Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

Merci à la professeure Anne-Christin Mittwoch de nous offrir une très belle synthèse sur la notion d’intérêt social en droit allemand pour montrer que la notion de raison d’être doit être comprise en lien avec elle. Un billet à lire de toute urgence !

• « The interest of the company as key to the corporate purpose discussion. Historic concepts in German company law revisited », Blogging for sustainability, 15 avril 2021

Extrait :

Lessons learnt from legal history: the company’s role in society as a whole

The company interest has a tradition of almost a hundred years, its roots dating even further back. The intersection between private and public interests has its origin in ancient Roman law that had been absorbed by German legal scholars since the 12^th century. This tradition has made it difficult to align private and public interests explicitly within the definition of the corporate purpose – until today, public and private law are considered separate. Thus, the early phase of German stock corporation regulation in the 19^th century was characterized by a sharp dichotomy of public and private interests (rather than shareholder and stakeholder interests). They seemed so incompatible with each other that the German octroi and concession system sought to interweave them in regulatory terms in order to provide protection for society against the unbridled pursuit of private interests of corporate managers and to deal with the threat this posed to the public good. As a result, it was not possible to incorporate in Germany between 1794 and 1843 if not for the purpose of the common or public good.

The common benefit as a condition for incorporation

This strict precondition was abandoned in 1870, but in the 20^th century, the discourse on the common good in company law gained ground again with the debate on the concept of the ‘company per se’. This discussion was initiated by Rathenau’s writings and aimed at a practical independence of the company from its governing bodies and their individual interests. Due to their considerable macroeconomic importance, Rathenau considered stock corporations no longer the sole objects of the private interests of shareholders but demanded that they should be detached from the purely private sector and linked to the interests of the state and civil society. Consequentially, the Stock Corporation Act of 1937 stipulated: ‘The Management Board shall, under its own responsibility, manage the company in such a way as […] the common benefit of the people and the state demand’.

The 1965 amendment to the Stock Corporation Act erased this statement from the wording of the law, because of its Nazi connotations and because it was deemed unnecessary to spell out the obvious. The continued validity of the common benefit as an unwritten principle of stock corporation law has since then been discussed and the development of codetermination in the 1970s intensified this discussion.

Where is the concept of company interest today?

In the following decades, various understandings of the interest of the company were put forward by academics and shaped this concept that until today is considered the major guideline for board members’ actions. Since the 1990s, the debate has opened up to the Anglo-American shareholder-stakeholder dichotomy and its influences can be seen in today’s foreword of the GCGC. However, binding standards of conduct for corporate bodies as well as for an associated liability were not developed. Does this render the concept of the company interest useless? No. It offers a framework, an overarching normative idea, in which different legal obligations for board members can be placed and interpreted. And its dynamic offers flexibility: it constantly poses the questions of the ‘right’ relationship between company and society and between public regulation and private interests. But currently, flexibility is accompanied by legal uncertainty.

Towards a better framework for the corporate purpose?

Without an explicit definition, the concept of the company interest seems to be at a crossroads. Thus, a legal clarification of its relevance is much needed. This clarification should connect to its historical core: the relation between public and private interests that have to be continuously balanced within corporate decision-making. And the responsibility of the company for the common good as its background. Yet a conclusive definition of its scope will not be possible: History has shown that none of the above-mentioned interest groups dominates over another on an abstract level. And what is in the company interest depends also on the object and the articles of association of the respective enterprise together with the individual situation. Nevertheless, the law can and should make explicitly clear that corporate boards are committed to the company interest. This clarification is not only needed in order to reject the shareholder-stakeholder dichotomy. It can also serve as a reference point for further obligations of the board to foster corporate sustainability. Because ultimately, it is in the enterprise’s best interests, that boards ensure a sustainable value creation within the planetary boundaries.

À la prochaine…

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, Mme Élisabeth Forget nous offre un article intéressant à la Revue des sociétés : « L’investissement éthique : Implications en droit des sociétés » (2015 p. 559).

Forme d’investissement de plus en plus pratiquée par les investisseurs particuliers aussi bien qu’institutionnels, l’investissement éthique offre d’infinies possibilités. Confessionnel, environnemental, ou encore humaniste, l’investissement éthique se veut le plus souvent durable et responsable. En cela, il épouse les objectifs de la RSE. Porteurs de ces valeurs, les investisseurs éthiques participent activement à la vie des sociétés dont ils détiennent des titres. Leur engagement se fait au service de l’intérêt de toutes les parties prenantes à la vie des sociétés. En cela, l’investissement éthique rebat les cartes des théories juridiques relatives à l’intérêt social et contribue à faire pénétrer en droit français la Stakeholder Theory

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Intéressant article publié en 2013 par le professeur Pierre-Henri Conac « Director’s Duties in Groups of Companies – Legalizing the Interest of the Group at the European Level » (European Company and Financial Law Review, 2013, Vol. 10, no 2, pp. 194-226). D’accord avec Pierre-Henri Conac ?

The Action Plan of the European Commission of December 2012 on “European company law and corporate governance – a modern legal framework for more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies” mentioned that “the Commission will, in 2014, come with an initiative to improve both the information available on groups and recognition of the concept of ‘group interest’.” The origin of this renewed interest by the European Commission can be found in the report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law of 2011. Recognising the interest of the group at the European level would provide many advantages, especially for groups having cross-border activities in the European Union, whether led by a large parent company or a Small and Medium Sized Enterprise (SME). In addition, recognition of the interest of the group has become Ius Commune in Europe. However, there is a need to proceed cautiously. Therefore, a recommendation would be the most attractive legal instrument. Any action at the European level should also take into consideration the distinction between wholly-owned and non-wholly-owned subsidiaries. In the case of the latter, specific instruments of protection of minority shareholders should be left to the Member State to develop.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Voilà une belle OPA qui est en cours… encore faut-il qu’elle réussise ! La société canadienne a tenté à nouveau de séduire K&S. La responsabilité sociétale n’est pas tout à fait éloignée du débat comme en témoigne cette déclaration de K&S : « the transaction proposed by PotashCorp puts jobs at risk and that sites and raw material production in Germany might not be maintained ».

K&S, the German potash and salt mining company that owns Morton Salt, said on Friday that the Potash Corporation had made another unsolicited takeover approach for the company. The latest offer, which came in a letter to K&S’s board of directors and management, was unchanged in its value, but included a more formal “business combination agreement,” K&S said in a news release on Friday. Norbert Steiner, the K&S chief executive, said that the proposed priced “does not at all reflect the fundamental value of K&S” and wasn’t in the company’s best interest. The takeover approach valued K&S at 7.8 billion euros, or about $8.5 billion.

Pour en savoir plus, cliquez ici.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian