Nouvelles diverses | Page 3

Article amenant à réfléchir dans le Wall Street Journal de Alexander William Salter : « Profit Keeps Corporate Leaders Honest » (8 décembre 2020).

Extrait :

(…) As National Review’s Andrew Stuttaford notes, this vision of wide-ranging corporate beneficence introduces a host of principal-agent problems in ordinary business decision-making. Profit is a concrete and clarifying metric that allows shareholders—owners—to hold executives accountable for their performance. Adding multiple goals not related to profit introduces needless confusion.

This is no accident. Stakeholder capitalism is used as a way to obfuscate what counts as success in business. By focusing less on profits and more on vague social values, “enlightened” executives will find it easier to avoid accountability even as they squander business resources. While trying to make business about “social justice” is always concerning, the contemporary conjunction of stakeholder theory and woke capitalism makes for an especially dangerous and accountability-thwarting combination.

Better to avoid it. Since profits result from increasing revenue and cutting costs, businesses that put profits first have to work hard to give customers more while using less. In short, profits are an elegant and parsimonious way of promoting efficiency within a business as well as society at large.

Stakeholder capitalism ruptures this process. When other goals compete with the mandate to maximize returns, the feedback loop created by profits gets weaker. Lower revenues and higher costs no longer give owners and corporate officers the information they need to make hard choices. The result is increased internal conflict: Owners will jockey among themselves for the power to determine the corporation’s priorities. Corporate officers will be harder to discipline, because poor performance can always be justified by pointing to broader social goals. And the more these broader goals take precedence, the more businesses will use up scarce resources to deliver diminishing benefits to customers.

Given these problems, why would prominent corporations sign on to the Great Reset? Some people within the organizations may simply prefer that firms take politically correct stances and don’t consider the cost. Others may think it looks good in a press release and will never go anywhere. A third group may aspire to jobs in government and see championing corporate social responsibility as a bridge.

Finally, there are those who think they can benefit personally from the reduced corporate efficiency. As businesses redirect cash flow from profit-directed uses to social priorities, lucrative positions of management, consulting, oversight and more will have to be created. They’ll fill them. This is rent-seeking, enabled by the growing confluence of business and government, and enhanced by contemporary social pieties.

The World Economic Forum loves to discuss the need for “global governance,” but the Davos crowd knows this type of social engineering can’t be achieved by governments alone. Multinational corporations are increasingly independent authorities. Their cooperation is essential.

Endorsements of stakeholder capitalism should be viewed against this backdrop. If it is widely adopted, the predictable result will be atrophied corporate responsibility as business leaders behave increasingly like global bureaucrats. Stakeholder capitalism is today a means of acquiring corporate buy-in to the Davos political agenda.

Friedman knew well the kind of corporate officer who protests too much against profit-seeking: “Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society these past decades.” He was right then, and he is right now. We should reject stakeholder capitalism as a misconception of the vocation of business. If we don’t defend shareholder capitalism vigorously, we’ll see firsthand that there are many more insidious things businesses can pursue than profit.

À la prochaine…

La FTQ publie un billet dans laquelle elle expose les 8 bonnes idées de la gouvernance : ici. Quelles sont-elles ?

1. Comprendre l’utilité d’un conseil d’administration

2. Ne pas confondre supervision et gestion

3. Agir avec loyauté envers l’entreprise

4. Créer de la valeur par la complémentarité

5. Lutter contre la « pensée groupale »

6. Prôner l’observation et la formation

7. Dans un monde idéal, viser entre sept et neuf membres

8. Assurer une rotation des membres

À la prochaine…

Dans Le Devoir, M. Gérard Bérubé offre une belle analyse du capital-actions à classe multiple pour laquelle il se montre enthousiaste en s’appuyant sur le cas de COGECO : « Sauver nos fleurons » (21 novembre 2020).

Extrait :

Québec peut, certes, envoyer un message clair proclamant la non-disponibilité de nos fleurons clés aux intérêts hors Québec, comme il l’a fait avec Cogeco, mais l’expérience de Rona est venue démontrer la portée limitée du geste. Lors de son premier essai, en 2012, Lowe’s avait
reçu le message clair du gouvernement libéral qu’il n’était pas le bienvenu à la tête de Rona. En 2016, près de quatre ans et un autre essai plus tard, le géant américain a remis cela avec une offre 65 % plus élevée que les actionnaires de Rona ne pouvaient, cette fois, refuser.

Et il restera toujours la taille des sommes en jeu, pouvant rendre difficile d’ériger une position de blocage.

Pour reprendre la position de l’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP), la meilleure protection sera toujours celle de l’actionnariat de contrôle et les structures d’actions à droit de vote multiples. Y greffer une stratégie gouvernementale face aux entreprises à impact systémique dans le respect de cette réalité voulant que le Québec abrite, grosso modo, trois fois plus de prédateurs que de proies viendra renforcer la résistance. Mais la présence de grands investisseurs institutionnels, tels les fonds fiscalisés et la Caisse de dépôt, capables à leur échelle d’accompagner leurs interventions de « clauses québécoises » ou d’orchestrer une position de blocage, est devenue incontournable.

Et François Dauphin, p.-d.g. de l’IGOPP, d’évoquer qu’une dynamique de renouvellement, voire d’élargissement, du portefeuille de « fleurons » au Québec ne peut qu’ajouter à la vitalité.

À la prochaine…

À lire cet intéressant article du professeur Licht : Amir Licht, « Varieties of Shareholderism: Three Views of the Corporate Purpose Cathedral », 19 octobre 2020, European Corporate Governance Institute – Law Working Paper No. 547/2020.

Résumé :

This Chapter seeks to make three modest contributions by offering views of the corporate purpose cathedral that bear on the role of law in it. These views underscore the difference and the tension between an individual perspective and a societal/national legal perspective on the purpose of the corporation. First, it reviews a novel dataset on national legal shareholderism – namely, the degree to which national corporate laws endorse shareholder primacy – as an exercise in operationalizing legal constructs. Second, it anchors the two archetypal approaches of shareholderism and takeholderism in personal human values. It is this connection with the fundamental conceptions of the desirable which animates attitudes and choices in this context. The upshot is potentially subversive: Legal injunctions to directors on corporate purpose might be an exercise in futility. Third, this Chapter highlights the importance of acknowledging the tensions between the two levels of analysis by looking at the works of prominent writers. Adolf Berle, Victor Brudney, and Leo Strine have been careful to keep this distinction in mind, which has enabled them to hold multiple views of the cathedral without losing sight of it.

À la prochaine…

CFA Institute a proposé des standards en matière de divulgation des critères ESG dans les produits financiers : « Consulter Paper on the Development of the CFA Institute – ESG Disclosure Standards For Investments Products » (août 2020).

• Pour un article de presse : ici

Petit extrait :

• Disclosure Requirements Many of the Standard’s requirements will be related to disclosures. Disclosure requirements are a key way to provide transparency and comparability for investors. A disclosure requirement is simply a means of ensuring that asset managers communicate certain information to investors. There are different ways that disclosures might be required, both in terms of scope and method. Therefore, it is necessary to establish principles to ensure the disclosure requirements meet the purpose of the Standard. We propose the following design principles:

• Disclosure requirements should focus on relevant, useful information. Disclosures must provide information that will help investors better understand investment products, make comparisons, and choose among alternatives. • Disclosure requirements should focus primarily on ESG-related features. Because the goal of the Standard is to enable greater transparency and comparability of investment products with ESG-related features, the Standard’s disclosure requirements should focus on these features. Focusing the disclosure requirements on ESG-related features also avoids adding unnecessarily to an asset manager’s disclosure burden.

• Disclosure requirements should allow asset managers the flexibility to make the required disclosure in the clearest possible manner given the nature of the product. Disclosure requirements can easily be reformulated as questions. There are two types of questions—open-ended and closed-ended. Open-ended questions ask who, what, why, where, when, or how. Closed-ended questions require answers in a specific form—either yes/no or selected from a predefined list. The open-ended disclosure requirement format provides the flexibility needed for the Standard to be relevant on a global scale and to pertain to all types of investment products with ESG-related features. The open-ended nature of the disclosure requirements, however, must be balanced to a certain degree with a standardization of responses for the sake of comparison by investors. The forthcoming Exposure Draft will include examples of openended and standardized disclosures.

• The disclosure requirements should aim to elicit a moderate level of detail. An investment product’s disclosures should accurately and adequately represent the policies and procedures that govern the design and implementation of the investment product. The Standard’s disclosure requirements can be thought of as a step between a database search and a due diligence conversation. The disclosures will provide more detail than can be standardized and presented in a database but less detail than the information one can obtain through a full due diligence process.

• The disclosure requirements should prioritize content over format. The disclosure requirements will focus on what information is disclosed rather than how it is disclosed. The Standard will provide a certain degree of flexibility in the format for information presentation. Providing latitude in the format is intended to reduce an asset manager’s disclosure burden and allow for harmonization with disclosures required by regulatory bodies and other standards. The Exposure Draft will offer examples of presentation formats. • Disclosure requirements should be categorized as “general” or “feature-specific”. The Standard will have both general and feature-specific disclosure requirements. General disclosure requirements will apply to all investment products that seek to comply with the Standard. Feature-specific disclosure requirements will apply only to investment products that have a specific ESG-related feature.

• The Standard should include disclosure recommendations in addition to requirements. We anticipate that in addition to the Standard’s required disclosures, the Standard will have recommended disclosures as well. Required disclosures represent the minimum information that must be disclosed in order to comply with the Standard. Recommended disclosures provide additional information that investors may find helpful in their decision making. Recommended disclosures are encouraged but not mandatory.

À la prochaine…

Dans BoardAgenda, Gavin Hinks propose une solution pour que les parties prenantes soient mieux pris en compte : la création d’un comité social et éthique (déjà en fonction en Afrique du Sud) : « Companies ‘need new mechanism’ to integrate stakeholder interests » (4 septembre 2020).

Extrait :

While section 172 of the Companies Act—the key law governing directors’ duties—has been sufficiently flexible to enable companies to re-align themselves with stakeholders so far, it provides no guarantee they will maintain that disposition.

In their recent paper, MacNeil and Esser argue more regulation is needed and in particular a mandatory committee drawing key stakeholder issues to the board and then reporting on them to shareholders.

Known as the “social and ethics committee” in South Africa, a similar mandatory committee in the UK considering ESG (environmental, social and governance) issues “will provide a level playing field for stakeholder engagement,” write MacNeil and Esser.

Recent evidence, they concede, suggests the committees in South Africa are still evolving, but there are advantages, with the committee “uniquely placed with direct access to the main board and a mandate to reach into the depths of the business”.

“As a result, it is capable of having a strong influence on the way a company heads down the path of sustained value creation.”

Will stakeholderism stick?

The issue of making “stakeholder” capitalism stick has vexed others too. The issue was a dominant agenda item at the World Economic Forum’s Davos conference this year, as well as becoming a key element in the presidential campaign of Democrat candidate Joe Biden.

Others worry that stakeholderism is a talking point only, prompting no real change in some companies. Indeed, when academics examined the practical policy outcomes from the now famous 2019 pledge by the Business Roundtable—a group of US multinationals—to shift their focus from shareholders to stakeholders, they found the companies wanting.

In the UK, at least, some are taking the issue very seriously. The Institute of Directors recently launched a new governance centre with its first agenda item being how stakeholderism can be integrated into current governance structures.

Further back the Royal Academy, an august British research institution, issued its own principles for becoming a “purposeful business”, another idea closely associated with stakeholderism.

The stakeholder debate has a long way to run. If the idea is to gain traction it will undoubtedly need a stronger commitment in regulation than it currently has, or companies could easily wander from the path. That may depend on public demand and political will. But Esser and MacNeil may have at least indicated one way forward.

À la prochaine…

Belle tribune dans Fortune de MM. Colin Mayer, Leo Strine Jr et Jaap Winter au titre clair : « 50 years later, Milton Friedman’s shareholder doctrine is dead » (13 septembre 2020).

