Archives

Le site Boursorama publie une petite actualité intéressante : « A partir de quel montant la rémunération d’un dirigeant vous parait-elle indécente ? » (28 octobre 2015).

Selon un sondage Opinion Way réalisé à l’occasion du prochain salon Actionaria, les 20 et 21 novembre prochains, 74 % des investisseurs individuels interrogés estiment qu’au-dessus de 500 000 €, la rémunération d’un dirigeant est indécente. 23,1 % pensent qu’elle l’est lorsque la rémunération du dirigeant dépasse 1 million d’euros. Elle est considérée comme indécente au-dessus de 100 000 euros par 7,5 % des sondés

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le journal Private Company Director détaille une étude Ernst & Young’s Center for Board Matters sur le « Board Retirement and Tenure Policies » (ici). Signalons cette statistique : Nearly 20% of Directors are Set for Board Exit !

1. Nearly 20% of directors set for board exit: Among the Fortune 100 companies with retirement policies, 19% of directorships are held by individuals within five years of reaching the board’s designated retirement age. Nearly all Fortune 100 companies have board retirement policies in place, with most companies setting the retirement age at 72.
2. S&P 500 and 1500 directors follow similar exit pattern:  18% of S&P 500 directorships are held by individuals who are 68 or older and have served on the board for 10 years or more, while 19% of S&P 1500 directorships fall within this range. While not aprecise measurement, the data reflects that the estimated portion of directors nearing retirement is significant, and greater than it was five years ago.
3. Fortune 100 board tenure policies are rare: Only four companies have them: one uses a term limit of 12 years; one uses 15 years; one uses 18 years; and one uses 20 years. As with retirement policies, board tenure policies are not binding, and most of the companies that do set term limits make clear that the board may make exceptions. Only two Fortune 100 directors are serving on boards past a designated term limit — in one case the director is the chair and CEO of the company, and in the other case the director is the board chair.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Intéressante synthèse publiée par Me Jean Teboul qui revient sur la responsabilité des entreprises dans le domaine des troubles de voisinage : ici.

L’article 976 C.c.Q. énonce que les voisins doivent accepter les inconvénients normaux du voisinage. La Cour suprême, dans l’arrêt Ciment du Saint-Laurent inc. c. Barrette, a confirmé que cet article établit un régime autonome fondé sur la mesure des inconvénients subis plutôt que sur la faute. Elle n’a toutefois pas fourni d’indicateurs permettant d’apprécier le seuil de normalité des inconvénients. De même, dans l’affaire Entreprises Auberge du parc ltée c. Site historique du Banc-de-pêche de Paspébiac, décidée quelques mois plus tard, la Cour d’appel n’a fait que valider l’utilisation de certains critères, sans pour autant les hiérarchiser. S’appuyant sur la doctrine et sur une analyse détaillée de la jurisprudence depuis 2006, cet article établit une typologie des critères employés pour déterminer le seuil de normalité. Il propose également un test permettant d’évaluer la normalité des inconvénients de voisinage.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le Financial reporting Council vient de publier un document de consultation : « UK Board Succession Planning » (ici). Voici ce qu’on peut y lire…

The FRC’s interest stems primarily from the fact that the quality of succession planning is one of the most frequent issues highlighted as a consequence of board evaluation. Stakeholders have suggested that we promote good practice to raise quality. The FRC also wishes to address the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards’ recommendations to the FRC on issues around director nomination, in which it commented that there is a ‘widespread perception that some “natural challengers” are sifted out by the nomination process. The nomination process greatly influences the behaviour of non-executive directors and their board careers.’

This paper is the result of discussions with a wide range of interested parties – individually and through group sessions – and analysis of other research. Our stakeholders have been extremely generous with their time and candid with their views, for which we are grateful. The aim of this paper is to look at the key issues, to identify suggestions for good practice and, more specifically, to examine how the nomination committee can play its role effectively. We are seeking to provoke discussion, and welcome your feedback on our approach and the issues and questions we have posed.

Issues explored in the paper include:

• how effective board succession planning is important to business strategy and culture;
• the role of the nomination committee;
• board evaluation and its contribution to board succession;
• identifying the internal and external ‘pipeline’ for executive and non-executive directors;
• ensuring diversity; and
• the role of institutional investors.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Peu de personnes se penchent sur le rôle crucial du procès-verbal des CA. Pourtant, ce document est plus que jamais important notamment en termes de responsabilité des administrateurs (on ne le rappellera jamais trop !). Or, voici qu’Ed Zimmermann en traite – sous un angle juridique en analysant la jurisprudence du Delaware – dans un article intitué « Did It In The Minutes: In Favor of More Detailed Startup Board Minutes for Important Décisions » (Forbes, 10 septembre 2015).

Qu’en retenir ? Je vous propose les extraits suivants…

We don’t typically advise boards to be Dickensian in approaching minutes, but do advise that board minutes reflect two things: first, that the board raised and considered the relevant questions, and second, that the board actually understood the transaction and its implications in the context of the broader market.

(…) Chief Justice Strine’s biting prose underscore that board members not only must press for answers, but the important factors the board considered when making material decisions should be reflected in the minutes.

(…) Board members should each review the minutes and approve them.  We too frequently see board members attempting to rubber stamp the minutes. At my law firm, we generally appreciate receiving edits or comments, as those typically demonstrate a heartening level of board-level engagement.  I say generally, because there are definitely times when a board member with a self-interested ax to grind provides detailed and self-serving comments geared toward effectuating what he wished had transpired rather than helping to correct inaccuracies.

The minutes shouldn’t be sloppy or a court may later find them unreliable.  Minutes should accurately reflect the attendee list for the meeting, even referencing those attendees who aren’t board members.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian