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Dans un article intitulé « The Pandemic and Executive Pay », Aniel Mahabier, Iris Gushi, and Thao Nguyen reviennent sur les conséquences de la COVID-19 en termes de niveaux de rémunération des CA et des hauts-dirigeants. Portant sur les entreprises du Russell 3000, cet article offre une belle synthèse et est très parlante.

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Is Reducing Base Salary Enough?

While salary reductions for Executives are greatly appreciated in this difficult time and are meant to show solidarity with employees, the fact is that base salary is only a fraction of the often enormous compensation packages granted to CEO’s and other Executives. Compensation packages predominately consist of cash bonuses and equity awards. Even though 80% of the Russell 3000 companies have disclosed 2019 compensation for Executives, we have not witnessed any companies making adjustments to these figures in light of the crisis, even for companies in hard-hit industries.

Edward Bastian, CEO of Delta Airlines, has agreed to cut 100% of his base salary for 6 months, [1] which equals USD 714,000, but still holds on to his 2019 cash and stock awards of USD 16 million, which were granted earlier in 2020. [2] Another interesting case is MGM Resorts International, where CEO Jim Murren was supposed to stay through 2021 to receive USD 32 million in compensation, including USD 12 million in severance. According to the terms of his termination agreement, he would not receive the compensation package if he left before 2021. [3] However, days after he resigned voluntarily in March, MGM announced that his resignation would be treated as a “termination without good cause”, which would qualify him to receive the full USD 32 million package. [4] In the meantime, 63,000 employees of MGM have been furloughed and will possibly be fired. [5]

Furthermore, activist investors have begun to feel unhappy about some executive pay actions amid the pandemic. CtW Investment Group, an investor of Uber, urged shareholders to reject Uber’s compensation package at the Annual General Meeting since it includes a USD 100 million equity grant to the CEO. [6]

While the ride-hailing company has suffered from a USD 2.9 billion first quarter net loss in 2020 [7] and planned to lay off 6,700 employees [8] (about 30% of its workforce), its CEO Dara Khosrowshahi only took a 100% base salary cut from May until the end of 2020, [9] which totals USD 666,000, and took home a USD 42.4 million pay package for 2019.

The same investor also urged shareholders of McDonald’s to vote against the USD 44 million+ exit package, including USD 700,000 in cash severance, for former CEO Stephen Easterbrook, who was fired last year over violation of company policies due to his relationship with an employee. [10]

The investor’s efforts failed in both instances and the CEO’s took home millions of dollars while their companies are struggling.

Since the COVID-19 outbreak, a number of public companies have gone bankrupt. Nevertheless, large sums of compensation were paid out to their Executives. Retailer J. C. Penney paid almost USD 10 million in bonuses to top executives [11] and oil company Whiting Petroleum issued USD 14.6 million in bonuses for its C-suite, [12] just days before both companies filed for bankruptcy.

Another school of thought is that the practice of issuers deferring executive salary cuts into RSUs will give rise to huge payouts in the future when the market eventually recovers and share value increases. This means that Executives who deferred their base salary have made a sacrifice that ultimately will benefit them, defeating the purpose of pay cuts.

Although the economic impacts of the pandemic on businesses are still on-going, the number of pay cuts announced has slowed since the end of May. As the effects continue to unfold over the next months, we expect companies to continue to re-evaluate their executive compensation policies. COVID-19 has changed daily lives, business operations, and the economy. Even though we will only know the full extent of impact in the second half of 2020, COVID-19 will certainly change executive pay and corporate governance practices in the future.

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Corporate Board Member fait une intéressante synthèse de la politique de démission d’un administrateur qui ne recevrait pas 50 % des votes lors de son élection : « Is A Director Resignation Policy Good For Governance? » (Matthew Scott). Promeut par les grands investisseurs de ce monde, comment résumer les effets positifs d’une telle politique ? C’est ce que vous propose l’auteur !

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While historically such policies have not been strictly enforced, adopting them challenges directors to do what’s right for the organization based on moral considerations and their fiduciary responsibility. Such a policy can also act as an indicator for when board refreshment might be necessary, particularly if support for the entire board begins to fall close to or below the 50 percent threshold.

That shareholders would lobby for this type of policy suggests they are looking for a very direct way to hold board members accountable for the work they do on behalf of the company. This is a growing trend for public companies. Shareholders have reasoned that if a director who is up for re-election to the board and is running unopposed can’t manage to get more than 50 percent of shareholders to vote for their return, then a change is needed. Shareholders aren’t happy that directors who receive less than the majority of votes are allowed to keep their board seats simply because no one ran against them. For corporate boards, the question “Why aren’t shareholders supporting that director?” must be asked, answered and dealt with swiftly. If the largest shareholders aren’t supporting certain board members, it’s only a matter of time before they suggest someone to run against them. It may be better for at-risk directors to resign gracefully before being forced out by a dissident shareholder running a candidate against them.

Additionally, this policy gives affected directors a chance to ask themselves, “Is it the best decision for me to continue to serve on a board where shareholders don’t support my service?” Future career opportunities, reputational impact and board appointments might be at stake.

Having such a resignation policy could have another positive effect on governance – it may make a few more board seats open up faster. Only a limited number of board seats become available each year, so anything that can encourage board turnover in a good way is welcome. This policy could help create more open positions for boards that are looking to add diverse candidates, and at the same time, add new perspectives and innovative thought to board discussions. And most governance professionals would favor that.

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Une nouvelle qui ne devrait pas étonnée : Les dividendes ont chuté de 22% dans le monde au second trimestre 2020, avec une baisse encore plus marquée en Europe, plombés par les effets de la pandémie de Covid-19 qui a fortement affecté les entreprises, selon un rapport publié ce lundi.

Le recul de 22% des dividendes « représente aisément la plus lourde chute trimestrielle depuis la crise financière mondiale », détaille ce rapport de la société de gestion Janus Henderson Investors, qui précise que « plus de la moitié » des entreprises « les ont purement et simplement supprimés ».

• Pour en savoir plus : « Les dividendes ont chuté de 22% dans le monde au 2e trimestre », La Tribune, 24 août 2020

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Voici un article qui intéressera celles et ceux qui suivent l’actualité entourant les Public Benefit Corporation : « Delaware Public Benefit Corporations—Recent Developments » (Michael R. Littenberg, Emily J. Oldshue, and Brittany N. Pifer, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 31 août 2020).

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The 2020 Amendments

Delaware has amended the PBC statute twice since inception to address concerns that limited its utility.

Most recently, in July, Delaware amended the PBC statute to, among other things, (1) reduce the stockholder approval threshold necessary for becoming a PBC, and for exiting the PBC regime; (2) eliminate statutory appraisal rights in connection with the conversion of a conventional corporation to a PBC; and (3) strengthen the protections for directors. Each of these amendments is discussed in more detail below.

Voting Thresholds for Opting In and Opting Out Lowered. Section 363(a) of the DGCL originally provided that an existing conventional corporation could not become a PBC without the approval of 90% of the outstanding stock on the amendment of its certificate of incorporation or the merger or consolidation with or into a PBC. Conversely, under Section 363(c), a PBC had to satisfy the 90% voting threshold to become a conventional corporation. In 2015, this threshold was amended down to a two-thirds majority. The 2020 PBC amendments eliminated Section 363(a) and (c). The result is that the voting thresholds for conversions, mergers and consolidations involving PBCs are now governed by Sections 242(b) and 251 of the DGCL, which provide for majority voting unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise.

Elimination of Statutory Appraisal Rights in Connection with PBC Conversions. Section 363(b) of the DGCL previously provided appraisal rights for stockholders of a conventional corporation that amended its certificate of incorporation to become a PBC or engaged in a merger or consolidation that resulted in the surviving corporation being a PBC, to the extent the stockholder did not vote for the amendment, merger or consolidation. In 2015, this section of the DGCL was amended to add a “market out” exception, which provided that appraisal rights generally would not be available to holders of shares listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more than 2,000 holders. The market out exception of course did not apply in the private company context.

The 2020 PBC amendments eliminated Section 363(b). As a result, there no longer is a specific statutory appraisal right if a conventional corporation converts to a PBC. Appraisal rights in connection with PBC mergers and consolidations are now governed by Section 262 of the DGCL, which addresses appraisal rights in connection with mergers and consolidations more generally.