Extrait :

Fifty years ago, Milton Friedman in the New York Times magazine proclaimed that the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. Directors have the duty to do what is in the interests of their masters, the shareholders, to make as much profit as possible. Friedman was hostile to the New Deal and European models of social democracy and urged business to use its muscle to reduce the effectiveness of unions, blunt environmental and consumer protection measures, and defang antitrust law. He sought to reduce consideration of human concerns within the corporate boardroom and legal requirements on business to treat workers, consumers, and society fairly. 

Over the last 50 years, Friedman’s views became increasingly influential in the U.S. As a result, the power of the stock market and wealthy elites soared and consideration of the interests of workers, the environment, and consumers declined. Profound economic insecurity and inequality, a slow response to climate change, and undermined public institutions resulted. Using their wealth and power in the pursuit of profits, corporations led the way in loosening the external constraints that protected workers and other stakeholders against overreaching.

Under the dominant Friedman paradigm, corporations were constantly harried by all the mechanisms that shareholders had available—shareholder resolutions, takeovers, and hedge fund activism—to keep them narrowly focused on stockholder returns. And pushed by institutional investors, executive remuneration systems were increasingly focused on total stock returns. By making corporations the playthings of the stock market, it became steadily harder for corporations to operate in an enlightened way that reflected the real interests of their human investors in sustainable growth, fair treatment of workers, and protection of the environment.

Half a century later, it is clear that this narrow, stockholder-centered view of corporations has cost society severely. Well before the COVID-19 pandemic, the single-minded focus of business on profits was criticized for causing the degradation of nature and biodiversity, contributing to global warming, stagnating wages, and exacerbating economic inequality. The result is best exemplified by the drastic shift in gain sharing away from workers toward corporate elites, with stockholders and top management eating more of the economic pie.

Corporate America understood the threat that this way of thinking was having on the social compact and reacted through the 2019 corporate purpose statement of the Business Roundtable, emphasizing responsibility to stakeholders as well as shareholders. But the failure of many of the signatories to protect their stakeholders during the coronavirus pandemic has prompted cynicism about the original intentions of those signing the document, as well as their subsequent actions.

Stockholder advocates are right when then they claim that purpose statements on their own achieve little: Calling for corporate executives who answer to only one powerful constituency—stockholders in the form of highly assertive institutional investors—and have no legal duty to other stakeholders to run their corporations in a way that is fair to all stakeholders is not only ineffectual, it is naive and intellectually incoherent.

What is required is to match commitment to broader responsibility of corporations to society with a power structure that backs it up. That is what has been missing. Corporate law in the U.S. leaves it to directors and managers subject to potent stockholder power to give weight to other stakeholders. In principle, corporations can commit to purposes beyond profit and their stakeholders, but only if their powerful investors allow them to do so. Ultimately, because the law is permissive, it is in fact highly restrictive of corporations acting fairly for all their stakeholders because it hands authority to investors and financial markets for corporate control.

Absent any effective mechanism for encouraging adherence to the Roundtable statement, the system is stacked against those who attempt to do so. There is no requirement on corporations to look after their stakeholders and for the most part they do not, because if they did, they would incur the wrath of their shareholders. That was illustrated all too clearly by the immediate knee-jerk response of the Council of Institutional Investors to the Roundtable declaration last year, which expressed its disapproval by stating that the Roundtable had failed to recognize shareholders as owners as well as providers of capital, and that “accountability to everyone means accountability to no one.” 

If the Roundtable is serious about shifting from shareholder primacy to purposeful business, two things need to happen. One is that the promise of the New Deal needs to be renewed, and protections for workers, the environment, and consumers in the U.S. need to be brought closer to the standards set in places like Germany and Scandinavia. 

But to do that first thing, a second thing is necessary. Changes within company law itself must occur, so that corporations are better positioned to support the restoration of that framework and govern themselves internally in a manner that respects their workers and society. Changing the power structure within corporate law itself—to require companies to give fair consideration to stakeholders and temper their need to put profit above all other values—will also limit the ability and incentives for companies to weaken regulations that protect workers, consumers, and society more generally.

To make this change, corporate purpose has to be enshrined in the heart of corporate law as an expression of the broader responsibility of corporations to society and the duty of directors to ensure this. Laws already on the books of many states in the U.S. do exactly that by authorizing the public benefit corporation (PBC). A PBC has an obligation to state a public purpose beyond profit, to fulfill that purpose as part of the responsibilities of its directors, and to be accountable for so doing. This model is meaningfully distinct from the constituency statutes in some states that seek to strengthen stakeholder interests, but that stakeholder advocates condemn as ineffectual. PBCs have an affirmative duty to be good corporate citizens and to treat all stakeholders with respect. Such requirements are mandatory and meaningful, while constituency statutes are mushy.

The PBC model is growing in importance and is embraced by many younger entrepreneurs committed to the idea that making money in a way that is fair to everyone is the responsible path forward. But the model’s ultimate success depends on longstanding corporations moving to adopt it. 

Even in the wake of the Roundtable’s high-minded statement, that has not yet happened, and for good reason. Although corporations can opt in to become a PBC, there is no obligation on them to do so and they need the support of their shareholders. It is relatively easy for founder-owned companies or companies with a relatively low number of stockholders to adopt PBC forms if their owners are so inclined. It is much tougher to obtain the approval of a dispersed group of institutional investors who are accountable to an even more dispersed group of individual investors. There is a serious coordination problem of achieving reform in existing corporations.

That is why the law needs to change. Instead of being an opt-in alternative to shareholder primacy, the PBC should be the universal standard for societally important corporations, which should be defined as ones with over $1 billion of revenues, as suggested by Sen. Elizabeth Warren. In the U.S., this would be done most effectively by corporations becoming PBCs under state law. The magic of the U.S. system has rested in large part on cooperation between the federal government and states, which provides society with the best blend of national standards and nimble implementation. This approach would build on that.

Corporate shareholders and directors enjoy substantial advantages and protections through U.S. law that are not extended to those who run their own businesses. In return for offering these privileges, society can reasonably expect to benefit, not suffer, from what corporations do. Making responsibility in society a duty in corporate law will reestablish the legitimacy of incorporation.

There are three pillars to this. The first is that corporations must be responsible corporate citizens, treating their workers and other stakeholders fairly, and avoiding externalities, such as carbon emissions, that cause unreasonable or disproportionate harm to others. The second is that corporations should seek to make profit by benefiting others. The third is that they should be able to demonstrate that they fulfill both criteria by measuring and reporting their performances against them.

The PBC model embraces all three elements and puts legal, and thus market, force behind them. Corporate managers, like most of us, take obligatory duties seriously. If they don’t, the PBC model allows for courts to issue orders, such as injunctions, holding corporations to their stakeholder and societal obligations. In addition, the PBC model requires fairness to all stakeholders at all stages of a corporation’s life, even when it is sold. The PBC model shifts power to socially responsible investment and index funds that focus on the long term and cannot gain from unsustainable approaches to growth that harm society. 

Our proposal to amend corporate law to ensure responsible corporate citizenship will prompt a predictable outcry from vested interests and traditional academic quarters, claiming that it will be unworkable, devastating for entrepreneurship and innovation, undermine a capitalist system that has been an engine for growth and prosperity, and threaten jobs, pensions, and investment around the world. If putting the purpose of a business at the heart of corporate law does all of that, one might well wonder why we invented the corporation in the first place. 

Of course, it will do exactly the opposite. Putting purpose into law will simplify, not complicate, the running of businesses by aligning what the law wants them to do with the reason why they are created. It will be a source of entrepreneurship, innovation, and inspiration to find solutions to problems that individuals, societies, and the natural world face. It will make markets and the capitalist system function better by rewarding positive contributions to well-being and prosperity, not wealth transfers at the expense of others. It will create meaningful, fulfilling jobs, support employees in employment and retirement, and encourage investment in activities that generate wealth for all. 

We are calling for the universal adoption of the PBC for large corporations. We do so to save our capitalist system and corporations from the devastating consequences of their current approaches, and for the sake of our children, our societies, and the natural world. 

À la prochaine…