objectifs de l’entreprise | Page 4

Nouvel article sur la raison d’être par Martin Lipton et al. : « On the Purpose and Objective of the Corporation » (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 5 août 2020).

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Recent events—notably including the pandemic, its disparate impact on various segments of society, and the focus on inequality and injustice arising in the wake of the death of George Floyd—have accelerated the conversation on corporate purpose. The result has been substantial, salutary reflection about the role that corporations play in creating and distributing economic prosperity and the nexus between value and values.

For our part, we have supported stakeholder governance for over 40 years—first, to empower boards of directors to reject opportunistic takeover bids by corporate raiders, and later to combat short-termism and ensure that directors maintain the flexibility to invest for long-term growth and innovation. We continue to advise corporations and their boards that—consistent with Delaware law—they may exercise their business judgment to manage for the benefit of the corporation and all of its stakeholders over the long term.

In looking beyond the disruption caused by the pandemic, boards and corporate leaders have an opportunity to rebuild with the clarity and conviction that come from articulating a corporate purpose, anchored in a holistic understanding of the key drivers of their business, the ways in which those drivers shape and are shaped by values, and the interdependencies of multiple stakeholders that are essential to the long-term success of the business.

This opportunity leads us to reiterate and refine a simple formulation of corporate purpose and objective, as follows:

The purpose of a corporation is to conduct a lawful, ethical, profitable and sustainable business in order to ensure its success and grow its value over the long term. This requires consideration of all the stakeholders that are critical to its success (shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and communities), as determined by the corporation and its board of directors using their business judgment and with regular engagement with shareholders, who are essential partners in supporting the corporation’s pursuit of its purpose. Fulfilling purpose in such manner is fully consistent with the fiduciary duties of the board of directors and the stewardship obligations of shareholders.

This statement of corporate purpose is broad enough to apply to every business entity, but at the same time supplies clear guideposts for action and engagement. The basic objective of sustainable profitability recognizes that the purpose of for-profit corporations includes creation of value for investors. The requirement of lawful and ethical conduct ensures generally recognized standards of corporate social compliance. Going further, the broader mandate to take into account all corporate stakeholders, including communities, is not limited to local communities, but comprises society and the economy at large and directs boards to exercise their business judgment within the scope of this broader responsibility. The requirement of regular shareholder engagement acknowledges accountability to investors, but also the shared responsibility of shareholders for responsible long-term corporate stewardship.

Fulfilling this purpose will require different approaches for each corporation depending on its industry, history, regulatory environment, governance and other factors. We expect that board committees—focusing on stakeholders, ESG issues and the stewardship obligations of shareholders— will be useful or even necessary for some companies. But for all the differences among companies, there is an important unifying commonality: corporate action, taken against the backdrop of this formulation of corporate purpose, will be fully protected by the business judgment rule, so long as decisions are made by non-conflicted directors acting upon careful consideration and deliberation.

Executed in this way, stakeholder governance will be a better driver of long-term value creation and broad-based prosperity than the shareholder primacy model. Directors and managers have the responsibility of exercising their business judgment in acting for the corporate entity that they represent, balancing its rights and obligations and taking into account both risks and opportunities over the long term, in regular consultation with shareholders. Directors will not be forced to narrow their focus and act as if any one interest trumps all others, with potentially destructive consequences, but will instead have latitude to make decisions that reasonably balance the interests of all constituencies in a manner that will promote the sustainable, long-term business success of the corporation as a whole.

À la prochaine…

Le 2 août 2020, Christiaan de Brauw a publié un intéressant billet sur l’Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance sous le titre « The Dutch Stakeholder Experience ».

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Lessons learned

The Dutch experience shows that the following lessons are key to make the stakeholder-oriented governance model work in practice.

Embed a clear stakeholder mission in the fiduciary duties of the board

To have a real stakeholder model, the board must have a duty to act in the interests of the business and all the stakeholders, not only the shareholders. In shareholder models there may be some room to consider stakeholder interests. For example, in Delaware and various other US states, the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders may be considered in the context of achieving overall long-term shareholder value creation. In US states with constituency statutes, the board’s discretion is preserved: the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders can be, but do not have to be, taken into account. A meaningful stakeholder model requires the board to act in the interests of the business and all stakeholders. This is a “shall” duty, in the words of Leo Strine and Robert Eccles (see Purpose With Meaning: A Practical Way Forward, Robert G. Eccles, Leo E. Strine and Timothy Youmans, May 16, 2020). Rather than allowing for the possibility that all stakeholders’ interests will be taken into account; it should create a real duty to do so. Since 1971, boards of Dutch companies have had such a “shall” duty to follow a stakeholder mission, similar to that of a benefit corporation in, for example, Delaware.

The stakeholder duty must be clear and realistic for boards in the economic environment in which they operate. To define the contours of such a mission in a clear and practical way is not easy, as the journey of the Dutch stakeholder model shows. Today, the Netherlands has a meaningful and realistically defined fiduciary duty for boards. The primary duty is to promote the sustainable success of the business, focused on long-term value creation, while taking into account the interests of all stakeholders and ESG and similar sustainability perspectives. These principles are broadly similar to the corporate purpose and mission proposed by Martin Lipton and others (see On the Purpose of the Corporation, Martin Lipton, William Savitt and Karessa L. Cain, posted May 27, 2020).

Critics of the stakeholder model sometimes point to the ambiguity and lack of clarity of such a pluralistic model. The developments of the Dutch stakeholder model since its inception show that a pluralistic model can work in practice. By now, Dutch boards’ overriding task is adequately clear and aligned with what is typically expected of a company’s executives: pursuing the strategic direction that will most likely result in long-term and sustainable business success. The Dutch stakeholder model also has a workable roadmap to deal with stakeholders’ interests, particularly if they diverge or cannot all be protected fully at the same time, which necessarily results in trade-offs between stakeholders. A realistic approach to governance acknowledges that a stakeholder model does not mean that boards can or should seek to maximize value for all the stakeholders equally and at the same time. It is simply unrealistic to simultaneously pay (and progressively increase) dividends, increase wages and improve contract terms, while also promoting the success of the business. The Dutch interpretation of the stakeholder model, as developed through practice over decades, boils down to the focus on the sustainable success of the business and long-term value creation. As said above, stakeholders are protected by the board’s duty to prevent disproportionate or unnecessary harm to any class of stakeholders. Boards should avoid or mitigate such harm, for example, by agreeing “non-financial covenants” in a takeover. This makes sense as a way to protect stakeholder interests in a realistic manner, much more so than merely requiring boards—without any further guidance—to create value for all the stakeholders.

A stakeholder-oriented model should also be modern and flexible enough to address and incorporate important developments. The Dutch model is especially well positioned to embrace ESG and similar sustainability perspectives. For example, the Dutch company DSM has successfully illustrated this, while being profitable and attractive for investors. There is growing appreciation that being a frontrunner in ESG is required for sustainable business success. In addition to the fact that ESG is required for continuity of the business model and can often give a company a competitive edge, stakeholders increasingly require it. Simply “doing the right thing”, as an independent corporate goal, is more and more seen as important by (new millennial) employees, customers, institutional investors and other stakeholders.

There is no standard test to determine whether a business has achieved sustainable success. There will be different ways to achieve and measure success for different companies, depending on the respective circumstances. Therefore, the test will always have to be bespoke, implemented by the board and explained to stakeholders.

The Dutch stakeholder model has proven to work quite well in times of crisis, such as today’s Covid-19 crisis, as it bolsters the board’s focus on the survival and continuity of the business. The board must first assess whether there is a realistic chance of survival and continuity of the business. If not, and if insolvency becomes imminent, the board’s duties transform to focus on creditors’ interests, such as preventing wrongful trading and the winding down or restarting of the business in line with applicable insolvency/restructuring proceedings. Driven by the economic reality and the need to survive, in times of crisis, boards typically have more freedom to do what it takes to survive: from pursuing liquidity enhancing measures, implementing reorganizations, suspending dividends to shareholders and payments to creditors and so on. The success of the business remains the overriding aim, and in some cases harm to one or more classes of stakeholders may need to be accepted. In addition, in a true stakeholder model, in times of crisis there may not be sympathy for corporate raiders or activists (so-called “corona profiteers” in the current case) who want to buy listed companies on the cheap. A just say not now defense in addition to the just say no defense will readily be available for boards who are occupied with dealing with the crisis and revaluating the best strategic direction. This idea that during the Covid-crisis protection against activists and hostile bidders may be needed seems to be understood as well by, for example, ISS and Glass Lewis, evidenced by their willingness to accept new poison pills for a one year duration (see, for example, ISS and Glass Lewis Guidances on Poison Pills during COVID-19 Pandemic, Paul J. Shim, James E. Langston, and Charles W. Allen, posted on April 26, 2020).

Teeth to protect the stakeholder mission and appropriate checks and balances

The Netherlands has adopted a model in which matters of strategy are the prerogative of the executive directors under supervision of the non-executive directors or, in the still widely used two-tier system, of the management board under supervision of the supervisory board. Similar to the discretion afforded to directors under Delaware’s business judgment rule, a Dutch board has a lot of freedom to choose the strategic direction of the company. In a dispute, the amount of care taken by the board in the decision-making process will be scrutinized by courts, but normally objectively reasonable decisions will be respected. In the Dutch model the board is the captain of the ship; it is best equipped to determine the course for the business and take difficult decisions on how to serve the interests of stakeholders. Generally, the board has no obligation to consult with, or get the approval of, the shareholders in advance of a decision.

At the same time, in recognition of the significant power that boards have in the Dutch stakeholder model, there should be checks and balances to ensure the board’s powers are exercised in a careful manner, without conflicts of interest and without entrenchment. Non-executive/supervisory directors will need to exercise critical and hands-on oversight, particularly when there are potential conflicts of interest. Further, shareholders and other stakeholders are entitled to hold boards to account: boards need to be able to explain their strategic decisions. Shareholders can use their shareholder rights to express their opinions and preferences. Shareholders can also pursue the dismissal of failing and entrenched boards. Boards need regular renewed shareholder mandates through reappointments. The courts are the ultimate guardian of the stakeholder model. The Dutch Enterprise Chamber at the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, which operates in a comparable manner to the Delaware Chancery Court, is an efficient and expert referee of last resort.

The stakeholder model should not convert to a shareholder model in takeover scenarios. The board should focus on whether a takeover is the best strategic option and take into account the consequences for all the stakeholders. In most cases, the best strategic direction for the business will create the highest valuation of the business. But, and this is a real difference with shareholder models, it should be acknowledged that the stand-alone (or other best strategic) option can be different from the strategic option favored by a majority of the shareholders and the option that creates the most shareholder value. This principle was confirmed by the Dutch Enterprise Chamber in 2017 in the AkzoNobel case.

A meaningful stakeholder model requires teeth. The right governance structures need to be put in place to create and protect the long-term stakeholder mission in the face of short-term market pressure. The reality—in the Netherlands as well as in the US—is that shareholders are the most powerful constituency in the stakeholder universe, with the authority to replace the board. In Dutch practice, various countervailing measures can be used to protect the stakeholder mission. A commonly used instrument is the independent protection foundation, the Dutch poison pill. The independent foundation can exercise a call option and acquire and vote on preference shares. It can neutralize the newly acquired voting power of hostile bidders or activists and is effective against actions geared at replacing the board, including a proxy fight. Once the threat no longer exists, the preference shares are cancelled. These measures have been effective, for example, against hostile approaches of America Movil for KPN (2013) and Teva for Mylan (2015).

