Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

devoirs des administrateurs Gouvernance normes de droit parties prenantes Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Structures juridiques

La Benefit corporation adoptée en Colombie-Britannique

En voilà une nouvelle ! La province de Colombie-Britannique vient de faire place à une Benefit Corporation. Certaines modifications apportées à la Business Corporations Act de la Colombie-Britannique (la « BCBCA ») qui vont entrer en vigueur le 30 juin 2020 permettent la création d’un nouveau sous-type de société, la « société d’intérêt social » (la benefit company). La Colombie-Britannique est le premier territoire canadien à adopter ce concept qui n’est pourtant pas nouveau aux États-Unis. Pas sûr que ce choix soit heureux dans la mesure où la 3C existait déjà et qu’elle se révèle sans doute plus porteuse pour la RSE…

Pour en savoir plus : « Une première au Canada : les sociétés d’« intérêt social » arrivent en Colombie-Britannique » (Stikeman Elliott, 5 juin 2020)

Extrait :

The major distinctions between a B.C. benefit company and other B.C. companies are as follows:

  • Notice of articles: The benefit company’s notice of articles will contain the following statement (the benefit statement”):

This company is a benefit company and, as such, is committed to conducting its business in a responsible and sustainable manner and promoting one or more public benefits.

  • Articles: The benefit company’s articles must include a provision that specifies the public benefits to be promoted (benefit provision). “Public benefit” refers to something that has a positive effect that benefits (i) a class of persons other than shareholders of the company in their capacity as shareholders, or a class of communities or organizations, or (ii) the environment. The positive effect can be:
    • Artistic
    • Charitable
    • Cultural
    • Economic
    • Educational
    • Environmental
    • Literary
    • Medical
    • Religious
    • Scientific
    • Technological
  • Alterations: Any decision to adopt or eliminate the benefit statement (i.e. to alter the company’s status as a benefit company) must be approved by a special resolution of the voting shareholders. Both voting and non-voting shareholders of the benefit company are entitled to dissent rights with respect to such a change or to a change in the benefit provision.
  • Benefit report: Each year, the benefit company must prepare, provide to its shareholders and post on its website (if it has one) a report (benefit report) that assesses the company’s performance in carrying out the commitments set out in the company’s benefit provision compared to a third-party standard. The report needs to include information about the process and rationale for selecting or changing the relevant third-party standard. Regulations may be enacted that provide more details about the third-party standard and the contents of the benefit report.
  • Penalties relating to the benefit report: It will be an offence if the directors of the benefit company do not prepare and post the benefit report as required by the BCBCA and the regulations. There is a potential fine of up to $2,000 for individuals or $5,000 for persons other than individuals.
  • Augmented fiduciary duty: The directors and officers of a benefit company will be required to act honestly and in good faith with a view to conducting the business in a responsible and sustainable manner and promoting the public benefits that the company has identified in its benefit provision. They must balance that public benefits duty against their duties to the company. (There is currently no guidance with respect to achieving this balance.) However, the amendments state that the public benefits duty does not create a duty on the part of directors or officers to persons who are affected by the company’s conduct or who would be personally benefitted by it.
  • Enforcement and remedies where duty breached: Several significant provisions in the amendments relate to enforcement and remedies:
    • Shareholders are the only persons who are able to bring an action against a BCBCA benefit company’s directors and officers over an alleged violation of their duty relating to public benefits;
    • Only shareholders that, in the aggregate, hold at least 2% of the company’s issued shares may bring such an action (in the case of a public company, a $2 million shareholding, in the aggregate, will also suffice); and
    • The court may not order monetary damages in relation to a breach of that duty. Other remedies, such as removal or a direction to comply, would still be available.

À la prochaine…

Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise Responsabilité sociale des entreprises Structures juridiques Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

Public Benefit Corporation : premières études empiriques

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, on revient toujours aux B Corporation notamment la Public Benefit Corporation du Delaware ! Voici une des premières études empiriques menées sur le sujet : Michael B. Dorff, James Hicks et Steven Solomon Davidoff , « The Future or Fancy? An Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations » (4 février 2020).

Une belle question que se posent les auteurs : Using our novel dataset, we can discern whether for-profit investment is occurring in PBCs, and if so, whether it is different in kind from ordinary early stage investment.

Extrait :

The PBC has stirred much debate and speculation about the future of
the corporation. Some have called it the future while others decried the
form as mere public relations or purpose washing. In this article we
have attempted to add data to the debate. Using a hand-collected
sample of all Delaware-registered PBCs that received investment
between 2013 and 2018 we examine whether PBCs are the future or
mere fancy.
We find that neither hypothesis holds. Instead, we find that there are
295 PBCs which have received investment from VC funds amounting
to over $2.5 billion in the aggregate. This investment is significant
because it shows that the PBC form is not a failure and that it is
capable of attracting for-profit investment, a marker of success. This
investment is coming not just from pro-social VCs but from top-tier
firms.
Nonetheless, we also find that PBCs are being funded over a wide
range of mostly consumer-focused industries (banking, food,
education, technology, and more), implying that the form is a
secondary consideration to the for-profit motive. In other words, the
PBC form is most likely to receive VC funding when the PBC’s
business strategy suggests the form will benefit a for-profit mission.
Our evidence also suggests that PBC round sizes are smaller than their
purely profit-seeking peers, implying that VCs are taking less risk with
these forms than with traditional corporations.
Ultimately, we theorize that, based on our findings, the future course
of the PBC is uncertain.

À la prochaine…

normes de droit Nouvelles diverses objectifs de l'entreprise Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

Primauté actionnariale et Benefit corporation

Le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation propose un bel article sous la plume de Frederick Alexander : « Moving Beyond Shareholder Primacy: Can Mammoth Corporations Like ExxonMobil Benefit Everyone? ». Une belle occasion de revenir sur le thème de la Benefit Corporation et de la remise en cause de la primauté actionnariale dont elle peut être la cause…

 

The New York Times recently took issue with Rex Tillerson, the President-elect’s nominee for Secretary of State, and the current CEO of ExxonMobil. Why? “Tillerson Put Company’s Needs Over U.S. Interests,” accused the front page headline. The article details how the company puts shareholders’ interests before the interests of the United States and of impoverished citizens of countries around the world.

In response, a company spokesman insisted that all laws were followed, and that “‘[a]bsent a law prohibiting something, we evaluate it on a business case basis.’” As one oil business journalist puts it in the article: “‘They are really all about business and doing what is best for shareholders.’” Thus, as long as a decision improves return to shareholders, its effect on citizens, workers, communities or the environment just doesn’t rank.

Unfortunately, this idea—evaluate the “business” case, without regard to collateral damage, permeates the global capital system. Corporations are fueled by financial capital, which ultimately comes from our bank accounts, pension plans, insurance premiums and mutual funds, and from foundations and endowments created for public benefit—in other words, our money. And yet when that capital is invested in companies that ignore societal and environmental costs, we all suffer: Corporations use our savings to drive climate change, increase political instability, and risk our future in myriad ways.

The good news is that structures like “benefit corporations” can help us repair our broken system of capital allocation—but the clock is ticking.

 

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian