Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale | Page 4

Bel éditorial du journal Le Monde du 3 mars 2021 sous le titre « Danone : la pression de rendements insoutenables ».

Quand, en juin 2020, Emmanuel Faber est parvenu à faire de Danone le premier groupe coté de taille mondiale à se doter du statut juridique d’entreprise à mission, le volontarisme du PDG avait ouvert de nouvelles perspectives sur l’évolution du capitalisme. L’entreprise n’avait plus pour unique horizon le retour sur investissement des actionnaires, elle devait parallèlement se fixer des objectifs sociaux et environnementaux ambitieux. Huit mois plus tard, la crise de gouvernance que traverse le géant des produits laitiers et de l’eau en bouteille résonne comme un dur rappel aux réalités de la primauté des actionnaires sur les autres parties prenantes : salariés, consommateurs, fournisseurs et citoyens.

Lundi 1^er mars, sous la pression de deux fonds d’investissement, le conseil d’administration de Danone a réduit les responsabilités d’Emmanuel Faber. Le patron se voit retirer la direction opérationnelle pour se concentrer uniquement sur la présidence du groupe. Cette dissociation des fonctions vise à répondre aux inquiétudes des actionnaires sur les performances de Danone. Le cours de Bourse a chuté d’un quart en 2020, tandis que sa rentabilité reste inférieure de quatre points à celle de ses principaux concurrents comme Nestlé ou Unilever qui affichent des marges autour de 18 % du chiffre d’affaires.

Même si les deux fonds n’ont pas obtenu entière satisfaction dans la mesure où ils réclamaient le départ pur et simple du PDG, la décision de limiter le pouvoir d’Emmanuel Faber révèle ainsi la difficulté de concilier les intérêts des actionnaires, qui réclament un niveau de rendement maximum, avec une croissance plus responsable. Déjà, en novembre 2020, l’exercice avait montré ses limites lorsque Danone avait annoncé la suppression de 2 000 emplois malgré un bénéfice net stable sur l’année à près de 2 milliards d’euros.

Emmanuel Faber n’est, certes, pas exempt de tout reproche. En interne, son exercice du pouvoir, autoritaire et solitaire, fait grincer des dents. Quant à sa stratégie, qui consiste à réorganiser le groupe par pays et non plus par marque pour mieux répondre aux attentes locales des consommateurs, elle suscite le scepticisme des cadres d’un groupe qui s’est construit sur le marketing. Les actionnaires peuvent être fondés à exprimer des critiques sur ces choix et sur cette concentration des pouvoirs.

Interrogation sur la soutenabilité des exigences

En revanche, au-delà du cas particulier de Danone, cette crise amène à s’interroger sur la soutenabilité des exigences de rentabilité des fonds d’investissement. Est-il raisonnable que les rendements des entreprises restent aussi élevés que dans les années 1990, alors qu’entre-temps les taux d’intérêt à long terme sont tombés à zéro et que le rythme de la croissance économique a singulièrement diminué ?

Hormis dans certains secteurs innovants ou dans celui du luxe, de tels retours sur investissement ne peuvent être obtenus impunément. Sur le plan environnemental, ils conduisent à générer des dommages qui sont incompatibles avec ce que la planète est capable de supporter. Sur le plan social, ils ont abouti, ces dernières années, à une déformation spectaculaire du partage de la valeur au détriment des salaires.

Fonds de pension et fonds souverains arbitrent de plus en plus leurs investissements en fonction de critères sociaux et environnementaux. Mais tant que cette évolution ne s’accompagnera pas d’une modération des rendements exigés, le développement durable s’en trouvera d’autant limité.

À la prochaine…

C’est à cette question que répond le professeur Pierre-Yves Gomez dans un billet fort intéressant dont je relaie un extrait ci-dessous (ici).

Extrait :

Gouvernance : Actionnariat anonyme vs Actionnariat Familial

C’est à partir de ce moment, au tournant des années 1930, que la société anonyme (et plus tard la SAS)  s’est aussi imposée comme la forme juridique dominante : ni l’actionnaire, ni le dirigeant ne sont plus responsables sur leurs biens propres. Sans attaches, ils peuvent entrer et sortir de l’entreprise en utilisant les mécanismes du marché des capitaux ou du travail.  Le lien substantiel entre le décideur et l’entreprise se distend. Parallèlement, parce que les actionnaires sont devenus anonymes et que leur responsabilité se limite à leurs apports financiers, la demande de responsabilité s’est déplacée vers les entreprises elles-mêmes. D’où l’exigence contemporaine d’une Responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE) associée à une mission ou une raison d’être. Ce que la famille propriétaire portait naguère est désormais attendu de l’entreprise prise comme individu doté d’une personnalité morale.

Pour autant, au delà de cette fiction juridique, l’actionnariat reste massivement familial dans les sociétés anonymes et la famille demeure l’institution sociale de référence comme le montrent régulièrement les sondages d’opinion. Ce paradoxe invite à réfléchir sur l’avenir d’un pouvoir actionnarial fondé encore sur l’héritage. Que peut signifier « hériter d’un capital » au 21ème siècle et comment le destin de l’institution  » famille » et celui de l’institution « entreprise » pourraient-ils être encore liés ?

Si l’actionnariat familial ne se réduit plus qu’à un simple transfert générationnel de patrimoine en vue d’accumulation de richesses et de rentes, il achèvera certainement de perdre toute légitimité. Dans les années futures, des réformes de gouvernance s’imposeront comme nécessaires pour limiter l’acquisition de parts sociales d’entreprises par le hasard injuste de l’héritage. Mais si un tel héritage est assumé comme une charge engageant à maintenir un projet social, des savoir-faire ou une communauté de travail, l’actionnariat associé au destin d’une famille pourrait apporter aux parties-prenantes une caution bienvenue de continuité dans la durée. Dans une société fractionnée et rongée d’incertitudes, il associerait le pouvoir souverain du capital à une communauté humaine tenue par des liens non-capitalistes. A la croisée des chemins, cette forme de gouvernance ancienne peut s’inventer une nouvelle pertinence ou sombrer avec l’idée même de famille traditionnelle.

À la prochaine…

Article amenant à réfléchir dans le Wall Street Journal de Alexander William Salter : « Profit Keeps Corporate Leaders Honest » (8 décembre 2020).

Extrait :

(…) As National Review’s Andrew Stuttaford notes, this vision of wide-ranging corporate beneficence introduces a host of principal-agent problems in ordinary business decision-making. Profit is a concrete and clarifying metric that allows shareholders—owners—to hold executives accountable for their performance. Adding multiple goals not related to profit introduces needless confusion.

This is no accident. Stakeholder capitalism is used as a way to obfuscate what counts as success in business. By focusing less on profits and more on vague social values, “enlightened” executives will find it easier to avoid accountability even as they squander business resources. While trying to make business about “social justice” is always concerning, the contemporary conjunction of stakeholder theory and woke capitalism makes for an especially dangerous and accountability-thwarting combination.

Better to avoid it. Since profits result from increasing revenue and cutting costs, businesses that put profits first have to work hard to give customers more while using less. In short, profits are an elegant and parsimonious way of promoting efficiency within a business as well as society at large.

Stakeholder capitalism ruptures this process. When other goals compete with the mandate to maximize returns, the feedback loop created by profits gets weaker. Lower revenues and higher costs no longer give owners and corporate officers the information they need to make hard choices. The result is increased internal conflict: Owners will jockey among themselves for the power to determine the corporation’s priorities. Corporate officers will be harder to discipline, because poor performance can always be justified by pointing to broader social goals. And the more these broader goals take precedence, the more businesses will use up scarce resources to deliver diminishing benefits to customers.

Given these problems, why would prominent corporations sign on to the Great Reset? Some people within the organizations may simply prefer that firms take politically correct stances and don’t consider the cost. Others may think it looks good in a press release and will never go anywhere. A third group may aspire to jobs in government and see championing corporate social responsibility as a bridge.

Finally, there are those who think they can benefit personally from the reduced corporate efficiency. As businesses redirect cash flow from profit-directed uses to social priorities, lucrative positions of management, consulting, oversight and more will have to be created. They’ll fill them. This is rent-seeking, enabled by the growing confluence of business and government, and enhanced by contemporary social pieties.

The World Economic Forum loves to discuss the need for “global governance,” but the Davos crowd knows this type of social engineering can’t be achieved by governments alone. Multinational corporations are increasingly independent authorities. Their cooperation is essential.

Endorsements of stakeholder capitalism should be viewed against this backdrop. If it is widely adopted, the predictable result will be atrophied corporate responsibility as business leaders behave increasingly like global bureaucrats. Stakeholder capitalism is today a means of acquiring corporate buy-in to the Davos political agenda.

Friedman knew well the kind of corporate officer who protests too much against profit-seeking: “Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society these past decades.” He was right then, and he is right now. We should reject stakeholder capitalism as a misconception of the vocation of business. If we don’t defend shareholder capitalism vigorously, we’ll see firsthand that there are many more insidious things businesses can pursue than profit.

À la prochaine…

Belle analyse de M. Stéphane Lauer sur LinkedIn : « Danone, entreprise à mission… impossible » (30 novembre 2020).

Extrait :

Le capitalisme bien ordonné

Mais le 23 novembre, face au recul de son cours de Bourse et à la chute des ventes d’eau en bouteille à cause de la crise liée à la pandémie, Danone a été obligé de rentrer dans le rang du capitalisme bien ordonné. L’amélioration de la compétitivité redevient la priorité au détriment des emplois, dont un quart doit disparaître dans les sièges sociaux pour économiser plusieurs centaines de millions d’euros.

Danone est-il au bord du dépôt de bilan ? Pas vraiment. Le groupe a versé 1,4 milliard d’euros de dividendes au titre des résultats de 2019, tandis qu’au premier semestre, les bénéfices se sont élevés à plus de 1 milliard d’euros, permettant de dégager une marge de 14 % du chiffre d’affaires. « La protection de la rentabilité d’une entreprise est fondamentale », explique le PDG. Certes, mais jusqu’où ?

La question fondamentale est celle du juste partage de la valeur. Est-il raisonnable que les rendements des entreprises restent aussi élevés que dans les années 1980 alors qu’entre-temps les taux d’intérêt à long terme sur les dettes publiques sont tombés à zéro et que la croissance a été divisée par deux ? Une rentabilité des fonds propres aux alentours de 15 % a-t-elle un sens dans un groupe agroalimentaire qui n’est ni une star de la high-tech ni un géant du luxe ? Des taux de marges d’un tel niveau sont-ils compatibles avec la préoccupation de rémunérer équitablement les producteurs de lait, de continuer à être présent sur certains marchés, de consacrer une part équitable des profits à sa masse salariale ?

Emmanuel Faber répond qu’à partir du moment où ses concurrents proposent des rendements supérieurs, son entreprise ne peut pas se laisser distancer. « Il est pris à son propre piège, estime Patrick d’Humières, consultant en stratégie durable et enseignant à l’Ecole centrale de Paris. S’il ne parvient pas à nouer un pacte avec des actionnaires qui comprennent que la course avec Nestlé ou Coca-Cola ne doit pas être le seul horizon de l’entreprise, le double discours sera compliqué à tenir sur le long terme. »

Au détriment des salaires

Il ne s’agit pas de clouer au pilori Emmanuel Faber. Il a su prendre des initiatives courageuses et ambitieuses sur le plan sociétal en droite ligne avec l’héritage laissé par le fondateur de Danone, Antoine Riboud. En réalité, le dilemme auquel l’entreprise fait face aujourd’hui pose la question du niveau de la rémunération du capital, qui devient de moins en moins soutenable sur le plan social et écologique.

Ces rendements mirifiques qui sont devenus la norme à partir des années 1980 ont fini par aboutir à une déformation spectaculaire du partage de la valeur au détriment des salaires. Logiquement, les rémunérations auraient dû progresser au même rythme que la productivité du travail. Or, depuis 1990, celle-ci a fait un bond de 50 % dans les pays de l’OCDE, alors que les salaires n’augmentaient que de 23 %.

Bien sûr le phénomène a été caricatural aux Etats-Unis, moins sensible en France. Mais le mécanisme reste le même. Pour que les entreprises puissent continuer à servir à leurs actionnaires les rendements exigés, il a fallu comprimer la part accordée aux salariés grâce à la flexibilisation du marché du travail, à la libéralisation à outrance des échanges, à la délocalisation de la production dans des pays à faibles coûts. La contrepartie s’est traduite dans les pays développés par une baisse du pouvoir d’achat, la disparition des emplois intermédiaires. Partout on assiste à la montée des inégalités.

Même constat sur le plan environnemental. Le maintien dans la durée de retours sur investissement artificiellement élevés conduit les entreprises à générer des externalités qui sont incompatibles avec ce que la planète est capable de supporter. « Les entreprises peuvent se déclarer “à mission”, chercher à améliorer leurs performances environnementales et sociales, mais rien de majeur ne changera si le rendement exigé du capital reste aussi élevé », tranchait récemment dans ces colonnes Patrick Artus, chef économiste de la banque Natixis. Patrick d’Humières est encore plus précis : « Il n’y aura pas d’économie durable dans les entreprises cotées si celles-ci ne parviennent pas à convaincre leurs actionnaires qu’ils doivent réduire leur rémunération de quatre ou cinq points. »

De plus en plus de fonds de pension et de fonds souverains arbitrent leurs investissements en fonction de critères sociaux et environnementaux. C’est un progrès décisif, mais si cette évolution ne s’accompagne pas d’une modération des rendements exigés, Danone et d’autres risquent de se transformer en entreprise à mission… impossible.

À la prochaine…

À lire cet intéressant article du professeur Licht : Amir Licht, « Varieties of Shareholderism: Three Views of the Corporate Purpose Cathedral », 19 octobre 2020, European Corporate Governance Institute – Law Working Paper No. 547/2020.

Résumé :

This Chapter seeks to make three modest contributions by offering views of the corporate purpose cathedral that bear on the role of law in it. These views underscore the difference and the tension between an individual perspective and a societal/national legal perspective on the purpose of the corporation. First, it reviews a novel dataset on national legal shareholderism – namely, the degree to which national corporate laws endorse shareholder primacy – as an exercise in operationalizing legal constructs. Second, it anchors the two archetypal approaches of shareholderism and takeholderism in personal human values. It is this connection with the fundamental conceptions of the desirable which animates attitudes and choices in this context. The upshot is potentially subversive: Legal injunctions to directors on corporate purpose might be an exercise in futility. Third, this Chapter highlights the importance of acknowledging the tensions between the two levels of analysis by looking at the works of prominent writers. Adolf Berle, Victor Brudney, and Leo Strine have been careful to keep this distinction in mind, which has enabled them to hold multiple views of the cathedral without losing sight of it.

À la prochaine…

Billet à lire de Frederick Alexander et al. : « From Shareholder Primacy to Stakeholder Capitalism » (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 26 octobre 2020).

Extrait :

This policy agenda includes the following categories of interventions required for a broad transition to Stakeholder Capitalism.

We have drafted proposed Federal legislative language, “The Stakeholder Capitalism Act,” attached in Exhibit A of the full paper linked to below, which incorporates each of the following ideas:

Responsible Institutions: We propose that the trustees of institutional investors be required to consider certain economic, social, and environmental effects of their decisions on the interests of their beneficiaries with respect to stewardship of companies within their portfolios. This clarified understanding of fiduciary duty will ensure that institutional investors use their authority to further the real interests of those beneficiaries who have stakes in all aspects of the economy, environment, and society. These changes can be achieved through an amendment to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a) by inserting language after paragraph (54) of Section 2 and after subsection (c) of Section 36.

Responsible Companies: Just as trustees of invested funds must expand their notion of the interests of their beneficiaries, the companies in which they invest must also expand the understanding of the interests of the economic owners of their shares, who are more often than not those same beneficiaries. We propose a federal requirement that any corporation or other business entity involved in interstate commerce be formed under a state statute that requires directors and officers to account for the impact of corporate actions not only on financial returns, but also on the viability of the social, natural, and political systems that affect all stakeholders. This change can be achieved through the addition of a new Chapter 2F of Title 15 of the U.S. Code.

Tools for Institutional Accountability: In order to allow beneficiaries to hold institutional investors accountable for the impact of their stewardship on all the interests of beneficiaries, we propose laws that mandate disclosure as to how they are meeting their responsibility to consider these broad interests, including disclosure of proxy voting and engagement with companies. We propose that the Securities and Exchange Commission should promulgate rules requiring each investment company and each employee benefit plan required to file an annual report under section 103 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

Tools for Company Accountability: Corporate and securities laws that govern businesses must also be changed in order to give institutional investors the tools to meet their enhanced responsibilities. This will include requiring large companies to meet new standards for disclosure regarding stakeholder impact as an important element of their accountability. This proposal can be achieved through an amendment added to The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) after section 13A.

(…)

This tension cannot be wished away. The White Paper proposes a solution: rules that facilitate and encourage investor-sanctioned guardrails. Such guardrails would allow shareholders to insist that all companies that they own forgo profits earned through the exploitation of people and planet. Unlike executives, the institutional shareholders who control the markets are diversified, so that their success rises and falls with the success of the economy, rather than any single company. This means that these institutions suffer when individual companies pursue profits with practices that harm the economy. We believe that by leveling the competitive playing field, these changes will pave the way for the type of corporate behavior imagined by the New Paradigm, the Davos Manifesto and the Business Roundtable Statement.

Indeed, far from being “state corporatism,” as the memo claims, what we propose is “human capitalism,” where the workers, citizens, and other humans whose savings fund corporations are given a say in the kind of world they live in. Will it be one in which all compete in a manner that rejects unjust profits? Or, in contrast, will it be one in which corporations continue to lobby against regulation that protects workers while the corporate executives make 300 times the median salary of workers?

À la prochaine…

Luca Enriques a publié un intéressant billet sur l’Oxford Business Law Blog : « Missing in Friedman’s Shareholder Value Maximization Credo: The Shareholders » (25 septembre 2020).

Extrait :

What Friedman’s Essay Says

As Alex Edmans has noted here,

‘Friedman’s article is widely misquoted and misunderstood. Indeed, thousands of people may have cited it without reading past the title. They think they don’t need to, because the title already makes his stance clear: companies should maximize profits by price-gouging customers, underpaying workers, and polluting the environment’.

That is not, of course, what Friedman wrote. According to Friedman:

1. Talking about the ‘social responsibility of business’ makes no sense because the responsibility lies with people. Public corporations are legal persons and may have their responsibilities, but they act through their directors and managers. Therefore, attention must be focused on the responsibilities of such players.
2. Managers are employees of corporations, which in turn are owned by their shareholders. Therefore, managers must act in accordance with the wishes of the shareholders. Unless the shareholders themselves explicitly determine an altruistic purpose, this means ‘conduct[ing] the business in accordance with [shareholders’] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom’.
3. If managers also had a social responsibility, they would find themselves in the position of having to act against the interests of shareholders, for example by hiring the ‘hardcore’ unemployed to combat poverty instead of hiring the most capable workers. By doing so, they would spend shareholders’ money to pursue a general interest. In other words, they would impose a tax on shareholders and also decide how to use its proceeds. Yet, it is countered, if there are serious and urgent economic and environmental problems, then it is necessary that managers face them without waiting for politicians’ action, which is always late and imperfect. According to Friedman, it is undemocratic for private individuals using other people’s money (and, importantly, exploiting the monopolistic rents of the large corporations they lead) to impose on the community their political preferences on how to solve urgent economic and environmental problems, which should instead be addressed through the democratic process.
4. The market is based on the unanimity rule; in ‘an ideal free market’, there is no exchange without the consent of those who participate in it. Politics, on the other hand, operate according to the conformity principle, whereby a majority binds the dissenting minority. The intervention of politics is necessary because the market is imperfect. But the social responsibility doctrine would extend the mechanisms of politics to the market sphere, since a private subject (enjoying some monopoly power) would impose its political will on others.
5. Often, the idea of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is just a public relations exercise to justify managerial choices already consistent with the interests of shareholders. Looking after the well-being of employees, devoting resources to the firm’s local communities, and so on may well be (and, as a rule, will be) in the long-term interest of corporations. Indeed, cloaking these actions under the label of CSR, as it was fashionable to do in 1970 (and is again today), can in itself contribute to increasing profits.

Missing from Friedman’s Picture: The Shareholders

Friedman’s essay assigned a totally passive role to what he calls the corporation’s ‘owners’ or ‘the employers’—that is, the shareholders. They are merely the beneficiaries of directors’ duty to increase profits, but they have no role to play in pursuing that very goal other than (as he notes in passing) when they elect the board.

That’s understandable. When Friedman wrote his piece, the shareholders of US companies were mostly individuals and rarely voted at annual meetings other than to rubber-stamp managers’ proposals. Today, a large majority of listed firms’ shares are held by institutional investors—that is, managers of other people’s funds. Institutions have become key players at US (as well as non-US) listed corporations (eg, this OECD study with data from across the world), because they regularly vote portfolio shares at shareholder meetings. And their pro-management vote is nowadays anything but certain.

This creates one additional layer of employee/employer relationships, to use Friedman’s terminology (today, we would say principal/agent relationships): the one between the institutions holding shares or (as Friedman saw it) their own managers, and the individuals (usually workers and pensioners) whose funds the managers invest. (To be sure, it is often more complicated than that because some institutions, such as pension funds, often delegate their asset management to other institutions; but this is not relevant for the purposes of my analysis).

Friedman’s essay raises the question: is there any room for asset managers to assume social responsibility duties in deciding how to invest and how to vote? In Friedman’s logic, the answer should be ‘no’, and it’s easy to imagine that he would chastise those fund managers who portray themselves (not always veritably) as socially responsible investors. Like corporate managers, fund managers manage other people’s money and should not grant themselves the license to make political choices, which will inevitably please some of their beneficiaries and not others. Their only goal should be giving their clients the highest returns on the funds invested.

Of course, much like a corporation can be set up with an altruistic (or mixed) purpose, so can asset management products expressly be marketed as socially responsible or ethically-investing. Intuitively, investors in such funds expect them to invest and vote in accordance with the socially responsible commitments undertaken. But absent a CSR connotation—namely, if the mutual fund has been marketed as a tool for generating financial returns—fund managers have to assume that the fund’s investors have a financial objective in mind and do not expect their own political preferences to be promoted by their fund manager, especially if that comes to the detriment of their return. Whether implicitly or explicitly, that’s the bargain with each of the fund shares buyers.

However, things are not always so straightforward. Passive institutional investors replicating indexes and, therefore, holding the entire market rather than picking stocks now hold more than 40 percent of the US stock market. As Madison Condon and Jack Coffee have noticed—here and here, respectively—for investors of that kind, portfolio value maximization may well mean pushing for ESG (Environment, Social and Governance) policies at the individual company level that, while not necessarily profitable for that company, will increase portfolio returns by making other companies more profitable. Think, for instance, of systemically important financial institutions adopting more conservative risk management policies that significantly reduce the chances of a potentially devastating financial crisis.

Hence, the overlap between socially responsible and profit-maximizing behavior, which Friedman himself acknowledged to be present at the individual company level and criticized only as being politically dangerous, is now even more pervasive at the institutional shareholder level.

In theory, all portfolio value maximizers’ decisions on ESG matters should be based on an assessment of the effects that the adoption of a given policy by an individual portfolio company would have, both on its value and on the value of the totality of other portfolio companies. Because ESG policies require widespread adoption to be effective, different scenarios will have to be elaborated and factored in to estimate those effects. Multiple other variables will have to be considered and a number of questionable assumptions made.

Passive investors, like any organization, are unlikely to have the human and financial resources to fully engage with this kind of assessment, let alone reach solid conclusions. And it would be naïve to assume that political preferences do not affect the simplified analysis they inevitably resort to in determining their ESG preferences.

Owing to shareholder pressure and/or managers’ desire to retain their jobs, the ESG preferences of portfolio value-maximizing institutions may well trickle down to the individual portfolio company level. Under what conditions that is the case will depend on a number of factors, including whether the company is protected from competition, undiversified shareholders’ stakes in the company, how politically divisive the socially responsible action is, and so on. Yet in some cases, and in respect of some of the socially and politically sensitive issues, managers will yield to those preferences. Given Friedman’s premise that ‘increasing profits’ must be the only corporate goal because the shareholders are the owners/employers, there is some irony to that.

Irony aside, today’s corporate world is very different from the one Milton Friedman wrote in. Yet, his essay still provides a useful framework for understanding the implications of managing companies for one purpose or another. And perhaps also for answering the reframed question of whether corporate managers should cater to the preferences of their portfolio-value-maximizing indexing investors when making decisions on behalf of their corporations.

À la prochaine