Foster a stakeholder mindset, governance and environment

Perhaps the most important prerequisite for a well-functioning stakeholder model is the actual mindset of executives and directors. This mindset drives how they will use their stakeholder powers. Fiduciary duties—also in a stakeholder model—are “open norms” and leave a lot of freedom to boards to pursue the strategic direction and to use their authority as they deem fit. The prevailing spirit and opinions about governance are important, as they influence how powers are interpreted and exercised. As an example, the Dutch requirement that boards need to act in the interest of the company and its business dates from 1971, but that did not prevent boards in the 2000s from seeing shareholders as the first among equals. Today, the body of ideas about governance in the developed world is tending to converge towards stakeholder-oriented governance. This seems to indicate a fundamental change in mindset, not merely a fashionable trend or lip service. Board members with a stakeholder conviction should not be afraid to follow their mission, even if it runs counter to past experience or faces shareholder opposition. Of course, the future will hold the ultimate test for the stakeholder model. Can it, in practice, deliver on its promise to create sustainable success and long-term value and provide better protection for stakeholders? If so, this will create a positive feedback loop in which more boards embrace it.

Stakeholder-based governance models remain works in progress. In order to succeed in the long term, models that grant boards the authority to determine the strategy need to stay viable and attractive for shareholders. Going forward, boards following a stakeholder-based model will likely need to focus more on accountability, for example by concretely substantiating their strategic plans and goals and, where possible, providing the relevant metrics to measure their achievements. In reality, stakeholder models are already attractive for foreign investors: about 90% of investors in Dutch listed companies are US or UK investors. In addition, developments in the definition of the corporate purpose will further refine the stakeholder model. In the Netherlands, there has been a call to action by 25 corporate law professors who argue that companies should act as responsible corporate citizens and should articulate a clear corporate purpose.

To make stakeholder governance work, ideally, all stakeholders are committed to the same mission. It is encouraging that key institutional investors are embracing long-term value creation and the consideration of other stakeholders’ interests, for instance by supporting the New Paradigm model of corporate governance and stewardship codes to that effect. However, the “proof of the pudding” is whether boards can continue to walk the stakeholder talk and pursue the long-term view in the face of short-term pressure, either through generally accepted goals and behavior or, if necessary, countervailing governance arrangements. Today, it is still far from certain whether institutional investors will reject pursuing a short-term takeover premium, even where they consider the offer to be undervalued or not supportive of long-term value creation. Annual bonuses of the deciding fund manager may depend on accepting that offer. Until the behavior of investors in such scenarios respects the principle of long-term value creation, appropriate governance protection is important to prevent a legal pathway for shareholders to impose their short-term goals. Therefore, even in jurisdictions where stakeholder-based approaches have been embraced, and are actually pursued by boards, governance arrangements might need to be changed to make the stakeholder mission work in practice. Clear guidance for boards is needed on what the stakeholder mission is and how to deal with stakeholders’ interests, as well as catering for adequate powers and protection for boards.

The Dutch model, which requires a company to be business success-driven, have a “shall duty” to stakeholders that applies even in a sale of the company, and that recognizes that corporations are dependent on stakeholders for success and have a corresponding responsibility to stakeholders, has been demonstrated to be consistent with a high-functioning economy. By highlighting the Dutch system, however, I do not mean to claim that it is unique. For policymakers who are considering the merits of a stakeholder-based governance model, the Dutch system should be seen as one example among many corporate governance systems in successful market economies (such as Germany) that embrace this form of stakeholder-based governance. There is likely no one-size-fits-all approach; each jurisdiction should find the tailor-made model that works best for it, like perhaps the introduction of the corporate purpose in the UK and France. In any event, there is a great benefit in exchanging ideas and learning from experiences in different jurisdictions to find common ground and best practices in order to increase the acceptance and appreciation of stakeholder-oriented governance models.

US governance practices have been, and are, influential around the world. In the 2000s the pendulum in developed countries, including to some extent in the Netherlands, clearly swung in the direction of shareholder-centric governance as championed in the US. In the current environment, if the US system’s focus on shareholders is not adjusted to protect stakeholder interests, it may over time perhaps become an outlier among many of the world’s leading market economies that in one way or the other have adopted a stakeholder approach. Adjustment towards stakeholder governance seems certainly possible in the US, for example through the emerging model of corporate governance, the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation. The benefit corporation seems to have many if not all of the key attributes of the Dutch system and could provide a promising path forward if American corporate governance is to change in a way that makes the US model truly focused on the long-term value for all stakeholders. The question for US advocates of stakeholder governance is whether they will embrace it, or adopt another effective governance change, and make their commitment to respect stakeholders rea

À la prochaine…

Alors que les entreprises se relancent péniblement, un rappel de ces mots du Forum économique mondial d’avril 2020 paraît adéquat (histoire de ne pas oublier et de ne pas faire primer l’économique et le financier sur toute autre considération).

Déclaration « Stakeholder Principles in the COVID Era »

As business leaders, we are experiencing how profoundly the COVID-19 emergency is affecting the world. Our employees face health risks in their daily lives, and challenges in performing their jobs. Our ecosystem of suppliers and customers is under extreme pressure. By doing all we can to coordinate our work, we can ensure that our society and economy get through this crisis and we can mitigate its negative impact on all of our stakeholders.

We accept our responsibility to address these crises. The first priority is to win the war against coronavirus. We need to do that while doing all we can to help our stakeholders now and, at the same time, to avoid a prolonged economic impact in the future. We will continue to embody “stakeholder capitalism” and do all we can to help those who are affected, and help secure our common prosperity.

To this end, we endorse the following Stakeholder Principles in the COVID Era:

− To employees, our principle is to keep you safe: We will continue do everything we can to protect your workplace, and to help you to adapt to the new working conditions

− To our ecosystem of suppliers and customers, our principle is to secure our shared business continuity: We will continue to work to keep supply chains open and integrate you into our business response

− To our end consumers, our principle is to maintain fair prices and commercial terms for essential supplies

− To governments and society, our principle is to offer our full support: We stand ready and will continue to complement public action with our resources, capabilities and know-how

− To our shareholders, our principle remains the long-term viability of the company and its potential to create sustained value

Finally, we also maintain the principle that we must continue our sustainability efforts unabated, to bring our world closer to achieving shared goals, including the Paris climate agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda. We will continue to focus on those long-term goals.

The world has gone through other crises. As a global community, we will prevail this time as well. But, to do so, we must all bond together and coordinate our response. As business leaders, we pledge to stand at society’s service, to help preserve and rebuild a viable society and economy, and to do all we can for our stakeholders.

À la prochaine…

La crise sanitaire à laquelle le monde entier assiste depuis le début de l’année continue d’avoir des conséquences à grande échelle. Au-delà du secteur sanitaire, l’économie mondiale est bouleversée. Cette réalité contraint les États à penser au soutien de l’économie et au renflouement des pertes énormes des derniers mois. À cette fin, les sociétés publiques du Québec demeurent un allié important, car elles jouent un rôle essentiel dans l’exécution des objectifs stratégiques du gouvernement. La pandémie a (re) mis en valeur le rôle du secteur public dans la protection des vies[1].

Le gouvernement n’a pas ménagé ses efforts pour minimiser les dégâts de la pandémie. Il a décidé du maintien des activités des entreprises désignées comme essentielles, concernant aussi bien les entreprises privées  (pharmacies, entreprises de production alimentaire…) que celles de propriété étatique (Société des Alcools et de cannabis, Hydro-Québec, hôpitaux, services de police, etc..).  .

Au Québec, comment le gouvernement pourvoit et accompagne les entreprises ?  Dans la ville de Montréal par exemple, les entreprises privées ou d’économie sociale ont récemment bénéficié d’un soutien financier d’urgence  du gouvernement[2], d’un report des moratoires (taxes et dettes), et un plan de relance est globalement annoncé. Le soutien technique et le virage au numérique se fera avec le concours de certaines OBNL.

En ce qui concerne les sociétés d’État à vocation commerciales – qui sont particulières par leur double objectif commercial et d’intérêt public -, on s’interroge sur les mesures prises les incluant pour faire face au coronavirus. L’incontournable question de la bonne gouvernance se pose, mais sous un prisme totalement différent. L’État-actionnaire est attendu au niveau du soutien des entreprises du secteur privé et public, et au niveau de son efficacité à répondre aux besoins des citoyens en temps de crise. Il n’est pas ici question de convoquer ou de remettre en question les règles de gestion ou de fonctionnement des entreprises publiques, ni leur contrôle. Il s’agit plutôt de visualiser dans quelles mesures ces instruments de l’État se sont montrées contributrices à la gestion de la crise sanitaire ou au soutien de l’économie en souffrance. La société d’État a des objectifs commerciaux et d’intérêt public. C’est sous ces deux axes que nous tenterons de visualiser l’impact de la COVID-19 sur ces entreprises de propriété gouvernementale.

Plus ou moins de ventes…

Une chose est sure, les revenus habituellement générés par les sociétés d’État seront loin des prévisions annuelles. De l’avis de Julien Arsenault, les sociétés d’État seront beaucoup moins « généreuses » pour les coffres du Québec en ces temps de crise. Les cas d’Hydro-Québec, de la SAQ (Société des Alcools du Québec) et de Loto Québec sont parlants. La société de distribution de l’énergie affiche un taux de consommation en baisse de 4,45%[3] depuis le 13 mars dernier. Certains syndicats ont demandé la suspension des factures d’Hydro-Québec.[4].

Les dividendes habituellement versées (4,6 milliards en 2017 selon le rapport de l’Institut sur la Gouvernance d’Organisations Privées et Publiques et 4.8 milliards pour l’année financière en cours) est, selon Marie-Soleil Tremblay, « non-négligeable ». Joint au téléphone par le journaliste, la professeure à l’Ecole nationale d’administration publique recommande aux entreprises publiques d’effectuer des mises à jour sur leurs prévisions afin de mieux estimer l’impact de leurs budgets révisés sur les finances publiques.

Mais la crise a des effets contraires. Certaines sociétés comme la SAQ et Loto Québec ne sont pas autant concernées par la baisse des ventes. Dans son article, Julien Arsenault mentionne que la SAQ serait à même de reverser davantage que le 1.2 milliard prévu.

Quoiqu’il en soit, le secteur économique perd de son équilibre. Les dirigeants des sociétés d’État ont opté pour la prudence dans leur sorties, car il pour l’instant difficile d’évaluer les pertes réelles d’une crise qui sévit encore. Chaque entreprise ira de sa propre stratégie pour se prémunir contre des résultats trop négatifs.

…Mais un soutien infaillible pour la continuité de l’État

Pour les sociétés d’État, tout n’est pourtant pas qu’une question de chiffres, leur essence réside aussi dans leur contribution à fournir au public des solutions, comme c’est le cas en cas de crise sanito-financière. A ce titre, la Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec a répondu présente, en annonçant pour sa part un soutien d’une valeur de 4 milliards, apporté aux entreprises affectées sous certaines conditions[5]. En sus, Québec a mis en place un plan de relance. Ce projet, appuyé par la Banque Nationale, consiste en la création d’un fonds de capital-actions pour stimuler le redémarrage économique après la crise[6].

Plus tôt en avril 2020, le gouvernement avait dévoilé par l’intermédiaire de son premier Ministre François Legault, puis des ministres des finances et de l’économie, que la société d’Etat Investissement Québec était prête à soutenir les entreprises.

Quoique tous les secteurs ne puissent en l’état actuel de la crise être soutenus par le gouvernement du Québec, il faut observer que malgré les critiques (notamment les montants alloués et les conditions d’admissibilité), les sociétés d’État semblent faire bonne figure dans la gestion de la crise. Par les incitations à consommer local, par le soutien logistique pour les entreprises développant le service à distance, et par les prêts à taux d’intérêt réduits, l’État plie mais ne rompt pas la continuité de la vie économique au Québec.

Globalement, le ministre Girard a indiqué que le gouvernement du Québec aura accordé 11 milliards en aide aux individus et aux entreprises, ce qui équivaut à 2,5% de son PIB. Néanmoins, du côté des politiques, certains observateurs ont soulevé la facilité excessive du gouvernement à se servir de la finance publique pour gérer une crise mal maitrisée.

[1] Vitor Gaspar, Paulo Medas, John Ralyea, Les entreprises publiques à l’ère de la COVID-19, Fonds Monétaire International, 7 Mai 2020.

[2] « COVID-19 : Mesures en soutien aux entreprises montréalaises », via www.montréal.ca, consulté le 13 Juillet 2020. Les petites et moyennes entreprises du Québec seront admissibles à recevoir un soutien financier d’un montant inférieur à 50.000 $, cette aide est accordée sous forme de prêt au taux d’intérêt de 3%.

[3] Julien Arsenault, « Des sociétés d’Etat moins généreuses pour les coffres du Québec », dans La Presse Canadienne, 12 Juillet 2020, www.ledroit.com.

[4] Caroline Plante, « Québec annonce un plan d’urgence de 2,5 milliards », dans La Presse Canadienne, 19 Mars 2020.

[5] Les conditions évoquées sont liées à la rentabilité des entreprises avant la crise, le montant du soutien requis supérieur ou égal à 5millions, et la justification d’un potentiel de croissance intéressant.

[6] François Desjardins, « Québec mettra 100 millions dans un fonds pour les PME », dans Le Devoir, du 12 juillet 2020, www.ledevoir.com.

Intéressante tribune dans La presse par Milville Tremblay : « Faire ce qui est juste » (14 juillet 2020). Cela semble une évidence mais il est bon de le rappeler !

Extrait :

Faire ce qui est juste, c’est placer la barre plus haut que la légalité des décisions et la satisfaction des seuls actionnaires. Même dans l’adversité, on s’attend aujourd’hui à ce que les dirigeants tiennent compte des besoins légitimes de toutes les parties prenantes de l’entreprise : les employés, les clients, les fournisseurs, les gouvernements, la société en général, l’environnement et, bien sûr, les actionnaires.

(…) Considérer ne veut pas dire donner raison à tous ou nuire à personne. Une compagnie n’est pas l’État-providence. Parfois les dirigeants doivent prendre des décisions qui font mal, mais beaucoup dépend de la manière.

L’opinion publique juge sévèrement ceux qui exigent des sacrifices de tous — sans toucher à leurs propres privilèges, comme on l’a vu chez Bombardier.

(…) Le tribunal de l’opinion publique tranche vite et sans appel. La bonne réputation d’une entreprise prend des années à bâtir et se brise en un instant. Non seulement les dirigeants doivent-ils prendre des décisions justes, mais aussi savoir communiquer avec franchise, surtout s’il y a eu faute. Ceux qui espèrent que leurs bourdes passeront inaperçues courent un risque élevé.

Les bailleurs de fonds exercent aussi une pression accrue sur les patrons. Un nombre croissant de grands gestionnaires d’actifs intègrent les dimensions ESG (pour environnement, social et gouvernance) dans la sélection des sociétés en portefeuille. Les grandes caisses de retraite publiques canadiennes, telle la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, sont du nombre. Ces gestionnaires de fonds commencent à retirer leur appui aux dirigeants qui s’entêtent dans l’erreur et aux administrateurs qui les tolèrent, leur adressent des remontrances derrière les portes closes ou préfèrent les actions d’un concurrent, qui fait ce qui est juste.

(…) On s’attend aujourd’hui à ce que les dirigeants saisissent rapidement les changements de valeurs portés par l’air du temps, ce qui n’est pas évident pour ceux qui s’isolent avec des gens qui pensent comme eux. Il est trop tard, s’ils attendent de réagir à ce qui est devenu évident.

En matière de gouvernance, on regrette les trop lents progrès pour faire place aux femmes à la haute direction et dans les conseils d’administration.

Et si on décante le mouvement Black Lives Matters, on réalise que la diversité ne se limite pas au sexe. Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’une question d’équité, mais d’intégrer des perspectives variées pour de meilleures décisions.

Le profit n’est plus une finalité, mais une exigence pour assurer la croissance à long terme de l’entreprise. Sans profit, les sources de capital se tarissent et avec elles la capacité d’investir et d’innover.

Mais au-delà des profits, les dirigeants doivent réfléchir à l’utilité sociale de leur entreprise, comme le recommande la Business Roundtable, une association de PDG américains. Le piège, comme d’autres modes en management, est qu’il n’en résultera qu’un slogan, que les employés découvriront creux.

Le regard des employés est souvent plus cynique que celui du public, car ils sont mieux placés pour déceler les écarts entre le discours et la réalité. Les dirigeants qui posent des gestes cohérents et qui reconnaissent les inévitables manquements ont de meilleures chances de mobiliser leurs troupes. Les travailleurs du savoir, particulièrement les milléniaux, ne s’achètent plus avec un bon salaire et une table de billard. Ils veulent aussi que l’entreprise reflète leurs valeurs.

La crise braque les projecteurs sur la manière dont la gouvernance traite la dimension sociale de l’entreprise, soit les lettres G et S des critères ESG. La préoccupation pour le E de l’environnement n’a pas disparu et j’y reviendrai prochainement.

En effet, la plupart des patrons ont posé des gestes énergiques pour protéger la santé de leurs employés et de leurs clients. Quelques-uns se sont lancés dans la production de matériel de protection sanitaire. Plusieurs ont sabré leur salaire à l’annonce de mises à pied, bien que certains vont se refaire avec de nouvelles options d’achat d’actions à prix déprimé.

Les exemples d’entreprises sur la sellette se multiplient. Facebook fait face au boycottage de grands annonceurs pour n’avoir pas éradiqué les discours haineux de sa plateforme. Adidas est durement critiquée pour étrangler ses fournisseurs. Amazon, dénoncée pour négliger la santé de ses travailleurs durant la pandémie. Plus près de nous, Ubisoft clouée au pilori pour avoir fermé les yeux sur le harcèlement de ses employées. Pas besoin d’être devin pour anticiper les critiques des sociétés qui auront bénéficié de l’aide publique tout en recourant aux paradis fiscaux.

À la prochaine…

Dans « Beware of the Panacea of Stakeholder-friendly Corporate Purposes », le professeur Marco Ventoruzzo propose une critique sévèrement de l’ouverture de la gouvernance d’entreprise aux parties prenantes (Oxford Business Law Blog, 13 avril 2020). À réfléchir…

Extrait :

In this short essay (…), I take issue with the relevance and effectiveness of ’corporate purpose’ as a form of private ordering (eg, as a bylaws provision), or in other sources of soft-law (self-regulation in corporate governance codes, declarations of business associations, etc). I challenge whether these are, in fact, effective tools to induce greater commitment toward stakeholders.

(…) My possible disagreement with Mayer and other similar approaches and initiatives—or, more precisely, with a possible reading of these approaches and initiatives—lays in the excessive trust and emphasis that has been reserved to formulas concerning the purpose of the corporation and their possible consequences. Mayer argues that the corporate contract should include a reference to stakeholders and general social interests beyond value for shareholders, suggesting that this simple trick would have a meaningful impact on business conduct.

(…) The reasons are obvious.

First, these formulas are so broad, vague and ephemeral that they cannot possibly represent a compass for corporate action; they cannot provide meaningful guidance for virtually any specific corporate decision that implies a (legitimate) tradeoff between the interests of different stakeholders. Also, as precedents show, these formulas can be used even less to invoke the violation of directors’ duties and their liability. This conclusion is inevitable because the very essence of the agency relationship, the crucial function of a director or executive, is exactly mediating and balancing the different and often conflicting interests that converge on the corporation in an uncertain and evolving scenario. The idea of constraining the necessary discretion of directors within the boundaries of a simple purpose declaration is no better than the idea of writing in the contract with a painter that her work must be a masterpiece. Such an attempted shortcut to real value is self-evidently flawed.

Second, multiplying the goals and interests that directors must or can pursue, if it can have any effect at all, by definition increases their flexibility and discretion and makes it easier to justify, ex ante and ex post, very different choices. Without being cynical, from this perspective it is not surprising that these formulas are often welcomed, if not sponsored, by business associations and interest groups linked to managers, executives and entrenched shareholders.

Third, self-regulation and private ordering are often a way to avoid or delay the adoption of more stringent statutory or regulatory provisions. The former might be more or less effective, but they might also create an illusion of responsibility. The risk of putting too much trust into the beneficial consequences of these formulas is a disregard for more biting mandatory provisions, which may be necessary to avoid externalities and other market failures.

À la prochaine…