legal Person (section 2). En substances, voici ce que précisent lesdits articles :
Les actionnaires ne doivent pas intenter à l’intérêt de la personne morale ou à celui des créanciers.
Les entreprises assument une responsabilité sociale.
Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China (No. 45)
The Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China, as adopted at the 3rd Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on May 28, 2020, is hereby issued, and shall come into force on January 1, 2021.
President of the People’s Republic of China: Xi Jinping
May 28, 2020
Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China
(Adopted at the 3rd Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on May 28, 2020)
Extrait :
An investor of a for-profit legal person shall not damage the interests of the legal person or any other investor by abusing the rights of an investor. If the investor abuses the rights of an investor, causing any loss to the legal person or any other investor, the investor shall assume civil liability in accordance with the law.
An investor of a for-profit legal person shall not damage the interests of a creditor of the legal person by abusing the independent status of the legal person and the limited liability of the investor. If the investor abuses the legal person’s independent status or the investor’s limited liability to evade debts, causing serious damage to the interests of a creditor of the legal person, the investor shall be jointly and severally liable for the legal person’s debts.
In business activities, a for-profit legal person shall comply with business ethics, maintain the safety of transactions, receive government supervision and public scrutiny, and assume social responsibilities.
Merci à mon collègue, le professeur Bjarne Melkevik, de cette information.
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devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance mission et composition du conseil d'administration Normes d'encadrement normes de droit
Devoir de prudence des administrateurs en contexte de COVID-19
Ivan Tchotourian 22 mai 2020 Ivan Tchotourian
Lecture de Leon Yehuda Anidjar sur le devoir de prudence et son intérêt dans le contexte de la COVID-19 : « A Firm-Specific View of Directors’ Duty of Care in Times of Global Epidemic Crisis » (Oxford Business Law Blog, 20 mai 2020).
Extrait :
In a recent paper, I discuss the directors’ duty of care in times of financial distress from a global perspective and focus on directors’ roles in different types of SMEs. I argue that while the economic crunch of the years 2007–2009 was a direct result of large governance deficiencies (Bruner, 2011), which generated various reforms that reinforced the monitoring role of directors, the current crisis will highlight the significance of the directors’ managerial roles. Accordingly, we can expect jurists and policymakers to design numerous regulatory reforms that will reinforce their advisory role in a fashion that will assist them in tackling the severe consequences of our current times. Moreover, supervisory authorities may decrease the regulatory burden imposed on directors to allow them to invest considerable managerial resources for supporting the survival of companies (as Enriques demonstrates concerning corporate law, and Chiu et al point out regarding financial regulation).
Furthermore, I argue that the civil law on directors’ duty of care provides boards with a broader scope of discretion to confront the challenges associated with COVID-19 than the Anglo-American law. Delaware corporate law, for instance, posits that since directors, rather than shareholders, manage the affairs of the corporation, they should be protected by the business judgment rule. However, a recent empirical study demonstrated that challenges to business judgment in English and Welsh cases have been increasingly successful from the mid-nineteenth century until the present, with a marked increase in legal liability since 2007. This indicates that the proposition that English courts will generally not review directors’ business decisions is incorrect (Keay et al, 2020). In contrast, under the law applicable in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, the standard of care cannot be determined absolutely: it must address the specific situation for which the question of the due diligence of organ dealing arises. Accordingly, this standard is at the same time objective and relative, ie, a company comparable in size, business, and the economic situation shall serve as a model (as illustrated by, the Cancun ruling of the Dutch Supreme Court).
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