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Bonjour à toutes et à tous, la province de l’Alberta a décidé d’aller de l’avant avec le thème de la féminisation des CA. Aussi, sa commission des valeurs mobilières vient-elle de lancer une consultation publique sur un projet de type « se conformer ou s’expliquer » (Janet McFarlane, « Alberta Securities Commission proposes gender diversity rule », The Globe and Mail, 14 septembre 2014). Pour rappel, cette règle du « conformer ou s’expliquer » a été mis en place dans la plupart des autres provinces canadiennes à l’exception de l’Alberta, de la Colombie-Britannique et de l’Île du Prince Édouard..

Alberta’s securities regulator is reversing course and has unveiled a proposal to adopt new reporting rules requiring companies to disclose their approach to gender diversity on their boards.

The Alberta Securities Commission (ASC) said Wednesday it will seek public comment on a proposal to adopt “comply or explain” rules requiring companies to explain their policies regarding the representation of women on their boards and executive positions, including whether they have internal targets for women.

The rule, open for comment until Oct. 14, would not require companies to add women to their ranks or adopt a diversity policy, but would require them to explain why they have opted not to have one. Companies would also have to report on the proportion of women on their boards and in executive officer roles.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Marc T. Moore offre un beau papier sur la place de la valeur actionnariale en Grande-Bretagne dans une perspective historique : « Shareholder Primacy, Labour and the Historic Ambivalence of UK Company Law » (Oxford University, 20 septembre 2016).

Most directors and senior managers of British companies would likely regard it as trite law that, in undertaking their functions, they are accountable first and foremost to their employer firm’s general body of shareholders. It follows that the interests of other corporate constituencies – and, in particular, those of employees – must ultimately cede to those of shareholders in the event of conflict. Although frequently taken for granted today, the lexical priority that the British company law framework affords to the interests of shareholders is remarkable, not least when viewed alongside the correspondingly disempowered corporate governance status of labour in the UK.

On first reflection, it is somewhat curious that the interests of employees have not figured more prominently within British company law, especially when one considers the general political disposition of the country in modern times. Throughout the course of the last century, the UK has witnessed 37 years of Labour government (or 42 years if one includes Labour’s participation in the wartime coalition government). And although the UK is acknowledged on the whole as having a more neo-liberal (ie right-wing) political orientation than many of its northern European counterparts, it nonetheless has a comparatively strong social-democratic (ie left-wing) political tradition in relation to other English-speaking and former-Commonwealth countries, at least since the Second World War. It is thus not unreasonable to expect that, at some point during the post-war era, democratic public policy measures might have been taken to effect the direct integration of worker interests into the heart of the British corporate legal structure.

Une de ses conclusion est intéressante :

However, whilst the centrality of shareholders’ interests to the doctrinal and normative fabric of contemporary UK company law is both manifest and incontrovertible, this has curiously not always been the case. With respect to the fundamental question of the proper corporate objective (that is, as to whose interest British company directors are expected to serve while carrying out their functions), UK company law up until 2006 adopted a highly ambiguous position. Moreover, British company law has in the fairly recent past come precariously close to adopting a radically different board representation model, in which worker interests would formally have shared centre-stage with those of shareholders in a similar vein to the traditional German corporate governance model.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Le magazine The Economist publie en septembre un numéro consacré au gigantisme des sociétés par actions et à la tendance au regroupement qui se développe depuis quelque temps : « A giant problem ».

DISRUPTION may be the buzzword in boardrooms, but the most striking feature of business today is not the overturning of the established order. It is the entrenchment of a group of superstar companies at the heart of the global economy. Some of these are old firms, like GE, that have reinvented themselves. Some are emerging-market champions, like Samsung, which have seized the opportunities provided by globalisation. The elite of the elite are high-tech wizards—Google, Apple, Facebook and the rest—that have conjured up corporate empires from bits and bytes.

As our special report this week makes clear, the superstars are admirable in many ways. They churn out products that improve consumers’ lives, from smarter smartphones to sharper televisions. They provide Americans and Europeans with an estimated $280 billion-worth of “free” services—such as search or directions—a year. But they have two big faults. They are squashing competition, and they are using the darker arts of management to stay ahead. Neither is easy to solve. But failing to do so risks a backlash which will be bad for everyone.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, je vous informe qu’Andrew Ceresney (directeur de la division Enforcement à la SEC) s’est exprimé lors de la Sixteenth Annual Taxpayers Against Fraud Conference à Washington le 14 septembre 2016 (« The SEC’s Whistleblower Program: The Successful Early Years »). À cette occasion, M. Ceresney est revenu sur la dénonciation, son histoire et son succès actuel… ainsi que l’influence qu’a exercé le programme de dénonciation américain pour le Canada (Ontario et Québec) et l’Australie.

Whistleblowers provide an invaluable public service, often at great personal and professional sacrifice and peril. I cannot overstate the appreciation we have for the willingness of whistleblowers to come forward with evidence of potential securities law violations. I often speak of the transformative impact that the program has had on the Agency, both in terms of the detection of illegal conduct and in moving our investigations forward quicker and through the use of fewer resources.

Dans son allocution, M. Ceserney fournit des chiffres :

1. The success of the program can be seen, in part, in the over $107 million we have paid to 33 whistleblowers for their valuable assistance, in cases with more than $500 million ordered in sanctions
2. Since the inception of the program, the Office has received more than 14,000 tips from whistleblowers in every state in the United States and from over 95 foreign countries. What’s more, tips from whistleblowers increased from 3,001 in fiscal year 2012 — the first full fiscal year that the Commission’s Whistleblower Office was in operation — to nearly 4,000 last year, an approximately 30% increase. And we are on target to exceed that level this year. During fiscal year 2015, the Office returned over 2,800 phone calls from members of the public. By the end of fiscal year 2015, the Commission and Claims Review Staff had issued Final Orders and Preliminary Determinations with respect to over 390 claims for whistleblower awards.

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Ivan Tchotourian

82.154 euros. Voilà ce qu’a gagné, en moyenne, au titre de 2015, un membre du conseil d’administration du CAC 40. Dont 32.602 euros de fixe et un jeton variable autour de 3.865 euros par réunion du conseil, selon une étude réalisée par le cabinet de chasseur de têtes Spencer Stuart. En 2014, il avait perçu 72.608 euros. Cette augmentation est faciale, car, dans les faits, l’administrateur n’a pas perçu 13,8 % de plus en espèces sonnantes et trébuchantes. La comparaison est tronquée, car la composition de l’indice CAC 40 a changé avec l’entrée du nouveau groupe fusionné LafargeHolcim et de Nokia, à la place d’Alcatel. Ces derniers ont versé des jetons de présence figurant parmi les plus importants de l’indice. A cela vient s’ajouter la sortie d’EDF, dont la rémunération moyenne des administrateurs était faible (autour de 20.000 euros en raison de la présence de 5 représentants de l’Etat).

Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, c’est l’anniversaire du scandale Volkswagen aujourd’hui. Une belle occasion de rappeler toutes l’importance d’accorder aux préoccupations extra-financières une attention particulière : « Volkswagen anniversary reminds investors of the value of ESG analysis » (World Finance, Vipul Arora, 14 septembre 2016).

This month marks one year since the start of the Volkswagen emissions scandal, when the US Environmental Protection Agency found Volkswagen’s ‘defeat devices’ masked emissions that were 40 times the legal standard of nitrogen oxide, causing smog and poor health conditions.

A year of vehicle recalls, plummeting sales and falling profits followed and Volkswagen has seen 30 percent wiped off its share price. What’s more, the company could face up to $18bn in fines from US regulators – equivalent to the entire Russian budget for hosting the 2018 World Cup. The scandal has been terrible news for Volkswagen and its shareholders.

But should those that got stung have been a little more wary? The Volkswagen scandal was far from unprecedented in the industry and in this particular case analysts had spotted signs of trouble as early as 2014 – when Volkswagen’s response to emissions discrepancies found by a chance test from the International Council on Clean Transportation was to undertake a recall of 500,000 vehicles. Volkswagen’s membership of a collaboration that worked against emissions reducing technology from 1997-2011 was also a red flag for some investors.

To avoid being stung again, investors should view all voluntary recalls as a reason for deeper investigation. But wider than that, the scandal has also helped persuade many investors of the value of taking a closer look at a company’s environmental, social and governance (ESG) credentials.

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Ivan Tchotourian

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, je vous signale cet article de e-RSE : « Les entreprises certifiées ISO14001 sont plus compétitives et plus performantes ». Cet article cherche à répondre à la question suivante : La RSE permet-elle d’augmenter les gains financiers, les profits et la performance des entreprises ? La réponse pour l’auteur est oui !

Les normes ISO semblent aider à rendre les acteurs privés plus profitables. Une nouvelle étude apporte la preuve que les entreprises qui adoptent la certification ISO 14001 sont plus compétitives, plus performantes, gagnent des contrats et font plus de bénéfice.

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Ivan Tchotourian