Selon une étude révélée par le Financial Times, peu suspect d’anticapitalisme primaire, les dividendes de 2019 pourraient compromettre la survie de bien des entreprises en 2020. 37 % des sociétés qui composent l’indice américain S&P 500 ont versé, en 2019, des dividendes (ou procédé à des rachats d’actions, ce qui est équivalent) pour un montant supérieur à l’ensemble de leurs bénéfices nets de l’année. C’est un peu moins en Europe, autour de 29 %.
Or, un tiers des entreprises a versé en 2019 plus que ce qu’elles ont gagné. Elles payent maintenant d’avoir cédé au court terme, note Philippe Escande, éditorialiste économique au « Monde ».
In this short essay (…), I take issue with the relevance and effectiveness of ’corporate purpose’ as a form of private ordering (eg, as a bylaws provision), or in other sources of soft-law (self-regulation in corporate governance codes, declarations of business associations, etc). I challenge whether these are, in fact, effective tools to induce greater commitment toward stakeholders.
(…) My possible disagreement with Mayer and other similar approaches and initiatives—or, more precisely, with a possible reading of these approaches and initiatives—lays in the excessive trust and emphasis that has been reserved to formulas concerning the purpose of the corporation and their possible consequences. Mayer argues that the corporate contract should include a reference to stakeholders and general social interests beyond value for shareholders, suggesting that this simple trick would have a meaningful impact on business conduct.
(…) The reasons are obvious.
First, these formulas are so broad, vague and ephemeral that they cannot possibly represent a compass for corporate action; they cannot provide meaningful guidance for virtually any specific corporate decision that implies a (legitimate) tradeoff between the interests of different stakeholders. Also, as precedents show, these formulas can be used even less to invoke the violation of directors’ duties and their liability. This conclusion is inevitable because the very essence of the agency relationship, the crucial function of a director or executive, is exactly mediating and balancing the different and often conflicting interests that converge on the corporation in an uncertain and evolving scenario. The idea of constraining the necessary discretion of directors within the boundaries of a simple purpose declaration is no better than the idea of writing in the contract with a painter that her work must be a masterpiece. Such an attempted shortcut to real value is self-evidently flawed.
Second, multiplying the goals and interests that directors must or can pursue, if it can have any effect at all, by definition increases their flexibility and discretion and makes it easier to justify, ex ante and ex post, very different choices. Without being cynical, from this perspective it is not surprising that these formulas are often welcomed, if not sponsored, by business associations and interest groups linked to managers, executives and entrenched shareholders.
Third, self-regulation and private ordering are often a way to avoid or delay the adoption of more stringent statutory or regulatory provisions. The former might be more or less effective, but they might also create an illusion of responsibility. The risk of putting too much trust into the beneficial consequences of these formulas is a disregard for more biting mandatory provisions, which may be necessary to avoid externalities and other market failures.
In particular, securities regulators should make pay ratio disclosures mandatory to improve transparency of executive pay packages at public companies. Pay ratio disclosures reveal the difference in the total remuneration between a company’s top executives and its rank and file workers….
The impact of the losses on shareholders will be significant. Investors, however, are being forced to rely on news reports to try to understand how the crisis is impacting companies in their portfolios and how those companies are responding. The SEC must act to require companies to provide consistent, reliable data to investors about the economic impact of the pandemic on their business, human capital management practices, and supply chain risks. These disclosures should include:
Workplace COVID-19 Prevention and Control Plan—Companies should disclose a written infectious disease prevention and control plan including information such as the company’s practices regarding hazard identification and assessment, employee training, and provision of personal protective equipment.
Identification, Contact Tracing, and Isolation—Companies should disclose their policies for identifying employees who are infected or symptomatic, contact tracing and notification for potentially exposed employees and customers, and leave policies for infected employees who are isolating.
Compliance with Quarantine Orders and phased reopening orders—Companies should disclose how they are complying with federal, state, and local government quarantine orders and public health recommendations to limit operations.
Financial Implications—Companies should disclose the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their cash flows and balance sheet as well as steps taken to preserve liquidity such as accessing credit facilities, government assistance, or the suspension of dividends and stock buybacks.
Executive Compensation—Companies should promptly disclose the rationale for any material modifications of senior executive compensation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including changes to performance targets or issuance of new equity compensation awards.
Employee Leave—Companies should disclose whether or not they provide paid sick leave to encourage sick workers to stay home, paid leave for quarantined workers, paid leave at any temporarily closed facilities, and family leave options to provide for childcare or sick family
Health Insurance—Companies should disclose the health insurance coverage ratio of their workforce and whether the company has a policy to provide employer-paid health insurance for any employees who are laid off during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Contingent Workers—Companies should disclose if part-time employees, temporary workers, independent contractors, and subcontracted workers receive all the protections and benefits provided to full-time company employees, including those outlined above.
Supply Chains-Companies should disclose whether they are current on payments to their supply chain vendors. Timely and prompt payments to suppliers will help retain suppliers’ workforces and ensure that a stable supply chain is in place for business operations going forward.
Workers’ Rights-Companies should disclose their policies for protecting employees who raise concerns about workplace health and safety from retaliation, including whistleblower protections and contractual provisions protecting workers’ rights to raise concerns about workplace conditions.
Political activity—Companies should disclose all election spending and lobbying activity, especially money spent through third parties like trade associations and social welfare 501(c)4 organizations.
Prior to the onset of COVID-19, it was often argued that human rights, worker protection and supply chain matters were moral issues not relevant to a company’s financial performance. As millions of workers are laid off and supply chains unravel, the pandemic has proven that view wrong. Businesses that protect workers and consumers will be better positioned to continue operations and respond to consumer demand throughout the pandemic. The disclosures outlined above will provide investors with important information to help them understand how COVID-19 is impacting the companies they are invested in. In addition, by requiring these disclosures, the Commission has the opportunity to encourage companies to review their current practices and consider whether updates are necessary in light of recent events. The process of preparing these disclosures may help some public companies to recognize that their current practices are not sufficiently robust to protect their workers, consumers, supply chains and, as a result, their investors’ capital given the impact of the pandemic.
Le 28 avril 2020, l’Autorité des marchés financiers a proposé des mesures ciblées pour améliorer la transparence vis-à-vis du marché et le dialogue entre les émetteurs et les actionnaires.
L’engagement actif des actionnaires dans la vie des sociétés cotées est une condition de leur bon fonctionnement et d’une saine gouvernance. A cet égard, l’AMF considère qu’il doit être encouragé. Pour le régulateur, la problématique n’est donc pas d’empêcher l’activisme mais d’en fixer les limites et de se donner la capacité à en maîtriser les excès.
En l’état de la réglementation, l’AMF considère qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de faire évoluer de manière importante le cadre juridique applicable.
Les propositions de l’AMF visent à :
améliorer l’information sur la montée au capital et la connaissance de l’actionnariat, en abaissant le premier seuil légal de déclaration et en rendant publiques les déclarations faites à la société sur le franchissement des seuils fixés dans ses statuts ;
assurer une meilleure information au marché sur l’exposition économique des investisseurs, en complétant les déclarations de positions courtes par une information sur les instruments de dette également détenus (obligations, credit defaults swaps par exemple). L’AMF soutiendra ces propositions au niveau européen ;
promouvoir un dialogue ouvert et loyal entre les sociétés cotées et leurs actionnaires : l’AMF complètera son guide sur l’information permanente et la gestion de l’information privilégiée afin d’y ajouter des développements sur le dialogue actionnarial. Elle complètera également sa doctrine afin de préciser que les émetteurs peuvent apporter toute information nécessaire au marché en réponse à des déclarations publiques les concernant, même en cours de périodes de silence, sous réserve du respect des règles sur les abus de marché. Elle recommandera, par ailleurs, à tout actionnaire qui initie une campagne publique de communiquer sans délai à l’émetteur concerné les informations importantes qu’il adresserait aux autres actionnaires ;
accroître les capacités d’analyse et de réaction de l’AMF afin de lui permettre d’apporter des réponses rapides et adaptées lorsque les circonstances l’exigent : via, par exemple, l’instauration d’un pouvoir d’astreinte en matière d’injonction administrative et d’une faculté d’ordonner à tout investisseur, et non plus seulement à un émetteur, de procéder à des publications rectificatives ou complémentaires en cas d’inexactitude ou d’omission dans ses déclarations publiques.
Intéressant billet sur le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance mettant en avant l’importance prise par le « S » des critères ESG : « Time to Rethink the S in ESG » (Jonathan Neilan, Peter Reilly, et Glenn Fitzpatrick, 28 juin 2020).
Extrait :
In advising companies on protecting and enhancing corporate reputation—through good and bad times—our guiding principle is to ‘do the right thing’. Simple as it sounds, it is reflected in the adage that ‘good PR starts with good behaviour’. This guiding principle also translates to building your ‘S’ credentials. While the various ESG criteria of the reporting frameworks and ratings agencies are a useful guide, our consistent approach in advising companies is for them to take the steps they believe are genuinely in the best interest of the company and its wider stakeholders. Not every decision will meet the expectations of every stakeholder; but it’s a good place to start.
As the wider sustainability agenda also drives more rapid and fundamental change in global markets and technology innovation, properly considering the pressure from public policy and evolving legal requirements, as well as the needs of key stakeholders, is key to understanding what is (and will be seen as) ‘good behaviour’.
As the focus on the ‘S’ grows, companies will need to shift from a reactive to a proactive position. While governance and environmental data is readily available for most companies, the same is not true of the ‘S’. The leeway companies have been afforded on the ‘S’ in the past is unlikely to continue; and, expectations of (and measurement by) rating agencies and investors will continue to increase.
In light of the economic shocks and social upheaval across the globe, demands from stakeholders—most pressingly investors and Governments—will reach a crescendo over the coming six months. As the sole arbiter of much of the information needed to value the ‘S’ in ESG, companies have an opportunity to demonstrate a willingness to shift levels of transparency before they are forced to do so. Companies understandably tend to highlight the efforts they make, often through their corporate social responsibility or communications departments, rather than the higher-cost, higher-risk analysis of the effectiveness of those efforts. Fundamentally, hastened by the emergence of a global pandemic, the world recognises the significance of the risk that failure to address stakeholder interests and expectations represents to business. That shift can be identified as demand for evidence of positive outcomes as opposed to simply efforts or policies.
As we noted in our 2019 Paper, ESG will never replace financial performance as the primary driver of company valuations. Increasingly, however, it is proving to drive the cost of capital down for companies while playing a hugely important role in companies’ risk management frameworks. Most immediately, companies should get a firm handle on how comprehensive their policies, procedures and data are in the five areas listed through a candid audit, as well as other factors material to their businesses’ long-term success. However, this is just a first step and companies must build a narrative and strategy around disclosure for all future annual reports and, where appropriate, market communications. Investors of all sizes are increasingly driving this factor home to Boards and management. In just one week at the end of April, human capital management proposals from As You Sow, a non-for-profit foundation, received 61% and 79% support at two S&P 500 companies, Fastenal and Genuine Parts, respectively. The two companies must now prepare reports on diversity and inclusion, and describe the company’s policies, performance, and improvement targets related to material human capital risks and opportunities as designed by a small shareholder—as opposed to crafting an approach and associated disclosure themselves.
What has become clear over the past three months is that a host of stakeholders, including many investors, will expect a sea-change in their access to information and company practices. While there is no requirement to be the first mover on this, those that are laggards will face avoidable challenges and a rising threat to their ‘licence to operate’.
