Valeur actionnariale vs. sociétale | Page 4

C’est sous ce titre que les professeurs Gatti et Ondersma amène à une réflexion critique sur l’ouverture de l’objectif des entreprises à la théorie des parties prenantes : « Can a Broader Corporate Purpose Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder Approach Chimera » (4 mars 2020).

Extrait (tiré de l’entrevue suivante « Can a Broader Corporate Purpose Redress Inequality? » :

Our paper also rebuts the premise that shareholder primacy is a key contributor to economic stagnation and inequality. To be sure, shareholder primacy may have contributed to concentration and monopsony in labor markets, excessive executive compensation, the decline in workers’ prerogatives, and tax cuts. But so might the stakeholder approach. Note that a stakeholder approach can hardly fix the central drivers of stagnation and inequality. Globalization, technology, and education cannot be addressed by corporate boardrooms alone. Similarly, collective action dynamics suggest that we cannot expect boards to retreat from further concentration. Experiences with constituency statutes and the battles between large corporations and organized labor tell us that boards won’t improve worker protections without regulation. Implementing legislative or regulatory measures would be much more effective in addressing stagnation and inequality than would be a change in corporate purpose.

In fact, stakeholderism is likely counter-productive. It would give corporations both a sword and a shield with which to defend the status quo.

First, managers and directors can play offense by expanding lobbying efforts, purportedly in the interest of all stakeholders, thus risking corporate capture of the reformist agenda. Second, corporations can deploy stakeholderism defensively by arguing that no direct regulation is needed.  Like others, we take a cynical view of the Business Roundtable’s Statement on Corporate Purpose and Martin Lipton’s “New Paradigm,” which includes regulatory preemption as an express purpose. Meanwhile, a switch to a stakeholder approach would require diverting momentum for change into significant political capital in order for it to be adopted – and once adopted, enshrined in against further change.  Thus, the pursuit of a stakeholder approach would deplete time, energy, and resources necessary to pass reforms to reduce inequality, such as tax, antitrust, and labor measures – precisely the changes most likely to meaningfully distribute power and resources to employees and other weaker constituents.

The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbates this concern.  As many businesses cannot survive without government aid, some have accepted conditions for receiving bailout money, primarily with respect to stock buy-backs and dividend payouts. We speculate that, at some point, businesses might find it convenient to simply offer, in exchange for further government relief, a formal adoption of a stakeholder approach in their charter.  This would preempt more onerous restrictions while preserving the status quo.

As disastrous as the current economic situation is, it also offers a rare opportunity to rethink and possibly reset certain policies. There is little choice but to depart from the tradition of tinkering with corporate governance and instead identify more effective tools to address inequality (mainly in labor, antitrust, and tax laws). This will undoubtedly require greater collaboration across fields and disciplines.

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Martin Lipton, William Savitt et Karessa L. Cain ont publié sur le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance un intéressant papier intitulé : « On the Purpose of the Corporation » (27 mai 2020).

Extrait :

The growing view that corporations should take into account environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues in running their businesses, and resistance from those who believe that companies should be managed solely to maximize share price, has intensified the focus on the more fundamental question of corporate governance: what is the purpose of the corporation?

The question has elicited an immense range of proposed answers. The British Academy’s Future of the Corporation Project, led by Colin Mayer, suggests that the purpose of the corporation is to provide profitable solutions to problems of people and planet, while not causing harm. The Business Roundtable has articulated a fundamental commitment of corporations to deliver value to all stakeholders, each of whom is essential to the corporation’s success. Each of the major US-based index funds has also expressed their views about the purpose of the corporations in which they invest, which, considered collectively, can be summarized as the pursuit of sustainable business strategies that take into account ESG factors in order to drive long-term value creation. On the other hand, the Council of Institutional Investors, some leading economists and law professors, and some activist hedge funds and other active investors continue to advocate a narrow scope of corporate purpose that is focused exclusively on maximizing shareholder value. The Covid-19 pandemic has brought into sharp focus the inequality in our society that, in considerable measure, is attributable to maximizing shareholder value at the expense of employees and communities.

For our part, we have supported stakeholder governance for over 40 years—first, to empower boards of directors to reject opportunistic takeover bids by corporate raiders, and later to combat short-termism and ensure that directors maintain the flexibility to invest for long-term growth and innovation. We continue to advise corporations and their boards that they may exercise their business judgment to manage for the benefit of all stakeholders over the long term.

As the pandemic disrupts settled expectations and provokes fresh perspectives, we believe it is critical to the vitality of our economic system for corporations—and the asset managers and investors who hold their shares—to recognize that ESG and stakeholder purpose are necessary elements of sustainable business success, and to engage on a regular basis to rationalize their views as to governance and stewardship. The roadmap for this shared understanding is elaborated in The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implied Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, which we developed for the World Economic Forum in 2016.

These imperatives lead us to a simple formulation of corporate purpose:

The purpose of a corporation is to conduct a lawful, ethical, profitable and sustainable business in order to create value over the long-term, which requires consideration of the stakeholders that are critical to its success (shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and communities), as determined by the corporation and the board of directors using its business judgment and with regular engagement with shareholders, who are essential partners in supporting the corporation’s pursuit of this mission.

This conception of purpose is broad enough to apply to every business entity but at the same time supplies clear principles for action and engagement. The basic objective of sustainable profitability recognizes that the purpose of for-profit corporations is to create value for investors. The requirement of lawful and ethical conduct ensures minimum standards of corporate social compliance. Going further, the broader mandate to take into account corporate stakeholders—including communities, which is not limited to local communities, but comprises society and the economy at large—directs boards to exercise their business judgment within the scope of this broader responsibility. The requirement of regular shareholder engagement acknowledges accountability to investors, but also shared responsibility with shareholders for responsible long-term corporate stewardship.

Fulfilling this purpose will require different approaches for each corporation, dependent on its industry, history, governance and other factors. We expect that board committees—focusing on stakeholders, ESG issues and the stewardship obligations of shareholders—may be useful or even necessary for some companies. But for all the differences among companies, there is an important unifying commonality: corporate action, taken against the backdrop of this view of corporate purpose, will be fully protected by the business judgment rule, so long as it reflects the decisions of unconflicted directors acting upon careful deliberation.

Executed in this way, stakeholder governance is more consistent with a value-creation mandate than the shareholder primacy model. Directors and managers enjoy broad authority to act for the corporate entity they represent, over the long term, balancing its many rights and obligations and taking into account both risks and opportunities, in regular consultation with shareholders. Directors will not be forced to act as if any one interest trumps all others, with potentially destructive consequences, but will instead have latitude to make decisions that reasonably balance the interests of all constituencies and operate to the benefit of the sustainable, long-term business success of the corporation as a whole.

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En voilà tout un titre ! Le professeur Brian Cheffins livre tout un article sur SSRN : « Brian R. Cheffins, « Stop Blaming Milton Friedman! », 11 mars 2020, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 9/2020.

Résumé :

A 1970 New York Times essay on corporate social responsibility by Milton Friedman is often said to have launched a shareholder-focused reorientation of managerial priorities in America’s public companies. The essay correspondingly is a primary target of those critical of a shareholder-centric approach to corporate governance. This paper argues that it is erroneous to blame (or credit) Milton Friedman for the rise of shareholder primacy in corporate America. In order for Friedman’s views to be as influential as has been assumed, his essay should have constituted a fundamental break from prevailing thinking that changed minds with some alacrity. In fact, what Friedman said was largely familiar to readers in 1970 and his essay did little to change managerial priorities at that point in time. The shareholder-first mentality that would come to dominate in corporate America would only take hold in the mid-1980s. This occurred due to an unprecedented wave of hostile takeovers rather than anything Friedman said and was sustained by a dramatic shift in favor of incentive-laden executive pay. Correspondingly, the time has come to stop blaming him for America’s shareholder-oriented capitalism.

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Article sympathique à lire de Suren Gomtsian intitulé : « When Businesses Can Do Good: Lessons from the Coronavirus Crisis for Promoting Responsible Business Practices » (Oxford Business Law Blog).

Extrait :

Universal threats can unite opposing camps in a common effort. The new coronavirus has hit almost every country and has created a shared understanding that every effort to contribute, however small it may be, is needed to overcome the crisis. Many businesses, typically criticised for giving priority to profits and to the interests of shareholders and managers, are part of the common response to the virus.

(…)

It is very unlikely that the virus has suddenly changed the corporate world. Clearly, the motivations of businesses for doing good may differ. While some have a genuine sense about their role in fighting the virus and helping those in need, many others view the crisis as a well-calculated opportunity to amend their battered reputations as partners and employers and gain advantage over competitors once the pandemic is over. But regardless of the motivations, the reaction of the corporate world to the pandemic offers three lessons for the promotion of responsible business practices in normal times.

First, in the absence of legislative action, change in corporate behaviour happens when there is broad consensus in society that collective action in response to a threat is an urgent priority. It is not poor ethics or morals that hold businesses back from working together with other parts of society, but disagreements about the scale and urgency of the problem. The collective response to coronavirus is the result of a broadly shared agreement on what companies are expected to do in the crisis that has emerged in almost every affected nation. Remarkably, companies are behaving differently even in the absence of legal reforms – laws on corporate purpose and directors’ duties are the same today as they were at the outset of the crisis.

Company founders and managers are a diverse group, and so are their preferences. Some may have serious concerns about global challenges facing humanity, such as inequality—whether of income, gender, race, or opportunities—or climate risks. But even these businesses may struggle in behaving responsibly because of concerns about becoming uncompetitive against less enlightened businesses. The classic collective action problem forces would-be responsible businesses to make the rational decision of ignoring inequality and environmental problems.

Where market failures like this are strong, the usual response is government intervention, for example, through the adoption of stricter employment protections or environmental standards. The reaction to the virus shows the power of a decentralized solution to the problem through collective social backlash. By increasing the costs of ignorant behaviour, broad society consensus promotes responsible business practices across markets and nations.

Second, businesses need clear guidelines as to what practical steps they are expected to take to meet the common goal. Governments have been clear about their expectations from businesses during the COVID-19 crisis by recommendations to preserve employment, cut dividends and share buybacks, and lower rents by property owners. Similarly, society in general has been sending clear signals about the expected behaviour by approving some actions taken by companies and showing discontent over undesired conduct in the form of widespread backlash.

For example, when Johnson & Johnson, a medical company, announced plans to invest US $1bn in developing a COVID-19 vaccine, the company’s shares jumped despite the not-for-profit nature of the project. By contrast, the decision by Sports Direct to keep shops open as essential or the decision by Adidas to skip rental payments on its stores led to public outcry and calls to boycott products in tabloid and social media. Similarly, the reluctance by the UK’s largest banks and German carmakers to cut dividends raised many eyebrows. Not only were some of these companies forced to apologize and reverse course, but their reputations were damaged too. Widely shared public reaction can thus send a clear message to all other businesses what to do and how not to behave.

Third, developing consensus over global challenges requires international cooperation. The exceptional scale of the current crisis coupled with the fear that governments responding to the crisis differently to others will face fierce questions explains why, even in the absence of coordination, all nations individually have acted similarly. But countries are likely to be affected differently, at least in the short run, on many other important matters. For example, the degree of underlying inequality varies across countries and some countries experience more acute climate-related risks, like forest fires or rising sea levels, than other nations. This means that atomistic development of consensus through peer pressure, unlike in the case of COVID-19, is highly unlikely. Local action, meanwhile, cannot offer meaningful solutions because markets are still global and responsible governments and businesses will not be able to compete if others do not act similarly.

To sum up, if we want businesses to act responsibly, we need to deliver a clear message by developing consensus over global challenges and communicating it clearly to businesses as one shared global voice. We also need to set out what practical steps businesses need to take to achieve the common goal – whether through government nudges or endorsements in social and news media. Where threats affect nations differently, this can be achieved only through cooperation on a global scale. Given the rise of national sovereign interests and national governments, we are facing a huge task in developing broad consensus on matters that are important. The arrival of responsible capitalism may thus take time. For now, until this consensus is formed, blame us and our elected governments, not businesses, for the failures of capitalism.

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Bel article qui amène à réfléchir : Akshaya Kamalnath, « Shareholder Primacy in the Time of Coronavirus », Oxford Business Law Blog, 7 avril 2020.

Extrait :

It has become fashionable in these troubled times to write about how the coronavirus (or Covid-19) situation shows that the writer’s favourite policies are the best ones. Trite as it may be, I don’t want to miss the opportunity to explain and defend shareholder primacy as a theory / principle followed in corporate law.

Do companies have an ethical obligation to take care of employees during the coronavirus pandemic? If not, why are companies asking employees to work from home and even paying employees when they are not coming in to work? Even companies in the gig economy like Uber are stepping up and offering unexpected support to their drivers whom they have refused to consider as employees. For instance, Uber announced that it would offer 14 days of financial assistance to drivers affected by Covid-19. Similarly, to accommodate the demand from workplaces and educational institutions to switch to working online, tech companies like Google, Microsoft, and Zoom have begun offering some of their products’ features for free. Why are they going well beyond what current laws require them to do?

Have they begun to embrace stakeholderism (the idea that companies should service all stakeholders equally) and, if so, can we expect such continued benefits being offered to employees in need even after the pandemic has passed? I’d answer both parts of this question in the negative. In my view, these companies are guided by shareholder primacy (the idea that shareholder interests have primacy over that of other stakeholders).

The first and most obvious reason is that shareholders would want directors of the company they have invested in to step up to the occasion when a crisis as big as a pandemic is staring us in the face. While it is normally assumed that shareholder interests translate into profit-making or wealth maximization, intelligent directors would understand that a crisis calls for a different understanding of what shareholders want. The second possible reason for companies to act in the interests of stakeholders at this time is to enhance their reputation. A company making accommodations during a time of crisis might forego some profits in the short-term but will have reputational gains in the long term. The consideration of reputational incentives is not to suggest that companies acting altruistically should be seen as cynical. On the contrary, it is laudable that the directors of these companies have acted in the interests of the company by taking care of relevant stakeholders when it was most needed. The fact that company reputation was one of the variables in the calculus should be noted positively because that shows that shareholder primacy ensures companies act in the interests of other stakeholders when it is most essential. A third reason is that by offering benefits to employees (or independent contractors as in the case of Uber’s drivers) or customers as in the case of the tech companies, the companies have ensured that the relevant stakeholders (customers and employees / independent contractors) would want to work or continue to work with these companies.

If shareholder primacy leads to beneficial outcomes, why is it so reviled? Shareholder primacy is often confused with a myopic focus on short-term profits. To be sure, the company law of most countries requires directors to act in the best interests of the company and, in determining which interests within the company are to be prioritised, to give primacy to that of shareholders. The default assumption is that most shareholders would want to maximise the wealth that they have invested in the company. However, it is left to directors to consider other relevant interests where they are in the best interests of the company. As I have argued above, it was clearly in the interests of the company to prioritise various stakeholders’ interests and act accordingly, and in this instance they have acted accordingly. Not every situation has such an easy answer and so it is left to directors to choose the course of action best suited to the company, with the interests of shareholders being ultimately prioritised.

What happens after the pandemic has passed? While the coronavirus situation is a big crisis and companies have been stepping up, decisions prioritising the interests of one stakeholder over those of others are routine, even in calmer situations, or where a company alone is facing a crisis of some sort. Take for example, employees’ complaints about toxic work culture and harassment, which we now know was the case with Uber in the past. Often the response is to keep the issue under wraps or refuse to address the particular stakeholder’s needs. This unsavoury behaviour cannot however be attributed to either shareholder primacy or stakeholderism. We would expect that shareholders would want companies to clean their house as soon as they know there is trouble so that they are not at the receiving end of the law suit at a later date and, more importantly, because shareholders would want talented employees to be retained within the company. Unfortunately, the unsavoury behaviour is simply an expression of human nature in some cases and better incentives to prevent such behaviour need to be devised. Similarly, for concerns of other stakeholders, the environment for instance, environment protection and climate change laws would constrain directors’ actions rather than relying on principles of either shareholder primacy or stakeholderism to do the job.

All this is to say that there are problems with how companies are run and we need innovative solutions to create better incentives rather than falling back on paying lip service to stakeholderism as the Business Roundtable recently did in its 2019 statement.

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Bonjour à toutes et à tous, on revient toujours aux B Corporation notamment la Public Benefit Corporation du Delaware ! Voici une des premières études empiriques menées sur le sujet : Michael B. Dorff, James Hicks et Steven Solomon Davidoff , « The Future or Fancy? An Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations » (4 février 2020).

Une belle question que se posent les auteurs : Using our novel dataset, we can discern whether for-profit investment is occurring in PBCs, and if so, whether it is different in kind from ordinary early stage investment.

Extrait :

The PBC has stirred much debate and speculation about the future of
the corporation. Some have called it the future while others decried the
form as mere public relations or purpose washing. In this article we
have attempted to add data to the debate. Using a hand-collected
sample of all Delaware-registered PBCs that received investment
between 2013 and 2018 we examine whether PBCs are the future or
mere fancy.
We find that neither hypothesis holds. Instead, we find that there are
295 PBCs which have received investment from VC funds amounting
to over $2.5 billion in the aggregate. This investment is significant
because it shows that the PBC form is not a failure and that it is
capable of attracting for-profit investment, a marker of success. This
investment is coming not just from pro-social VCs but from top-tier
firms.
Nonetheless, we also find that PBCs are being funded over a wide
range of mostly consumer-focused industries (banking, food,
education, technology, and more), implying that the form is a
secondary consideration to the for-profit motive. In other words, the
PBC form is most likely to receive VC funding when the PBC’s
business strategy suggests the form will benefit a for-profit mission.
Our evidence also suggests that PBC round sizes are smaller than their
purely profit-seeking peers, implying that VCs are taking less risk with
these forms than with traditional corporations.
Ultimately, we theorize that, based on our findings, the future course
of the PBC is uncertain.

À la prochaine…