Rémunération sans performance ?

Dans le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, un article intéressant est proposé qui porte sur des propositions en matière de rémunération des dirigeants : « Pay for Performance-Mirage? » (par Cydney Posne, 3 octobre 2019).

Pour en savoir plus : ici

Extrait :

Yes, it can be, according to the Executive Director of the Council of Institutional Investors, in announcing CII’s new policy on executive comp.

Among other ideas, the new policy calls for plans with less complexity (who can’t get behind that?), longer performance periods for incentive pay, hold-beyond-departure requirements for shares held by executives, more discretion to invoke clawbacks, rank-and-file pay as a valid reference marker for executive pay, heightened scrutiny of pay-for-performance plans and perhaps greater reliance on—of all things—fixed pay. It’s back to the future for compensation!

Il est intéressant de noter que le CII indique sur le long terme que : « Executive compensation should be designed to attract, retain and incentivize executive talent for the purpose of building long-term shareholder value and promoting long-term strategic thinking. CII considers “the long-term” to be at least five years. Executive rewards should be generally commensurate with long-term return to the company’s owners. Rewarding executives based on broad measures of performance may be appropriate in cases where doing so logically contributes to the company’s long-term shareholder return ».

À la prochaine…

Ce contenu a été mis à jour le 22 octobre 2019 à 16 h 37 min.

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