Director Protections Strengthened. As discussed above, under Section 365(a) of the DGCL, directors of a PBC must balance the pecuniary interest of stockholders, the interests of other stakeholders and the specific public benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation. Section 365(c) has been amended to clarify that a director’s ownership of stock or other interests in the PBC does not inherently create a conflict of interest, unless the ownership of the interests would create a conflict of interest in a conventional corporation.

In addition, the 2020 PBC amendments revised Section 365(c) to provide that any failure on a director’s part to satisfy Section 365(a)’s balancing requirement does not constitute an act or omission not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty for purposes of Section 102(b)(7) (exculpation of directors) or Section 145 (indemnification) of the DGCL, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. Previously, this was framed as an opt-in in Section 365(c), rather than as an opt-out.

Ability to Bring Derivative Suit Brought into Alignment with Conventional Corporations. Section 367 of the DGCL sets forth the ownership requirements for PBC stockholders to be able to bring a derivative suit to enforce the statutory requirement to balance the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the PBC’s conduct and the public benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation. The 2020 PBC amendments provide that a derivative action to enforce the balancing requirement can only be brought by one or more plaintiffs owning individually or collectively (1) at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or (2) in the case of a corporation listed on a national securities exchange, the lesser of 2% of the corporation’s shares and shares with a value of at least $2,000,000.

The amendments to Section 367 align the thresholds for PBC derivative actions with those applicable to conventional corporations.

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Retour sur la tribune de Lucian Bebchuk et Roberto Tallarita dans le Wall Street Journal critiquant le soi-disant stakeholderism qui émergerait de l’après COVID-19 par Cavin Hinks dans Board Agenda du 7 août 2020 : « Stakeholderism: study finds evidence in short supply ».

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Acceleration

Where does that leave stakeholderism? It’s no secret that many have argued fundamental change would be needed for the movement to really gain traction. In the UK, at least, the Institute of Directors has set up an entirely new governance centre to specifically explore this issue.

It may also be the case that boardroom approval and governance guidelines are not sufficient to prove that stakeholderism is absent in the US or elsewhere. Policy decision making at different levels—including chief executives acting alone—may reflect a shift to new forms of corporate behaviour, regardless of board-sanctioned decisions.

When the Sustainability Board Report , a campaign group, looked as corporate statements made by the world’s largest 100 companies as a result of Covid-19, it concluded there was evidence to suggest stakeholderism had “accelerated” during the pandemic. But it was inspecting disclosures about policies relating to employees, customers, suppliers and communities rather than formal boardroom approval processes or redrafted governance guidelines.

That might suggest CEOs make decisions that reflect stakeholderism without constructing a formal board-approved shift in approach. For that matter, it might also indicate such a movement could be short-lived and swing back once the threat of Covid-19 has receded.

Campaigners hope not. Close observers might also ask how stakeholderism might be properly observed or even measured.

The discussion has a long way to go. Bebchuk and Tallarita raise important questions with some compelling evidence. But it’s not entirely clear we’ve reached a final verdict on stakeholderism.

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Me Laure Levine du cabinet Stikeman Elliott publie un billet éclairant sur la manière dont les grandes entreprises doivent divulguer l’information financière : « L’importance de l’information financière au temps de la COVID-19 » (24 juillet 2020).

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Les ACVM ont publié une déclaration de soutien à la déclaration sur l’importance de fournir de l’information relative à la COVID-19 (la « déclaration de l’OICV ») de l’Organisation internationale des commissions de valeurs (l’« OICV ») du 29 mai 2020, qui rappelle aux émetteurs l’importance de communiquer une information financière de grande qualité aux investisseurs. Les ACVM renvoient également les émetteurs assujettis canadiens à leur présentation du 6 mai 2020 – COVID-19 : Les obligations d’information continue des émetteurs et leurs enjeux (la « présentation des ACVM »), qui décrit un certain nombre d’importants enjeux en lien avec la communication de l’information financière des émetteurs, y compris le rapport de gestion et les déclarations de changement important.

Dans sa déclaration, l’OICV reconnaît l’incidence considérable de la COVID-19 sur l’information publiée dans les états financiers des sociétés ouvertes à travers le monde et observe que les émetteurs vont devoir porter des jugements et faire des estimations importants dont le niveau d’incertitude sera plus élevé que d’habitude. Elle rappelle aux émetteurs l’importance d’avoir de l’information exacte pour faire des estimations et porter des jugements éclairés, compte tenu des répercussions de la pandémie de COVID-19 et de l’aide ou du soutien gouvernemental dont les émetteurs peuvent se prévaloir. (…).

Les émetteurs devraient également essayer d’adapter l’information donnée à propos de la COVID-19 à leur propre situation. Comme nous l’avons observé dans le passé, les formules toutes faites ou le modèle de communication universel de l’information ne suffiront généralement pas à décrire les incidences réelles ou éventuelles de la COVID-19 sur les activités de l’émetteur. Surtout, malgré les nombreuses répercussions de la COVID-19, les exigences de fond et de forme liées aux obligations d’information continue canadiennes demeurent les mêmes. Par conséquent, les effets de la COVID-19 se feront sentir sur certaines obligations d’information existantes.

Rapport de gestion

Dans son rapport de gestion, l’émetteur doit s’efforcer d’expliquer ce qui suit :

• Les répercussions réelles ou éventuelles de la COVID-19 sur ses résultats financiers, sa situation financière et ses flux de trésorerie. Il faut examiner les incidences de la COVID-19 sur les politiques de dividendes, le coût des immobilisations, ainsi que la capacité à recouvrer les comptes débiteurs et à s’acquitter des comptes fournisseurs et des autres obligations contractuelles, notamment les facilités de crédit et les passifs liés aux baux, entre autres.
• La manière dont il a changé sa stratégie afin d’endiguer les effets de la COVID-19. Il devrait mettre à jour ou retirer l’information prospective communiquée antérieurement afin de rendre compte de son changement de stratégie. Il devrait se demander s’il existe un fondement valable à l’information prospective communiquée antérieurement et quelles ont été les incidences de la COVID-19 sur ses perspectives globales en lien avec ses activités et sa situation de trésorerie à court et à long terme.
• Les mesures qu’il a prises afin d’atténuer les incidences de la pandémie sur son entreprise.

La présentation des ACVM rappelle aux émetteurs que le rapport de gestion est censé être un exposé de leurs résultats financiers du point de vue de la direction et met en évidence quatre principaux points d’intérêt dont ils doivent traiter dans leur rapport de gestion en lien avec la COVID-19 (…).

Information financière

Les ACVM reconnaissent que les émetteurs établissent leurs états financiers avec de l’information possiblement imparfaite, dans un contexte évolutif et incertain. Les émetteurs devraient formuler des jugements éclairés en fonction de la meilleure information disponible. À mesure que de nouvelles données émergent, il faut se demander s’il est nécessaire de mettre à jour les jugements et estimations ou l’information passée.

Les émetteurs doivent se rappeler des indications données dans l’Avis 52-306 du personnel des ACVM (révisé), Mesures financières non conformes aux PCGR, particulièrement au moment de décrire une perte ou une dépense comme étant non récurrente, rare ou inhabituelle lorsqu’une perte semblable est raisonnablement susceptible de se produire au cours d’une période de deux exercices. En outre, les ACVM considèrent qu’il serait trompeur de qualifier un ajustement comme étant relié à la COVID-19 si la direction n’explique pas de quelle façon ce montant y était expressément associé.

Déclarations de changement important

Finalement, la présentation des ACVM donne des indications sur les situations dans lesquelles la COVID-19 pourrait déclencher la production d’une déclaration de changement important. Même si une incidence égale sur l’ensemble d’un secteur d’activité ne constitue probablement pas un changement important, les incidences propres à l’émetteur pourraient nécessiter le dépôt d’une déclaration de changement important. Voici des exemples d’information potentiellement importante découlant de la COVID-19 énumérés dans la présentation des ACVM :

• Perturbation importante du personnel ou des activités d’exploitation de l’émetteur.
• Retards ou perturbations dans la chaîne d’approvisionnement.
• Hausse du coût des produits ou des services.

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