engagement et activisme actionnarial | Page 5

Dans ReadClear Markets, Bernard Sharfman critique la dernière position prise par BlackRock : « Does BlackRock’s Shareholder Activism Breach Its Fiduciary Duties? ».

Extrait :

In Larry Fink’s (CEO of BlackRock) most recent letter to CEOs, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, Fink lays out a strategy for how BlackRock will use its considerable amount of delegated shareholder voting power to dictate its own vision of what a public company’s (a company traded on a U.S. stock exchange or over-the-counter) stakeholder relationships should be. These relationships represent the management of an enormous number of entities and individuals, entailing much complexity. That is why their management is placed in the hands of those who have the knowledge and expertise to manage them: the company’s management team. In this writing, I argue that BlackRock’s implementation of a strategy of interfering with a public company’s stakeholder relationships (“strategy”) is a form of shareholder activism that may breach the fiduciary duties owed to its investors.

As a means to implement its strategy, a strategy that allegedly is meant “to promote long-term value” for its investors, BlackRock will be requiring each public company that it invests in—virtually all public companies—to disclose data on “how each company serves its full set of stakeholders.” Moreover, noncompliance will not be tolerated. According to Fink, “we will be increasingly disposed to vote againstmanagement and board directors when companies are not making sufficient progress on sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and plans underlying them.” Based on first-quarter 2020 data, this threat appears to be playing out in reality.

(…)

But what if BlackRock’s strategy is not really motivated by a desire to enhance shareholder value but to attract the investment funds held by millennials and, at least while they are young, their perceived preference for less financial returns and more social activism? Millennials will increasingly be the ones holding most of the wealth in the U.S., making it essential for advisers like BlackRock to start catering to their needs and developing their loyalty now, not later. This is an argument recently made by corporate governance scholarsMichal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis, and David Webber.

Or what if BlackRock’s strategy is used to appease shareholder activists who attack BlackRock’s management? For example, in November 2019, Boston Trust Walden and Mercy Investment Services submitted a shareholder proposal to BlackRock demanding that it provide a review explaining why its climate-change rhetoric does not correspond with how it actually votes at shareholder meetings. The proposal was reportedly withdrawn after BlackRock agreed to give increased consideration to shareholder proposals on climate change and join Climate Action 100, an investor group that targets its shareholder activism at fossil fuel producers and greenhouse gas emitters.

So while BlackRock’s shareholder activism may be a good marketing strategy, helping it to differentiate itself from its competitors, as well as a means to stave off the disruptive effects of shareholder activism at its own annual meetings, it seriously puts into doubt BlackRock’s sincerity and ability to look out only for its beneficial investors and therefore may violate the duty of loyalty that it owes to its current, and still very much alive, baby-boomer and Gen-X investors.

À la prochaine…

Le quotidien Les Échos.fr vient de faire tomber la nouvelle : « La SEC renonce à sa proposition phare pour limiter le pouvoir les agences de conseil en vote ».

Le gendarme des marchés américains ne veut plus imposer aux agences de conseil en vote de soumettre leurs analyses aux entreprises cotées avant de les envoyer à leurs clients. En revanche, elle veut que les investisseurs arrêtent de voter aux assemblées générales en suivant aveuglément leurs recommandations.

À la prochaine…

Me Jessica Zhang propose un billet de blogue sur l’impact de la COVID-19 sur l’activisme actionnarial au Canada : « Impact of COVID-19 on Shareholder Activism » (7 avril 2020). Comme elle le rappelle aux CA, « Sharp declines in stock prices due to COVID-19 are making companies more vulnerable to shareholder activism and hostile attacks ».

Extrait :

Shareholder Activism in Canada

While shareholder activism is traditionally less prevalent in Canada than in the United States, Canada can be an attractive jurisdiction for shareholder activism due to its shareholder-friendly regulatory framework that includes:

• rights of shareholder to requisition meetings with a 5% ownership interest;
• ability of shareholders to communicate with up to 15 shareholders without the requirement to file and mail proxy solicitation materials or publicly disclose their solicitation intentions;
• ability of shareholders to accumulate 10% of a company’s shares before disclosing their interest;
• ability of shareholders to include proposals on the election of directors in management proxy circulars;
• entitlement to shareholder lists and ability to be reimbursed for costs associated with proxy contests; and
• fewer structural defences in Canada than in the United States.

Preparing for Shareholder Activism

While the primary focus of many companies in the current environment is on their employee health and safety, business continuity and financial stability, boards of directors and management should not lose sight of the potential increases in shareholder activism and be prepared to defend against any hostile attacks.

1. Shareholder Communication and Engagement. Shareholder communication and engagement is crucial to maintaining shareholder confidence. It is important for companies to be able to respond to shareholders in a meaningful manner, address concerns and misinformation and ensure open and transparent communication with their shareholders. A corporation’s board and management should prepare key messages with respect to the impacts of COVID-19 on the company, what steps the company is taking to mitigate the impacts and risks, and address its liquidity needs, the overall health of its business, and the company’s ability to rebound from the crisis. Companies should utilize public disclosure as an opportunity to engage with shareholders and communicate results, strategy, objectives and opportunities in a clear manner to enhance shareholder confidence. It is also important to ensure that the messages delivered provide a transparent assessment of the current and anticipated future impacts of COVID-19 on the company and not to create unrealistic and unreasonable expectations for shareholders.
2. Activist Response Team. Companies should consider establishing an internal team dedicated to dealing with activist shareholders and developing immediate and comprehensive responses to potential shareholder activism. This team should be composed of the most knowledgeable internal resources, including the chief financial officer, general counsel, and additional senior personnel from the finance, investor relations, and corporate communications departments. It should also leverage external resources, including external counsel, proxy solicitation firms, and public relations firms to assist in defending the corporate strategy and objectives, and to co-ordinate coherent and timely responses to shareholders.
3. Monitor and Assess. Management should regularly monitor and review the company’s shareholder base, objectives and investment strategies of the shareholders as well as changes in trading patterns in the company’s stock (e.g. stock surveillance), in order to stay alert to early signs of an opportunistic acquiror. Additionally, management should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the company’s vulnerabilities to shareholder activism and identify any activists that could be potentially interested in targeting the company.
4. Shareholder Rights Plan. A shareholder rights plan, also known as a poison pill, is a defensive measure used by public companies to defend against hostile takeover attempts by third parties. Shareholder rights plans in Canada have not historically been effective in stopping hostile bids but have been effective in providing boards with more time to consider strategic alternatives. In preparation for shareholder activism or takeover threats, companies that do not already have a shareholder rights plan may consider preparing one and keeping it “on the shelf” (fully drafted and ready for adoption). TSX requires the adoption of a shareholder rights plan to be ratified by shareholders within six months of adoption. Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) will generally support a shareholder-approved rights plan that conforms to its “new generation” rights plan best practice guidelines. Similarly, Glass Lewis will generally support shareholder rights plans adopted in response to COVID-19 and the related economic crisis if the plans have a duration limited to one year or less and the company discloses a sound rationale for adoption of the plan as a result of COVID-19.
5. Advance Notice Requirements. An advance notice provision affords protection against a “surprise attack” at or shortly before a shareholders’ meeting as it requires shareholders to provide advance notice to the company if they wish to propose nominees to the board of directors. In preparation for shareholder activism or takeover threats, companies may consider adopting an advance notice board policy or provisions in the articles or bylaws that require advance notice of any intention to propose nominees for directors. ISS and Glass Lewis will generally support advance notice provisions that meet their guidelines.
6. Corporate Governance. Corporate governance weaknesses is one of the attributes that tend to attract activist shareholders. Companies should ensure corporate governance standards are frequently evaluated and strictly followed to prevent activists from exploiting weaknesses or inconsistencies. Management should stay up-to-date on the evolving legal and regulatory developments as well as voting recommendations by proxy advisory firms, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, and consider how to best comply with best practices guidelines.
7. Employee Investment. Employees are generally among the company’s most loyal investors. The decline in stock prices can be an opportunity for companies to revise existing or implement new incentive programs to encourage employee investment in the company by enhancing stock purchase plan provisions and amending long-term incentive compensation plans.

À la prochaine…

Selon le journaliste Martin Vallières de La presse, « les assemblées annuelles en mode virtuel inquiètent les tenants des droits des actionnaires » (21 avril 2020). S’il soulève une question intéressante à laquelle Yvan Allaire apporte un bel éclairage, la vraie question est de se demander s’il y a le choix ? Ce qui m’inquiète plutôt est le futur : cette manière de faire restera-t-elle ? Espérons que non…

Extrait :

« Depuis un bon moment, avant la crise de la COVID-19, certaines entreprises souhaitaient passer à des assemblées d’actionnaires virtuelles en tout ou en partie, en combinant temporairement leur assemblée en personne et en mode virtuel », constate Yvan Allaire, président exécutif de l’Institut sur la gouvernance des organisations publiques et privées (IGOPP).

« La crise de pandémie fournit l’occasion pour les entreprises de tester ce modèle d’assemblée virtuelle en circonstances exceptionnelles. Mais il n’en demeure pas moins que de telles assemblées ne donneront pas pleinement satisfaction aux petits actionnaires. Et pendant que les grands fonds [d’investissement] conservent leurs autres moyens d’accès aux dirigeants et administrateurs des entreprises. »

Expérience troublante

Selon Yvan Allaire, la toute récente expérience des premières assemblées virtuelles parmi les banques canadiennes a mis en lumière les défis à surmonter.

« Si l’on s’en remet aux pratiques mises en place par les banques lors de leurs assemblées en ligne, notamment la transmission d’avance par écrit des questions d’actionnaires pour lecture et réponse durant l’assemblée, c’est bien difficile dans ce contexte pour un actionnaire de demander plus de précision, de contredire la réponse qu’on lui a apportée ou d’indiquer son insatisfaction. »

Du point de vue de Willie Gagnon, directeur du regroupement québécois d’actionnaires militants MEDAC, « si la tenue d’assemblées d’actionnaires en mode virtuel devait perdurer après cette crise de pandémie, on espère que ce qui vient de se passer lors des premières assemblées virtuelles parmi les banques canadiennes ne deviendra pas la norme parmi les autres entreprises influentes en Bourse ».

« Depuis le début d’avril, le MEDAC a participé aux assemblées virtuelles des banques où il détient des actions titres et où il avait soumis une proposition d’actionnaire dûment inscrite dans chacune des circulaires », relate-t-il à La Presse.

« Néanmoins, la conduite très contrôlée de ces assemblées virtuelles a fait que nous n’avons pas eu notre droit de parole habituel pour présenter notre proposition. Et les autres actionnaires ont été réduits à communiquer par écrit leurs interventions qui étaient ensuite lues et commentées par des représentants et des dirigeants de chaque banque. »

L’après-pandémie ?

« La tenue d’une assemblée en mode virtuel ou en ligne plutôt qu’en personne est une précaution raisonnable en crise de pandémie. Cela dit, est-ce que les nombreuses entreprises qui tiendront une assemblée virtuelle pour la première fois donneront à leurs actionnaires les mêmes possibilités d’y participer que s’ils étaient physiquement présents, y compris la possibilité de poser des questions et d’engager le dialogue ? » s’inquiète Kevin Thomas, chef de la direction de l’association SHARE, spécialisée en formation et recherche en droits des actionnaires.

Par ailleurs, « une fois passée la crise de pandémie, plusieurs entreprises voudront sans doute continuer à tenir leurs assemblées d’actionnaires de façon virtuelle et en ligne ».

Toutefois, souligne-t-il à La Presse, « les récentes assemblées virtuelles des banques ont révélé des indices troublants sur la façon dont les droits des actionnaires pourraient être restreints. Par conséquent, nous attendons des entreprises qu’elles s’engagent explicitement à tenir à nouveau leurs assemblées en personne lorsque les préoccupations de santé publique le permettront ».

« Entre-temps, si nous devions constater que des entreprises utilisent délibérément la tenue de leur assemblée en mode virtuel pour restreindre l’accès et la pleine participation de leurs actionnaires, avertit Kevin Thomas, les membres de SHARE se mobiliseraient pour voter contre tous les administrateurs de ces entreprises à la prochaine occasion. »