Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale

Très intéressant papier de recherche de l’ECGI de Susan Watson et Lynn Buckley intitutlé « Directors’ Positive Duty to Act in the Interests of the Entity: Shareholders’ Interests Bounded by Corporate Purpose ». La maximisation actionnariale a du plomb dans l’aile !

Résumé :

Directors’ duty to act in good faith and to act in the best interests of the company relates to the interests of shareholders held in the company as a separate legal entity. The obligation to act in the best interests of shareholders is potentially bounded by corporate purpose as the office requires directors to act in accordance with the constitution and Companies Act.  The origin of the duty is traced to the emergence of permanent capital in the business corporation and the resulting new oaths sworn by directors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with Charitable Corporation v Sutton considered in that historical context.

The analysis illustrates that the duty is not owed to shareholders collectively at any time, but rather to the company as a separate entity from its shareholders. The interests of shareholders are held in the company as its capital base. The duty is considered in relation to the even longer-standing obligation that officers of corporations act faithfully to ensure compliance with the corporation’s charter.

The article concludes that the re-inclusion of purpose provisions in company constitutions combined with recognition that the modern company is an entity rather than contractual could significantly influence the application of the good faith and best interests duty.

À la prochaine…

Merci au journaliste Richard Dufour qui propose dans La presse du 23 décembre 2023 de revenir sur l’affaire Gildan. Il est parfois bon de s’arrêter pour prendre un peu de recul : « Le surprenant feuilleton Gildan«  (La presse, 23 décembre 2023).

Presque chaque journée amène son effet de surprise depuis le congédiement du fondateur et PDG du fabricant montréalais de vêtements, il y a deux semaines.

Cette crise n’est pas sans rappeler des situations similaires du passé, dont une à l’automne s’étant soldée par le retour en poste du PDG congédié.

(…) Dans le cas de Gildan, le conseil a viré Glenn Chamandy le 10 décembre et a justifié sa décision par des divergences liées au plan de succession. Mais aussi en soutenant que Glenn Chamandy souhaitait aller de l’avant avec une stratégie d’acquisitions de plusieurs milliards de dollars dans des secteurs adjacents au principal champ d’expertise de l’entreprise qui est la fabrication.

Vince Tyra a été nommé pour succéder à Glenn Chamandy en vertu d’un processus de relève « planifié et réfléchi ». Le président du conseil, Donald Berg, et Vince Tyra sont tous deux résidants du Kentucky ayant des liens étroits avec l’Université de Louisville. Donald Berg siège au conseil de surveillance de l’Université de Louisville alors que Vince Tyra a été directeur des sports interuniversitaires de cette université de 2017 à 2021.

Une dizaine d’importants actionnaires institutionnels contrôlant ensemble plus du tiers des actions de Gildan se sont jusqu’ici opposés publiquement à la décision du conseil.

(…) Gildan a renoncé à ses actions à droit de vote multiple au début des années 2000 au moment où Glenn Chamandy a succédé à son frère Greg à la barre de Gildan.

« Le contrôle a alors été abandonné », dit François Dauphin.

Le président de l’Institut sur la gouvernance rappelle que le rôle des actionnaires est d’élire et de choisir des administrateurs pour les représenter afin de déterminer les orientations de l’entreprise.

Il ajoute dans la foulée que le groupe d’actionnaires institutionnels dissidents a voté il y a six mois à peine en faveur de tous les administrateurs actuellement en poste qui ont décidé de congédier le PDG.

(…)

Certains observateurs ne se surprendront toutefois pas de voir des actionnaires de longue date se ranger derrière Glenn Chamandy et appuyer son retour puisque ces actionnaires dissidents ont potentiellement développé une relation personnelle au fil des années à la suite de multiples rencontres et conférences téléphoniques trimestrielles. Glenn Chamandy était PDG depuis une vingtaine d’années.

Il n’est pas à écarter que la crise débouche sur une bataille de procurations menant à un vote des actionnaires en assemblée extraordinaire.

Cette éventualité risquerait toutefois d’étirer la crise sur plusieurs semaines, voire plusieurs mois. Employés, clients, fournisseurs et actionnaires de Gildan sont en droit de craindre qu’une prolongation de la crise cause une distraction pouvant nuire à l’entreprise.

 

À la prochaine…

Intéressant article du professeur étatsunien Stephen Bainbridge sur la fameuse décision américaine Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. : « Why We Should Keep Teaching Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. » (UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 22-05, 5 avril 2022). Le titre ne laissera personne indifférent puisqu’il est exactement à l’opposé de celui de la professeure Lynn Stout publié en 2008 !

À la prochaine…

La professeur australienne Jennifer Hill (toujours intéressante à lire, je vous la conseille vivement !) vient de publier ce nouvel article « Corporations, Directors’ Duties and the Public/Private Divide » dans l’ECGI Law Series 539/2020 (25 septembre 2020). Par rapport à nos thématiques du site, cette étude est un incontournable !

Extrait :

Business history and theory reflect a tension between public and private conceptions of the corporation. This tension and conceptual ambiguity lay close to the surface of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, in which Berle and Means portrayed the modern public corporation as straddling the public/private divide. It is also embodied in the famous Berle-Dodd debate, which provides the basis for contemporary clashes between “different visions of corporatism,” such as the conflict between shareholder primacy and stakeholder-centered versions of the corporation.

This chapter examines a number of recent developments suggesting that the pendulum, which swung so clearly in favour of a private conception of the corporation from the 1980s onwards, is in the process of changing direction.

The chapter provides two central insights. The first is that there is not one problem, but multiple problems in corporate law, and that different problems may come to the forefront at different times. Although financial performance is a legitimate concern in corporate law, it is also important to recognize, and address, the danger that corporate conduct may result in negative externalities and harm to society. The chapter argues that it is therefore, a mistake to view the two sides of the Berle-Dodd debate as binary and irreconcilable. The second insight is that corporate governance techniques (such as performance-based pay), which are designed to ameliorate one problem in corporate law, such as corporate performance, can at the same time exacerbate other problems involving the social impact of corporations.

As the chapter shows, a number of recent developments in corporate law have highlighted the negative externalities and social harm that corporate actions can cause. These developments suggest the emergence of a more cohesive vision of the corporation that encompasses both private and public aspects. The developments also potentially affect the role and duties of company directors, who are no longer seen merely as monitors of corporate performance, but also as monitors of corporate integrity and the risk of social harm.

À la prochaine…

Belle tribune dans Fortune de MM. Colin Mayer, Leo Strine Jr et Jaap Winter au titre clair : « 50 years later, Milton Friedman’s shareholder doctrine is dead » (13 septembre 2020).

Extrait :

Fifty years ago, Milton Friedman in the New York Times magazine proclaimed that the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. Directors have the duty to do what is in the interests of their masters, the shareholders, to make as much profit as possible. Friedman was hostile to the New Deal and European models of social democracy and urged business to use its muscle to reduce the effectiveness of unions, blunt environmental and consumer protection measures, and defang antitrust law. He sought to reduce consideration of human concerns within the corporate boardroom and legal requirements on business to treat workers, consumers, and society fairly. 

Over the last 50 years, Friedman’s views became increasingly influential in the U.S. As a result, the power of the stock market and wealthy elites soared and consideration of the interests of workers, the environment, and consumers declined. Profound economic insecurity and inequality, a slow response to climate change, and undermined public institutions resulted. Using their wealth and power in the pursuit of profits, corporations led the way in loosening the external constraints that protected workers and other stakeholders against overreaching.

Under the dominant Friedman paradigm, corporations were constantly harried by all the mechanisms that shareholders had available—shareholder resolutions, takeovers, and hedge fund activism—to keep them narrowly focused on stockholder returns. And pushed by institutional investors, executive remuneration systems were increasingly focused on total stock returns. By making corporations the playthings of the stock market, it became steadily harder for corporations to operate in an enlightened way that reflected the real interests of their human investors in sustainable growth, fair treatment of workers, and protection of the environment.

Half a century later, it is clear that this narrow, stockholder-centered view of corporations has cost society severely. Well before the COVID-19 pandemic, the single-minded focus of business on profits was criticized for causing the degradation of nature and biodiversity, contributing to global warming, stagnating wages, and exacerbating economic inequality. The result is best exemplified by the drastic shift in gain sharing away from workers toward corporate elites, with stockholders and top management eating more of the economic pie.

Corporate America understood the threat that this way of thinking was having on the social compact and reacted through the 2019 corporate purpose statement of the Business Roundtable, emphasizing responsibility to stakeholders as well as shareholders. But the failure of many of the signatories to protect their stakeholders during the coronavirus pandemic has prompted cynicism about the original intentions of those signing the document, as well as their subsequent actions.

Stockholder advocates are right when then they claim that purpose statements on their own achieve little: Calling for corporate executives who answer to only one powerful constituency—stockholders in the form of highly assertive institutional investors—and have no legal duty to other stakeholders to run their corporations in a way that is fair to all stakeholders is not only ineffectual, it is naive and intellectually incoherent.

What is required is to match commitment to broader responsibility of corporations to society with a power structure that backs it up. That is what has been missing. Corporate law in the U.S. leaves it to directors and managers subject to potent stockholder power to give weight to other stakeholders. In principle, corporations can commit to purposes beyond profit and their stakeholders, but only if their powerful investors allow them to do so. Ultimately, because the law is permissive, it is in fact highly restrictive of corporations acting fairly for all their stakeholders because it hands authority to investors and financial markets for corporate control.

Absent any effective mechanism for encouraging adherence to the Roundtable statement, the system is stacked against those who attempt to do so. There is no requirement on corporations to look after their stakeholders and for the most part they do not, because if they did, they would incur the wrath of their shareholders. That was illustrated all too clearly by the immediate knee-jerk response of the Council of Institutional Investors to the Roundtable declaration last year, which expressed its disapproval by stating that the Roundtable had failed to recognize shareholders as owners as well as providers of capital, and that “accountability to everyone means accountability to no one.” 

If the Roundtable is serious about shifting from shareholder primacy to purposeful business, two things need to happen. One is that the promise of the New Deal needs to be renewed, and protections for workers, the environment, and consumers in the U.S. need to be brought closer to the standards set in places like Germany and Scandinavia. 

But to do that first thing, a second thing is necessary. Changes within company law itself must occur, so that corporations are better positioned to support the restoration of that framework and govern themselves internally in a manner that respects their workers and society. Changing the power structure within corporate law itself—to require companies to give fair consideration to stakeholders and temper their need to put profit above all other values—will also limit the ability and incentives for companies to weaken regulations that protect workers, consumers, and society more generally.

To make this change, corporate purpose has to be enshrined in the heart of corporate law as an expression of the broader responsibility of corporations to society and the duty of directors to ensure this. Laws already on the books of many states in the U.S. do exactly that by authorizing the public benefit corporation (PBC). A PBC has an obligation to state a public purpose beyond profit, to fulfill that purpose as part of the responsibilities of its directors, and to be accountable for so doing. This model is meaningfully distinct from the constituency statutes in some states that seek to strengthen stakeholder interests, but that stakeholder advocates condemn as ineffectual. PBCs have an affirmative duty to be good corporate citizens and to treat all stakeholders with respect. Such requirements are mandatory and meaningful, while constituency statutes are mushy.

The PBC model is growing in importance and is embraced by many younger entrepreneurs committed to the idea that making money in a way that is fair to everyone is the responsible path forward. But the model’s ultimate success depends on longstanding corporations moving to adopt it. 

Even in the wake of the Roundtable’s high-minded statement, that has not yet happened, and for good reason. Although corporations can opt in to become a PBC, there is no obligation on them to do so and they need the support of their shareholders. It is relatively easy for founder-owned companies or companies with a relatively low number of stockholders to adopt PBC forms if their owners are so inclined. It is much tougher to obtain the approval of a dispersed group of institutional investors who are accountable to an even more dispersed group of individual investors. There is a serious coordination problem of achieving reform in existing corporations.

That is why the law needs to change. Instead of being an opt-in alternative to shareholder primacy, the PBC should be the universal standard for societally important corporations, which should be defined as ones with over $1 billion of revenues, as suggested by Sen. Elizabeth Warren. In the U.S., this would be done most effectively by corporations becoming PBCs under state law. The magic of the U.S. system has rested in large part on cooperation between the federal government and states, which provides society with the best blend of national standards and nimble implementation. This approach would build on that.

Corporate shareholders and directors enjoy substantial advantages and protections through U.S. law that are not extended to those who run their own businesses. In return for offering these privileges, society can reasonably expect to benefit, not suffer, from what corporations do. Making responsibility in society a duty in corporate law will reestablish the legitimacy of incorporation.

There are three pillars to this. The first is that corporations must be responsible corporate citizens, treating their workers and other stakeholders fairly, and avoiding externalities, such as carbon emissions, that cause unreasonable or disproportionate harm to others. The second is that corporations should seek to make profit by benefiting others. The third is that they should be able to demonstrate that they fulfill both criteria by measuring and reporting their performances against them.

The PBC model embraces all three elements and puts legal, and thus market, force behind them. Corporate managers, like most of us, take obligatory duties seriously. If they don’t, the PBC model allows for courts to issue orders, such as injunctions, holding corporations to their stakeholder and societal obligations. In addition, the PBC model requires fairness to all stakeholders at all stages of a corporation’s life, even when it is sold. The PBC model shifts power to socially responsible investment and index funds that focus on the long term and cannot gain from unsustainable approaches to growth that harm society. 

Our proposal to amend corporate law to ensure responsible corporate citizenship will prompt a predictable outcry from vested interests and traditional academic quarters, claiming that it will be unworkable, devastating for entrepreneurship and innovation, undermine a capitalist system that has been an engine for growth and prosperity, and threaten jobs, pensions, and investment around the world. If putting the purpose of a business at the heart of corporate law does all of that, one might well wonder why we invented the corporation in the first place. 

Of course, it will do exactly the opposite. Putting purpose into law will simplify, not complicate, the running of businesses by aligning what the law wants them to do with the reason why they are created. It will be a source of entrepreneurship, innovation, and inspiration to find solutions to problems that individuals, societies, and the natural world face. It will make markets and the capitalist system function better by rewarding positive contributions to well-being and prosperity, not wealth transfers at the expense of others. It will create meaningful, fulfilling jobs, support employees in employment and retirement, and encourage investment in activities that generate wealth for all. 

We are calling for the universal adoption of the PBC for large corporations. We do so to save our capitalist system and corporations from the devastating consequences of their current approaches, and for the sake of our children, our societies, and the natural world. 

À la prochaine…

Ma collègue Beate Sjåfjell nous gâte encore avec un très bel article (accessible en ligne !) : « Sustainable Value Creation Within Planetary Boundaries—Reforming Corporate Purpose and Duties of the Corporate Board » (Sustainibility, 2020, Vol. 12, Issue 15). Je vous conseille vivement la lecture de cet article…

Résumé :

Business, and the dominant legal form of business, that is, the corporation, must be involved in the transition to sustainability, if we are to succeed in securing a safe and just space for humanity. The corporate board has a crucial role in determining the strategy and the direction of the corporation. However, currently, the function of the corporate board is constrained through the social norm of shareholder primacy, reinforced through the intermediary structures of capital markets. This article argues that an EU law reform is key to integrating sustainability into mainstream corporate governance, into the corporate purpose and the core duties of the corporate board, to change corporations from within. While previous attempts at harmonizing core corporate law at the EU level have failed, there are now several drivers for reform that may facilitate a change, including the EU Commission’s increased emphasis on sustainability. Drawing on this momentum, this article presents a proposal to reform corporate purpose and duties of the board, based on the results of the EU-funded research project, Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART, 2016–2020).

À la prochaine…