engagement et activisme actionnarial | Page 2

IR Magazine offre un bel article sur la situation des entreprises américaines ayant fait leur entrée en bourse en assumant un capital-actions à classe action multiple : « How common are restricted voting rights for US shareholders? » (8 mars 2017). Une excellente occasion de revenir sur la discussion qui a entouré la récente entrée en bourse de Snap Inc.

Petits extraits d’une tendance en pleine expansion :

Snap’s IPO last week will likely be the biggest and most controversial on the NYSE in 2017. The operating company in charge of Snapchat drew ire from certain parts of Wall Street for its three-tier voting structure, which offered no voting rights to any new investors that participated in the IPO.

 

(…) While it is unprecedented to offer no voting rights during an IPO, the number of companies offering restricted voting rights is on the rise.
According to data from Dealogic, 27 of the 174 IPOs in the US in 2015 used dual-class structures – roughly half of these were technology companies. In 2005, just 1 percent of all IPOs used that structure.

 

(…) Bob Lamm, senior adviser to Deloitte’s Center for Boardroom Effectiveness, says that companies can still maintain positive relationships with investors while operating with a restricted share structure.

‘Most public companies can develop good governance practices and explain why they do what they do,’ he says, speaking to IR Magazine. ‘But if they don’t convey good corporate governance practices, they run the risk of investor discontent.’

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le 31 janvier 2017, le Investor Stewardship Group (réunissant plus de 16 investisseur), a publié un premier projet de code de gouvernance d’entreprise et de code de gérance des investisseurs. Concernant le Stewardship Code, les principes sont les suivants :

Principle A: Institutional investors are accountable to those whose money they invest.

Principle B: Institutional investors should demonstrate how they evaluate corporate governance factors with respect to the companies in which they invest.

Principle C: Institutional investors should disclose, in general terms, how they manage potential conflicts of interest that may arise in their proxy voting and engagement activities.

Principle D: Institutional investors are responsible for proxy voting decisions and should monitor the relevant activities and policies of third parties that advise them on those decisions.

Principle E: Institutional investors should address and attempt to resolve differences with companies in a constructive and pragmatic manner.

Principle F: Institutional investors should work together, where appropriate, to encourage the adoption and implementation of the Corporate Governance andStewardship principles.

Pour accéder à ces principes : cliquez ici.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Quel bel article d’Alana Semuels dans The Atlantic (ici) ! Cette étude revient sur la politique des fonds de couverture (hedge funds) et l’implication de leur activisme sur les politiques et les stratégies mises en place par les entreprises américaines.

Extrait :

DuPont is one of dozens of American companies that have abandoned a long-term approach to doing business after being the target of so-called activist investors. These investors buy up shares of a company and attempt to maximize the returns to their shares, usually by replacing members of the board of directors with hand-picked candidates who will push the company to cut costs. Activity by such investors has skyrocketed of late. In a 20-month stretch in 2005 and 2006, there were only 52 activist campaigns, according to John C. Coffee, a professor at Columbia University Law School. Between 2010 and early 2014, by contrast, there were 1,115 activist campaigns. “Hedge-fund activism has recently spiked, almost hyperbolically,” Coffee writes in a 2016 paper, “The Wolf at The Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance.”

These campaigns are damaging to the long-term outlook of individual companies like DuPont and also to America’s economy more generally. They often result in big cuts to research and development, substantial reductions in the workforce, and a focus on outcomes—in particular short-term profit—that hurt a company’s ability to survive in the long-term. The threat of activism affects companies across the economy: Even public companies not targeted by activists often change their behavior and cut costs to avoid becoming a target. This may be one of the reasons why America is slipping in funding research and development projects when compared with other countries.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le message a le mérite d’être clair ! Le blog of Manifest, the proxy voting agency se montre pour le moins critique (!) d’une réforme américaine qui vient d’être proposé et qui vise notamment à mettre en place un encadrement des agences de conseil en vote : « Global investors condemn US attempt to undermine their voting decisions »

The US House of Representatives’ Finance Services Committee last week passed a series of  Bills which seek to repeal large chunks of the Dodd-Frank Act which was passed in response to the 2008 financial crash.

The bills would amend the mandate on public companies to provide shareholders with a vote on executive compensation to occur only when the company has made a material change to the executive compensation; repeal the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) authority to issue rules on proxy access and repeal the mandate that publicly-traded companies disclose the ratio of median versus chief executive officer pay.

Part of the package of legislative proposals is the Corporate Governance Reform & Transparency Act of 2016 would, if passed by Congress and signed by President Obama, require mandatory SEC registration for proxy advisory firms such as Manifest wishing to operate in the US.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le Council of Institutional Investors (CII) a adopté le 23 mars 2016 de nouvelles politiques destinées à protéger l’intérêt des actionnaires.

Pour résumer les choses :

Company going public should have a « one share, one vote » structure, simple majority vote requirements, independent board leadership and annual elections for board directors.

Pour en savoir plus, cliquez ici.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Très intéressant article du The Wall Street Journal qui met en lumière le fait qu’une part non négligeable d’administrateurs américains occupent leur siège depuis plus de 10 ans (24 %). Cette situation ne serait pas gênante, si les investisseurs ne commençaient à se rebeller ! Lire la suite ici.

Large U.S. companies increasingly are governed by board members who have held their seats for a decade or more, even as some big investors question whether these directors serve shareholders’ best interests. At 24% of the biggest U.S. companies, a majority ofthe board has been in place for at least 10 yeaxs, .•a. Wall Street Journal~.lli!lysis found. It is a ~arked changed from 2005 when long-term directors made up a board majority at 11%of large companies. One factor driving the change is low turnover among directors.

(…) Some investors and proxy advisory firms aren’t waiting for companies to make changes. BlackRock Inc., State Street Global Advisors and o~?ig money managers have begun opposing the re-election of some directors with extended tenure.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian

Le MÉDAC a publié une nouvelle intéressante sur les propositions actionnariales aux États-Unis (ici).

En 2015, le nombre total de propositions d’actionnaires aurait atteint son niveau le plus élevé en cinq ans aux États-Unis.

Ces propositions auraient surtout visé des enjeux de bon gouvernement d’entreprise, comme l’accès par procuration, le vote sur la rémunération des dirigeants, la composition des conseils d’administration, la planification de la relève, les engagements mutuels entre émetteurs et actionnaires, la participation accrue des administrateurs, ainsi que la création de valeur à long terme.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian