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Le bien informé Financial Times (« Brussels deal to give shareholders more clout on directors’ pay« , 8 décembre 2016) vient de révéler une information qui fera réagir les lectrices et lecteurs de ce blogue. L’UE serait sur le point d’adopter un accord donnant plus de pouvoir aux actionnaires en matière de rémunération des dirigeants, l’objectif étant de contrecarrer le court-termisme dont feraient preuve les CA.

Pour les points essentiels, voici ce qui a été décidé :

Under the deal struck between negotiators from the European Parliament and Slovakia, which holds the EU’s presidency, shareholders will get a vote on companies’ pay policy at least every four years.

The agreement reached will leave individual nations to decide whether to opt for a system of binding shareholder votes on pay, or to allow votes to be advisory. However, even an advisory vote against pay structures would require companies to present a revised policy for another vote at the next general meeting of shareholders.

Investors will also get an advisory say on listed companies’ annual remuneration reports, which provide an individual breakdown of pay and benefits given to individual directors over the last financial year.

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Ivan Tchotourian

M. Gérard Bérubé publie une perspective dans Le Devoir un intéressant papier : « Un CA activiste ».

La notion de « capitalisme de propriétaires » est dans l’air du temps. Le mois dernier, dans une allocation ayant pour thème les sièges sociaux au Québec, Gaétan Morin, président et chef de la direction du Fonds de solidarité FTQ, s’est fait plus précis en utilisant l’étiquette d’actionnaire propriétaire. Loin d’être tautologique, cette expression nous rappelle qu’en matière de gouvernance, le C.A. des entreprises à contrôle diffus souffre depuis trop longtemps d’un déphasage devenu chronique face à aux prédateurs institutionnels. Il est attendu que les administrateurs sauront s’inspirer de cet actionnariat activiste qui a su se développer au fil des crises et des enjeux débordant la simple valorisation boursière.

De tout temps, les conseils d’administration des entreprises à actionnariat diffus ont rarement fait le poids face aux institutionnels spéculateurs et autres grands adeptes de la valorisation à court terme. À quand les C.A. activistes ?

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Ivan Tchotourian

L’OCDE vient de publier un rapport « Strengthening Corporate Governance Codes in Latin America« .

In September the Corporate Affairs Division of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) released “Strengthening Corporate Governance Codes in Latin America” which examined the ways in which corporate governance codes are drafted, updated and implemented; and enforced in Latin America.

The report found a “noticeable weakness” in the degree of engagement of institutional investors on corporate governance issues in Latin America, which has limited the impact of corporate governance codes. However, Latin American codes are generally aimed at improving the culture of governance within the country, often with a focus on improving investor confidence and access to information.

Vous trouverez un commentaire sur Diligent ici.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Dans « Why Enron Remains Relevant » (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 2 décembre 2016), Michael W. Peregrine aborde les leçons de l’affaire Enron, 15 ans après. Un bel article !

The fifteenth anniversary of the Enron bankruptcy (December 2, 2001) provides an excellent opportunity for the general counsel to review with a new generation of corporate officers and directors the problematic board conduct that proved to have seismic and lasting implications for corporate governance. The self-identified failures of Enron director oversight not only led to what was at the time the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, but also served as a leading prompt for the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the corporate responsibility movement that followed. For those reasons, the Enron bankruptcy remains one of the most consequential governance developments in corporate history.

Enron evolved from a natural gas company to what was by 2001 a highly diversified energy trading enterprise that pursued various forms of particularly complex transactions. Among these were the soon-to-be notorious related party transactions in which Enron financial management executives held lucrative economic interests. (These were the so-called “Star Wars” joint ventures, with names such as “Jedi”, “Raptor” and “Chewco”). Not only was Enron’s management team experienced, both its board and its audit committee were composed of individuals with broad and diverse business, accounting and regulatory backgrounds.

In the late 1990s the company experienced rapid growth, such that by March 2001 its stock was trading at 55 times earnings. However, that rapid growth attracted substantial scrutiny, including reports in the financial press that seriously questioned whether such high value could be sustained. These reports focused in part on the complexity and opaqueness of the company’s financial statements, that made it difficult to accurately track its source of income.

By mid-summer 2001 its share price began to drop; CEO Jeff Skilling unexpectedly resigned in August; the now-famous Sherron Watkins whistleblower letter was sent (anonymously) to Board Chair Ken Lay on August 15. On October 16, the company announced its intention to restate its financial statements from 1997 to 2007. On October 21 the SEC announced that it had commenced an investigation of the related party transactions. Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow was fired on October 25 after disclosing to the board that he had earned $30 million from those transactions. On October 29, Enron’s credit rating was lowered. A possible purchaser of Enron terminated negotiations on November 28, and the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on December 2.

The rest became history: the collapse of the company; the individual criminal prosecutions and convictions; the obstruction of justice verdict against company and, for Arthur Andersen (subsequently but belatedly overturned); the loss of scores of jobs and the collateral damage to the city of Houston; Mr. Lay’s sudden death; and, ultimately the 2002 enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, which was intended to prevent future accounting, financial and governance failings as had occurred in Enron and other similar corporate scandals. But a 2016 Enron board briefing would be much more than a financial history lesson. For the continuing relevance of Enron is at least two-fold

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Ivan Tchotourian

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Ivan Tchotourian