Archives

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, l’État français s’énerve avec l’affaire Renault à propos de la rémunération de son P-DG. Comme le relaie l’agence Reuters (ici), les administrateurs représentant l’État et le ministre français de l’Économie ont fait entendre leur voix !

France will maintain pressure on pressure on Renault to rein in Carlos Ghosn’s pay, Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron said on Tuesday, after shareholders voted against the chief executive’s 7.2 million euro ($8.3 million) payout for 2015. In comments to lawmakers, Macron railed against what he called Renault’s « dysfunctional governance », after shareholders rejected Ghosn’s pay package on Friday – only to be immediately overruled by the carmaker’s board. The government may consider firmer steps to limit executive pay levels deemed excessive unless companies such as Renault show greater moderation, the minister added.

After the consultative vote at Renault, in which the state wielded more than 18 percent of voting rights as the carmaker’s biggest shareholder, the board voted again to maintain last year’s CEO payout, while pledging to review its pay structure for 2016 and beyond.

The government’s two board representatives had consistently opposed Ghosn’s compensation proposal, Macron said on Tuesday. « What we are very clearly demanding is that Mr Ghosn live up to his responsibilities with regard to his compensation for 2016, » he said.

The government will seek a further Renault board meeting to « draw the necessary conclusions », Macron said. « Failing which we would be compelled to legislate. »

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

La Grande-Bretagne vient de faire évoluer son Code gouvernance d’entreprise en avril 2016 : UK Corporate Governance Code 2016.

Following the 2014 Code amendments, which focussed on the provision by companies of information about the risks which affect longer term viability, the FRC will continue to monitor compliance with these changes. Companies should be presenting information to give a clearer and broader view of solvency, liquidity, risk management and viability. For their part, investors should assess these statements thoroughly and engage accordingly.

To run a corporate board successfully should not be underrated. Constraints on time and knowledge combine with the need to maintain mutual respect and openness between a cast of strong, able and busy directors dealing with each other across the different demands of executive and non-executive roles. To achieve good governance requires continuing and high quality effort.

Chairmen are encouraged to report personally in their annual statements how the principles relating to the role and effectiveness of the board (in Sections A and B of the Code) have been applied. Not only will this give investors a clearer picture of the steps taken by boards to operate effectively but also, by providing fuller context, it may make investors more willing to accept explanations when a company chooses to explain rather than to comply with one or more provisions.

While in law the company is primarily accountable to its shareholders, and the relationship between the company and its shareholders is also the main focus of the Code, companies are encouraged to recognise the contribution made by other providers of capital and to confirm the board’s interest in listening to the views of such providers insofar as these are relevant to the company’s overall approach to governance.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Chiffre d’affaires, résultat d’exploitation, résultat financier… On ne sait jamais vraiment à quoi correspondent tous ces chiffres. Combien les entreprises gagnent-elles réellement ? Nous décryptons pour vous toute la comptabilité des entreprises !

Rapport sur la gouvernance des sociétés fermées par le NACD (pour une synthèse, cliquez ici) !

The National Association of Corporate Directors recently released its 2015-2016 NACD Private Company Governance Survey. In an article in the March 2016 edition of “Private Company Director” – a monthly publication sponsored by NACD – senior research analyst, Ted Sikora, highlighted a few of the results. Some of the more interesting take-aways were those that distinguished family owned business from other privately held companies. For example:

• Approximately three-quarters of all family owned business lack any kind of formal CEO/leadership succession plan. At the same time, respondents to the survey from family owned businesses identified leadership and management training as some of the most important and time consuming parts of their job (more so than other privately held companies). This interesting juxtaposition might arise from the fact that many family owned businesses (although certainly not all) already have a presumptive leadership heir. As such, there does not appear to be any need for a formal process for identifying a new CEO. Because the next generation of leadership is frequently already with the business, however, there is a constant reminder of the training they need
• Barely half of family owned businesses have any kind of board evaluation mechanism. Again, it is not difficult to imagine the relationship dynamics in a family business that would lead to this result. If everyone on the board of directors is in the family, a formal review process would seem particularly awkward.
• A majority of family owned businesses have no limitations or restrictions on time spent in management or on the board. Many privately held companies will have term limits, age limits and other restrictions, but these appear notably less used in family owned businesses.
• Respondents from family owned businesses strongly identified the need for outside, industry expertise on their boards. Yet family owned businesses are the most likely to have boards lacking in outsiders, industry experts and others identified as adding value.
• Consistent with nearly every other survey in this area, family owned businesses demonstrated a longer vision and a greater priority of long-term planning, as compared with their non-family owned counterparts.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le National Credit Union Administration est devenu la première des six Agences à dévoiler une proposition de règle d’implantation de l’article 956 de la loi américaine Dodd-Frank (« Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements », 17 CFR Part 303, Release No.; File no., RIN). Commentaire à recevoir au plus tard pour le 22 juillet 2016 !

The OCC, Board, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA, and SEC (the Agencies) are seeking comment on a joint proposed rule (the proposed rule) to revise the proposed rule the Agencies published in the Federal Register on April 14, 2011, and to implement section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Section 956 generally requires that the Agencies jointly issue regulations or guidelines:

(1) prohibiting incentive-based payment arrangements that the Agencies determine encourage inappropriate risks by certain financial institutions by providing excessive compensation or that could lead to material financial loss; and

(2) requiring those financial institutions to disclose information concerning incentive-based compensation arrangements to the appropriate Federal regulator.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian