Normes d’encadrement | Page 4

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, Vanessa van Coppenhagen et Shivani Naidoo proposent un bilan du Code de gouvernance sud-africain : « The South African King IV Report on Corporate Governance: themes and variations » (janvier 2017).

Extrait :

Inclusivity

One of King IV’s objectives is to broaden its acceptance by making it accessible and fit for implementation across a variety of sectors and organisational types. King IV contains sector supplements in respect of municipalities, non-profit organisations, retirement funds, small and medium enterprises and state-owned organisations, which provide direction and guidance on how to apply the principles and recommended practices in these sectors and organisational types.

As is the case in King III, King IV adopts a stakeholder-inclusive approach, meaning that the governing body should take into consideration the “legitimate and reasonable needs, interests and expectations of all material stakeholders in the execution of its duties in the best interests of the organisation over time”. Stakeholders include shareholders, employees, consumers, the community and the environment. Under this approach, the interests of shareholders and funders, and the interests of other sources of value creation (including social and relationship capital), should be given equal status and should be balanced over time, responding to current circumstances, but always in the best interests of the company in the longer term.

Integrated thinking

King IV has further developed the principles of integrated thinking and integrated reporting seen in King III. Through integrated thinking, an organisation should “take into account the connectivity and interdependence between a range of factors that affect an organisation’s ability to create value over time”. One of King IV’s objectives is to reinforce corporate governance as a holistic and interrelated set of arrangements to be understood and implemented in an integrated way. Integrated thinking underpins:

• the stakeholder inclusive approach, in that the interests of shareholders and stakeholders are interdependent;
• recognition that the organisation and society are interdependent, in that the organisation is a provider/developer of wealth, goods, services, employment and intellectual capital and society provides an operating environment, consumer base and skills;
• recognition that the organisation is a corporate citizen, having responsibilities to its own workplace, the economy, society and the environment; and
• sustainable development, in that the organisation operates in the context of the economy, society and the natural environment and present needs should not compromise the needs of future generations.

Integrated reporting is an outcome of integrated thinking.

À la prochaine…

Bonjour à toutes et à tous, merci à Leo Strine de rappeler cette évidence : les CA doivent se préoccuper des parties prenantes ! Dans son article « Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from My Hometown », Leo Strine s’appuie sur une analyse historique ô combien intéressante… À lire de toute urgence

Le message est clair (j’ai extrait deux phrases qui me semblent ne prêter guère le flanc à la critique) :

• This article is the first in a series considering a rather tired argument in corporate governance circles, that corporate laws that give only rights to stockholders somehow implicitly empower directors to regard other constituencies as equal ends in governance.
• DuPont’s board knew that only one corporate constituency — the stockholders — called the shots and that they were expected to make their end investors’ best interests, even if that meant hurting other constituencies. The DuPont saga isn’t a story about bad people, but a reminder to those with genuine concern for non-shareholder constituencies to face the truth and support changes in the power dynamics affecting corporate governance that make due regard for non-shareholder constituencies a required obligation for the conduct of business.

Using recent events in the corporate history of E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company—more commonly referred to today as DuPont—as a case study, this article makes the point that the board of directors is elected by only one constituency—stockholders—and that core power structure translates into corporate purpose. DuPont is an American icon, creator of household names like Nylon and Mylar, which prided itself on its core values, which included commitments to the safety and health of the communities in which DuPont operated and to treat its employees with dignity and respect. But when an activist investor came, DuPont reacted by preemptively downsizing—cutting jobs, and spinning off assets. After winning the proxy fight, DuPont failed to meet the aggressive earnings it used in its campaign. More job cuts came, the CEO was replaced with a member of her proxy fight slate, and DuPont soon embraced a merger consistent with the activists’ goals. At the same time, DuPont demanded tax and other incentives from the affected community it had asked to rally around it in the proxy fight. It did all this even though at no time was there a threat of a lawsuit or judicial intervention from unhappy shareholders. The DuPont saga illustrates how power dictates purpose in our corporate governance system. DuPont’s board knew that only one corporate constituency—the stockholders—called the shots and that they were expected to make their end investors’ best interests, even if that meant hurting other constituencies. The DuPont saga isn’t a story about bad people, but a reminder to those with genuine concern for non-shareholder constituencies to face the truth and support changes in the power dynamics affecting corporate governance that make due regard for non-shareholder constituencies a required obligation for the conduct of business.

À la prochaine…

Ivan Tchotourian