Gouvernance | Page 2

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, la sénatrice Élisabeth Warren vient d’introduire un projet de loi très ambitieux (!) : le S.3348 – Accountable Capitalism Act.

Plusieurs points saillants ressortent de ce projet :

• La création d’un Office of United States Corporations.
• La possibilité de s’enregistrer auprès de cet organisme fédéral (alors que jusqu’à maintenant, rappelons-le, l’enregistrement se faisait auprès des États et notamment celui du Delaware).
• Les salariés représenteraient 40 % du CA.
• L’entreprise devrait poursuivre une mission sociétale.
• La redéfintion des devoirs des administrateurs et hauts-dirigeants.

Pour en savoir plus, lire cet article ici du The Guardian.

Extrait du projet de loi

SEC. 5. Responsibilities of United States corporations.

(a) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) GENERAL PUBLIC BENEFIT.—The term “general public benefit” means a material positive impact on society resulting from the business and operations of a United States corporation, when taken as a whole. (…)

(1) IN GENERAL.—The charter of a large entity that is filed with the Office shall state that the entity is a United States corporation.

(2) CORPORATE PURPOSES.—A United States corporation shall have the purpose of creating a general public benefit, which shall be—

(A) identified in the charter of the United States corporation; and

(B) in addition to the purpose of the United States corporation under the articles of incorporation in the State in which the United States corporation is incorporated, if applicable.

(c) Standard of conduct for directors and officers.—

(c) Standard of conduct for directors and officers.—

(1) CONSIDERATION OF INTERESTS.—In discharging the duties of their respective positions, and in considering the best interests of a United States corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board of directors, and individual directors of a United States corporation—

(A) shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the United States corporation in a manner that—

(i) seeks to create a general public benefit; and

(ii) balances the pecuniary interests of the shareholders of the United States corporation with the best interests of persons that are materially affected by the conduct of the United States corporation; and

(B) in carrying out subparagraph (A)—

(i) shall consider the effects of any action or inaction on—

(I) the shareholders of the United States corporation;

(II) the employees and workforce of—

(aa) the United States corporation;

(bb) the subsidiaries of the United States corporation; and

(cc) the suppliers of the United States corporation;

(III) the interests of customers and subsidiaries of the United States corporation as beneficiaries of the general public benefit purpose of the United States corporation;

(IV) community and societal factors, including those of each community in which offices or facilities of the United States corporation, subsidiaries of the United States corporation, or suppliers of the United States corporation are located;

(V) the local and global environment;

(VI) the short-term and long-term interests of the United States corporation, including—

(aa) benefits that may accrue to the United States corporation from the long-term plans of the United States corporation; and

(bb) the possibility that those interests may be best served by the continued independence of the United States corporation; and

(VII) the ability of the United States corporation to accomplish the general public benefit purpose of the United States corporation;

(ii) may consider—

(I) other pertinent factors; or

(II) the interests of any other group that are identified in the articles of incorporation in the State in which the United States corporation is incorporated, if applicable; and

(iii) shall not be required to give priority to a particular interest or factor described in clause (i) or (ii) over any other interest or factor.

(2) STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR OFFICERS.—Each officer of a United States corporation shall balance and consider the interests and factors described in paragraph (1)(B)(i) in the manner described in paragraph (1)(B)(iii) if—

(A) the officer has discretion to act with respect to a matter; and

(B) it reasonably appears to the officer that the matter may have a material effect on the creation by the United States corporation of a general public benefit identified in the charter of the United States corporation.

(3) EXONERATION FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY.—Except as provided in the charter of a United States corporation, neither a director nor an officer of a United States corporation may be held personally liable for monetary damages for—

(A) any action or inaction in the course of performing the duties of a director under paragraph (1) or an officer under paragraph (2), as applicable, if the director or officer was not interested with respect to the action or inaction; or

(B) the failure of the United States corporation to pursue or create a general public benefit. (…)

(d) Right of action.—

(1) LIMITATION ON LIABILITY OF CORPORATION.—A United States corporation shall not be liable for monetary damages under this section for any failure of the United States corporation to pursue or create a general public benefit.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Dans L’hebdo des AG (« Dividendes record de ce printemps : une nouvelle arme anti-activistes? »), Mme Hautefort amène une réflexion intéressante sur le lien entre versement de dividendes et activisme actionnarial dur (celui des hedge funds !).

Extrait :

L’enquête annuelle de l’Hebdo des AG sur les dividendes met en évidence une nouvelle année record avec deux changements majeurs : des dividendes en hausse dans presque toutes les sociétés, et le recul des acomptes sur dividendes au profit des rachats d’actions.

 

(…) Un autre facteur peut être la multiplication des initiatives activistes au cours de ces derniers mois. Les activistes sont souvent soit des hedge funds, soit des fonds value, peu attirés par les dividendes. Verser des dividendes importants serait-il une façon d’attirer un maximum d’investisseurs non activistes ?

Autre changement majeur : les acomptes sur dividendes se font rare. Paradoxe, alors que les sociétés n’ont jamais eu autant de trésorerie ? Nous y voyons plutôt le recul de cette pratique au profit des rachats d’actions, procédé plus souple pour les sociétés qui souhaiteraient, en cours d’année, retourner de la trésorerie à l’actionnaire. Par exemple dans un contexte d’activisme.

Le dividende, nouvelle arme anti-activistes ? Ce printemps d’assemblées générales nous le dira.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Moxie Future, une firme basée en Asie et construite par et pour les femmes, vient tout juste de publier un nouveau rapport : “Understanding Female Investors: Women Using Capital to Change the World”. Ce rapport fournit des données intéressantes et pertinentes par rapport aux motivations, mais aussi aux possibles barrières des femmes et de l’investissement responsable.

En mars et avril 2017, 2 536 femmes âgées de 18 à 65 ans ont été interrogées sur cinq marchés l’Australie, de la Chine, de l’Allemagne, du Royaume-Uni et des États-Unis. Les résultats de la recherche démontrent la façon dont les investisseuses en Chine manifestent le plus d’intérêt et de préoccupation en matière d’investissement responsable. Au total, 84% des femmes sondées en Chine ont indiqué qu’elles étaient motivées à être une investisseuse responsable. 69% ressentent un sentiment d’urgence par rapport à l’investissement responsable.

Vous pouvez lire le communiqué de presse de Moxie Future ici et le rapport complet ici.

Bonne lecture!

Julie

Petite lecture sur l’ouverture des sociétés par actions au long-terme avec cet article de Arjya Majumdar : « A Legal Basis for Corporate Long-Termism » (Oxford Business Law Blog, 9 Jan 2018).

My recent paper attempts to reconcile the divergent positions of the shareholder and stakeholder primacy debate by proposing that directors- acting for the corporation- should preserve intergenerational equity. Three arguments are presented in course of this proposition.

Firstly, there has been a slew of judgments in UK common law which suggest that courts are reticent to recognize fiduciary duties that directors may have towards shareholders. The primary reason for this is that the assets controlled, administered and managed by directors belong to the corporation as a legal entity separate from its shareholders. As a result, directors have a higher fiduciary duty to the corporation and future shareholders, over that of present shareholders.

Secondly, corporations are perpetual in nature or, at least, are designed to be, and their continuing existence is predicated upon the ability of individual owners to transfer their ownership. This aspect of corporate perpetuity is little discussed, but of considerable significance in conjunction with fiduciary duties to corporations.

If directors owe their primary duty to the corporation, they must ensure -to the best of their abilities- that the corporation is maintained in good condition throughout. This forms the legal basis of protection to future shareholders. Since the survival of the corporation is paramount compared to the investment of the shareholder, directors are under an obligation to preserve the corporation.

Finally, in order to safeguard the interests of future shareholders, corporations must necessarily strive to preserve the natural and social environments upon which the future of the corporation and the wealth of future shareholders depends. Businesses must, therefore, either create sustainable methods of harvesting resources, or move to an alternative. Failure to do so would result in non-viability and consequent ‘extinction’ of the business itself.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian